Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerns a dispute between neighboring property owners in Johnston, Rhode Island. The plaintiffs purchased their property in 1985 and, over the years, cleared and improved a strip of land beside their home, installing features such as a playset, landscaping, and a staging area. The disputed strip lay between their property and the defendant’s property. The defendant bought his property in 2011. In 2013, a survey commissioned by the defendant revealed that some of the plaintiffs’ improvements encroached on the defendant’s land. Tensions escalated, leading to the defendant installing a fence and the plaintiffs filing an action to quiet title based on adverse possession, claiming they had possessed the disputed area for the required statutory period.Proceedings in the Providence County Superior Court included a bench trial, where the main factual dispute centered on whether the plaintiffs’ use of the disputed land was “hostile”—that is, without the permission of the record owner. The trial justice found that the plaintiffs had proved adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence as to a portion of the disputed area beyond an old line of hemlock trees, but not as to the area along the tree line itself. The court found the plaintiffs’ claim to hostility was undermined by evidence that a prior owner may have given them permission to use that area. Final judgment was entered, granting partial relief to each party. Both sides appealed.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment below. The Court held that, contrary to the trial justice’s view, the sale of the servient parcel (i.e., the land that was allegedly permissively used) can terminate prior permission and may render subsequent use hostile for adverse possession purposes. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further factual findings on hostility under the correct legal standard and for clarification on the precise location of the disputed area beyond the hemlock tree line. View "Desrochers v. Micheli" on Justia Law

The case centers on an owner of a waterfront condominium in Newport, Rhode Island, who hired a real estate agency and its agent to find a suitable tenant for his property. The agency presented a candidate, Cynthia Dziurgot, who passed credit and criminal background checks, and the owner entered into a lease with her. After several months, Dziurgot stopped paying rent and refused to vacate the property at the end of the lease, leading to an extended eviction process during the COVID-19 eviction moratorium. The owner later discovered that an internet search would have revealed a history of misconduct and legal issues involving the tenant.The plaintiff filed suit in Newport County Superior Court, alleging breach of contract and negligence by the agency and its agent for allegedly failing to adequately vet the tenant. The plaintiff intended to call a real estate expert to testify that a reasonable real estate professional would have conducted an internet search of the prospective tenant. However, after failing to produce the expert for deposition as agreed in a consent order, the court precluded the plaintiff from offering any expert testimony. The defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the plaintiff could not establish the applicable standard of care for real estate professionals. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the standard of care was not within common knowledge and required expert testimony.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Court held that establishing the standard of care for real estate professionals regarding background searches is not within the common knowledge of laypersons and requires expert testimony. Because the plaintiff was precluded from offering such testimony, summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Hurd v. H & H Real Estate, LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose following a failed real estate transaction involving the sale of a hotel property in Warwick, Rhode Island. The property was to be sold by Shiva, LLC, of which Jay Patel was the registered agent, to LandingPartners LLC under a Purchase and Sale and Discounted Pay-Off Agreement. Centreville Bank held a mortgage on the property, which was in default. When Shiva, Airport Hospitality (another entity linked to Patel), and Patel failed to respond to an earlier lawsuit brought by LandingPartners, the Superior Court entered a default judgment against them, ordering specific performance of their obligations under the agreement and appointing a commissioner to facilitate the closing. Afterward, LandingPartners and Centreville Bank reached a consent order with new terms for the sale and discharged the mortgage, and the case was dismissed with prejudice.Shortly after the dismissal of the first case, Patel filed a new lawsuit in the Washington County Superior Court against LandingPartners, Centreville, and a related entity, 1850 Post Road Owner LLC. He alleged violations of the agreement, fraud, misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were barred by res judicata because they arose from the same transaction addressed in the prior litigation. The Superior Court agreed, finding that the parties or their privies were the same, the issues arose from the same transaction, and there was a final judgment in the first action.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that res judicata barred Patel’s claims, as all issues now raised were or could have been raised in the initial suit, and the new claims concerned the same transaction. The dismissal of Patel’s complaint with prejudice was therefore upheld. View "Jay Patel v. LandingPartners LLC et al." on Justia Law

