Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff executed a promissory note in favor of EquiFirst, secured by a mortgage on real estate. The mortgage designated EquiFirst as the Lender and named Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as the mortgagee and the Lender’s nominee. MERS, as EquiFirst’s nominee, assigned the mortgage to Sutton Funding, which assigned the mortgage to Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company (Bank of New York). Bank of New York subsequently initiated a foreclosure sale, at which it prevailed as the highest bidder. Plaintiff filed suit in the superior court challenging the validity of the two mortgage assignments. The hearing justice dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint under Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding that the assignments were valid, and additionally dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(7) for failing to join an indispensible party, Bank of New York. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal on the basis of Rule 12(b)(7), holding that hearing justice’s dismissal on Rule 12(b)(7) grounds was appropriate where Plaintiff failed to join Bank of New York to the action. View "Rosano v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Decedent established a Trust that required, upon Decedent’s death, the trustee to distribute a parcel of land to the trustee and to distribute the remainder of the land to Decedent’s children. The Trust filed a complaint for eviction for unlawfully holding over after the termination of tenancy against Defendants, Decedent’s children. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Trust. Defendants appealed, arguing that the Trust was not a landlord and Defendants were not tenants, but rather, tenants in common with the trustee. Therefore, Defendants argued, an action for eviction could not lie. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the Trust lacked standing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the superior court did have jurisdiction over trespass and ejectment matters, and therefore, the motion justice erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing with respect to the issue of standing. View "Joseph P. Notarianni Revocable Trust v. Notarianni" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a home. To finance the transaction, Plaintiffs executed a note payable to Accredited Home Lenders. The note was secured by a mortgage on the property naming Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the mortgagee. MERS assigned the mortgage to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. Because Plaintiffs stopped making their payments as set forth in the note Deutsche Bank foreclosed on the property. Accredited REO Properties purchased the property. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief seeking orders declaring that they were owners of the property as a matter of law and that the foreclosure sale, conveyance, and assignment were void. Defendants - MERS, Deutsche Bank, Accredited REO Properties, Accredited Home Lenders, and others - filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a legal and valid foreclosure occurred in this case. View "Moura v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Frederick Carrozza, Sr. filed a petition seeking to impose a resulting trust on four properties and caused notices of lis pendens to be filed with respect to each of the properties at issue. Counterclaimants, in turn, filed a counterclaim alleging slander of title. Summary judgment was granted in favor of Counterclaimants with respect to the resulting trust issue. After a trial on the slander of title counterclaim, the trial justice held the counterclaim defendants - Frederick Sr. and his three living children - liable for slander of title. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in all respects except that part of the judgment awarding $845,00 in punitive damages, holding that the award of punitive damages should be reduced to $422,500. View "Carrozza v. Voccola" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, acting as subcontractor to Builder, performed work on a property in the City of Providence owned by Owner and leased by Lessee. A dispute subsequently arose regarding payment, and Plaintiff sought to enforce a mechanics’ lien against Owner, Lessee, and Builder. After Owner and Lessee deposited a bond, with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company as surety, the superior court discharged the lien. Plaintiff subsequently amended its complaint to add Liberty as a defendant. Plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment on the mechanics’ lien claim. The trial justice denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and entered final judgment in favor of Owner and Lessee. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in entering judgment in favor of Owner and Lessee because they, as well as Builder and Liberty, were all directly liable to it for any rights it had under the lien statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of the mechanics’ lien statute mandates the dismissal and discharge of the lien once a bond, which replaces the property as security for the claim, is deposited with the registry of the court. View "Nat'l Refrigeration, Inc. v. Capital Props., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, limited liability entities that owned property in the Town of Coventry, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the legality of sewer assessments assessed by Coventry. A hearing justice dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for their failure to follow the correct administrative appeal process. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint, holding (1) the hearing justice erred in granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs had not followed the R.I. Gen. Laws 44-5-26 tax appeal process, as section 44-5-26 did not apply in this case; and (2) the appeal process set forth in section 19 of Coventry’s sewer enabling act is the process by which residents of Coventry may appeal sewer assessments or charges levied by Coventry pursuant to its authority under the enabling act. View "Commerce Park Assocs. 1, LLC v. Houle" on Justia Law

The Moorland Farm Condominium consisted of thirty-three units in ten buildings. When the Moorland Farm Condominium Association became aware that certain outdoor decks in the condominium development were in need of repair, it issued a series of special assessments to pay for the repairs. Plaintiffs, owners of the condominium units that were not benefiting from the improvements, sued the association, contending that the assessments were illegal because the decks were not common areas, but rather, were part of individual units. The trial justice held that the assessments were illegal. The association appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred by advancing to trial in the absence of all indispensable parties, in particular, the unit owners who received the benefit of the association’s assessment for deck repairs but who would bear the financial burden of the reallocated costs as set forth in the judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the failure to join indispensable parties in this case was fatal and that the judgment was null and void. View "Burns v. Moorland Farm Condo. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs entered into a loan agreement with Potomac Realty Capital LLC (PRC) to rehabilitate and renovate certain property. As security for the loan, NV One granted a mortgage on the property. Plaintiffs later filed a complaint against PRC, asserting violations of the Rhode Island usury law, among other claims. The trial justice granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs with respect to the usury claim, entered an order declaring the loan usurious and void, and voided the mortgage. At issue on appeal was whether a usury savings clause in the loan document validated the otherwise usurious contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their usury claim because (1) the loan was a usury; and (2) the usury savings clause was unenforceable on public policy grounds. View "NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendants were owners of property with a common boundary. Plaintiff and Defendants disputed the location of the boundary line, and Plaintiff claimed Defendants encroached upon her property. When Defendants obtained a building permit to construct a building on their alleged property, Plaintiff filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The superior court granted injunctive relief to Plaintiff, permanently enjoined Defendants from trespassing on Plaintiff’s lot, ordered the removal of the portion of Defendants’ building that encroached on Plaintiff’s lot, and awarded damages to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err (1) in finding that the boundary line established by a survey initiated by Plaintiff constituted the boundary line between the two lots; and (2) in awarding damages to Plaintiff based on the diminution in the fair market value of her land as a result of the encroachment by Defendants. View "Banville v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs executed a mortgage identifying Domestic Bank as the lender and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as a corporation “acting solely as nominee” for the lender and the lender’s assigns. Later, MERS purported to assign the mortgage to Aurora Loan Services, LLC (Aurora). Aurora “or the successful bidder” allegedly took a foreclosure deed at a subsequent foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against MERS seeking a declaration that the assignment and foreclosure sale were void and that Plaintiffs owned a fee simple interest in the property. The superior court dismissed the complaint, concluding (1) Plaintiffs did not have standing to seek relief based on the assignment because they were neither an assignor nor an assignee of the assignment; and (2) even if Plaintiffs had standing, their allegations were insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to prosecute their claim; and (2) Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion was improperly granted because Plaintiffs’ complaint stated a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Chhun v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law