A tenant and her young son resided in a rental property owned by a landlord. The tenant failed to pay rent for August 2024, prompting the landlord to file an eviction action in the Rhode Island District Court for nonpayment. The District Court held a hearing, after which it awarded possession to the landlord and entered a damages judgment against the tenant. The tenant appealed to the Superior Court, raising an affirmative defense and counterclaim based on alleged uninhabitability of the premises due to plumbing problems and a sewage fly infestation.While the appeal was pending in the Superior Court, the landlord moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the tenant’s failure to pay a prorated portion of September rent (covering the period after judgment in District Court but before the next rent due date) mandated dismissal under the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The tenant conceded nonpayment of that portion but argued the statute only required payment of full rent due after the appeal was taken, which she had paid in October. The Superior Court agreed with the landlord and dismissed the appeal.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island granted certiorari and reviewed the statutory interpretation. The Court held that under the plain language of the relevant statutes, a tenant appealing an eviction judgment is obligated to pay rent only on the next scheduled due date after the appeal is filed, not a prorated portion for days between judgment and the next rent due date. The Court further held that after the tenant vacated the apartment, the case ceased to be an action for recovery of real property, and the statutory rent-payment requirement no longer applied. The Supreme Court quashed the Superior Court’s order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on damages. View "Pioneer Investments, LLC v. McKiernan" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on foreclosure proceedings involving a residential property in West Warwick, Rhode Island. The plaintiffs purchased the property in 2006, executing a mortgage and promissory note with Long Beach Mortgage Company. After defaulting on the mortgage payment due July 1, 2022, Select Portfolio Servicing (SPS), the mortgage servicer, sent a notice of default and right to cure by certified mail in August 2022. The mortgage had previously been assigned to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. Following further notices, including a notice of acceleration, the property was sold at foreclosure in April 2023. Plaintiffs then filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure based on purported defects in the required notices, specifically arguing that the notices failed to strictly comply with paragraph 22 of the mortgage contract, which governs the notice requirements prior to foreclosure.In Kent County Superior Court, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the notices strictly complied with the contractual requirements and properly informed plaintiffs of their rights, including the right to cure and reinstate. Plaintiffs objected, asserting that the notice of default contained inaccuracies regarding the cure date and that the notice of acceleration used language that was insufficiently unequivocal with respect to their right to reinstate. The hearing justice found no genuine issues of material fact and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding that the notices satisfied the requirements of the mortgage. Judgment was entered in February 2025.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case de novo. It held that the notice of default strictly complied with paragraph 22 of the mortgage, adequately informed plaintiffs of the required cure date, and unequivocally stated the right to reinstate after acceleration. The Court further determined that the notice of acceleration was not required to reiterate the right to reinstate in the same manner. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Diaz v. Select Portfolio Servicing" on Justia Law

A federally certified organization dedicated to providing comprehensive health and social services to elderly individuals, primarily those eligible for Medicaid, relocated its operations to East Providence and sought a property tax exemption for its new location. The organization asserted that nearly all its participants are low-income elderly and claimed eligibility for exemption under a state statute that provides tax-exempt status for property used for the aid or support of the aged poor, among other categories. After purchasing the property, the organization applied for the exemption, arguing that the statutory language supported its claim. The local tax assessor denied the application, finding that the organization was not one of the specifically enumerated entities—such as a library or a nonprofit hospital—under the statute, and that its mission was not limited to supporting only the aged poor.The organization appealed this denial to the East Providence Tax Board of Assessment Review, which affirmed the assessor’s decision. Subsequently, the organization brought the case to the Providence County Superior Court, where both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Superior Court found the statute ambiguous and, applying principles of statutory construction, concluded that the exemption applied only to the specific types of entities listed in the statute, all of which must use their property exclusively for the designated purposes. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the tax assessor.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the statutory language and agreed that it was ambiguous but held that, under Rhode Island law, tax exemption statutes must be strictly construed in favor of taxation. Consequently, any ambiguity must be resolved against the taxpayer. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in favor of the tax assessor. View "Pace Organization of Rhode Island v. Frew" on Justia Law

The plaintiff acquired property in Exeter, Rhode Island, in 1997 and later sought to develop a solar farm on it. To proceed, he needed legal access from a public road. A town map suggested such access via an extension of Estate Drive, but in reality, no road existed there—only undeveloped woods, which the town considered a “paper street.” The plaintiff attempted to clear and gravel the area without town approval, prompting the town to block access and send a cease-and-desist letter. The planning board denied his development application, and the zoning board affirmed. The plaintiff then filed multiple lawsuits, including one seeking a declaration that the disputed area was a public road, and later, claims for due process violations and, after losing on the road status issue, for adverse possession and related theories regarding ownership and access.The Superior Court first denied the town’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in the due process case and then denied the town’s motion to dismiss the adverse possession case. The trial justice reasoned that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply because, in her view, the facts and legal theories in the new cases were different from the previously litigated issues, such as whether the area was a public road. She further concluded that the town had acquiesced to separate lawsuits and that Davis was not barred from asserting inconsistent or alternative claims in later litigation.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed both cases on certiorari. The Court held that res judicata barred the plaintiff’s claims because all arose from the same set of facts concerning access to the disputed area and could have been raised in the initial litigation. The Court further concluded that collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel also precluded the plaintiff’s adverse possession and related claims, as key factual issues had already been determined. The Court quashed the Superior Court’s orders and remanded for dismissal of both cases. View "Davis v. Wood Estates, Inc." on Justia Law

The dispute concerns neighboring property owners in South Kingstown, Rhode Island. The plaintiffs purchased their home in 2010, and the defendant purchased the adjoining lot in 2021. The contested area, approximately 1,134.9 square feet, is included in the defendant’s deed, but the plaintiffs asserted that they had used and maintained it as their own for over a decade, engaging in activities such as planting grass and trees, mowing, and storing items. The defendant’s property was vacant until he moved in, and tensions arose after he objected to the plaintiffs’ continued use of the area and eventually erected a fence.Following the defendant’s acquisition and subsequent dispute, the plaintiffs initiated a suit in the Washington County Superior Court, seeking title by adverse possession, acquiescence, or a prescriptive easement. The Superior Court conducted a bench trial, during which testimony was heard from both parties, the developer, and an expert. After trial, the judge found the defendant’s evidence more credible, particularly noting conversations in which the plaintiffs acknowledged the superior title of the prior owner by inquiring about purchasing the disputed property and seeking permission for certain uses. The court determined that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated hostile possession or a recognized boundary for the requisite ten-year period.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court’s findings under a deferential standard, considering whether the lower court’s factual determinations were clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the elements of adverse possession, acquiescence, or prescriptive easement, specifically the requirements of hostility and recognition of a boundary. The Supreme Court also found that the trial court’s findings were sufficiently detailed under the applicable procedural rule. The judgment for the defendant was affirmed. View "Blechman v. Woodward" on Justia Law

The plaintiff owned a vacant parcel in Westerly, Rhode Island, and sought to construct a single-family home. To do so, he needed approval from the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for an onsite wastewater treatment system (OWTS). He applied for a variance from DEM’s regulations, asserting that his proposed system satisfied the general standard for granting variances. However, DEM denied the variance because the property’s water table was at zero inches from the original ground surface, failing to meet a specific regulatory requirement.After DEM’s denial, the plaintiff did not appeal to DEM’s Administrative Adjudication Division (AAD), arguing that such an appeal would be futile since the AAD purportedly lacked discretion to overturn the denial and could not adjudicate constitutional claims. Instead, he filed suit in the Superior Court, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, asserting both as-applied and facial challenges to the OWTS regulations under the Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The state moved to dismiss, arguing failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the lack of constitutional violations. The Superior Court granted the state’s motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the futility exception did not apply.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies for his as-applied challenges and that the futility exception did not apply because the AAD had independent authority to grant variances. For the facial constitutional challenge, the Court determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed and the matter remanded. View "DiBiccari v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

A man using a cane visited a public beach in Rhode Island and slipped and fell in the bathroom, allegedly due to sand and water on the floor. He suffered several injuries, including a fractured hip, and required medical attention. He filed a negligence lawsuit against the state, claiming the state failed to maintain the bathroom safely, failed to warn of the dangerous condition, and failed to clean the facility. After his death from unrelated causes, his daughter, as administrator of his estate, was substituted as plaintiff.The Rhode Island Superior Court reviewed the case following extensive discovery. The state moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under the Rhode Island Recreational Use Statute (RUS), which shields landowners from liability for injuries on land open to the public for recreational use unless the injury results from willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. The plaintiff argued there were factual issues regarding the state’s knowledge and actions, relying on complaints about cleanliness and state policies. The Superior Court found no evidence the state had specific notice of the hazardous condition or prior similar incidents, and ruled that the RUS applied, granting summary judgment for the state. The court did not reach the issue of the public duty doctrine.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to present evidence showing that the state willfully or maliciously failed to warn against or remedy a known dangerous condition. There was no genuine issue of material fact, and the state was entitled to immunity under the RUS. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in favor of the state. View "Estate of Campagnone v. The State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law