Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After Plaintiff failed to pay taxes on property she owned, Defendant purchased the property at a tax sale. Over a year after the tax sale, Defendant filed a petition to foreclose Plaintiff's right of redemption. The superior court granted Defendant's motion and entered a final decree foreclosing Plaintiff's right of redemption and vesting legal title in the property to Defendant. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action seeking to vacate the final decree. The trial justice granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish under R.I. Gen. Laws 44-9-24 that she did not receive notice of the petition to foreclose or that no taxes were owed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff was not deprived of due process because of an irregularity in the notices of the petition to foreclose because the irregularity was neither substantial nor misleading; and (2) Plaintiff's argument that a final decree could not have entered without a default having first entered against her was unavailing because the explicit language of section 44-9-30 clearly provides that a default is not a prerequisite to the entry of a final decree foreclosing the right of redemption. View "Johnson v. QBAR Assocs." on Justia Law

Property Owner owned two adjacent lots, a house lot and a vacant lot. Property Owner mortgaged certain real property to Option One Mortgage Corporation. Property Owner then conveyed its house lot to an individual who, in turn, granted a mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS). Aurora Loan Services, LLC was the servicer for MERS. Aurora later informed Option One that it intended to foreclose on the house lot. Option One filed a complaint seeking a declaration that Option One had a valid first lien encumbrance on the house lot that was superior to the Aurora mortgage. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Option One. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Option One mortgage was a valid first lien on the house lot where (1) there was no dispute the Option One mortgage was properly recorded in the town records so any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, including Aurora, was charged with constructive notice of the Option One mortgage; and (2) a prior deed reference in the Option One mortgage description was sufficient to put a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee on notice that the Option One mortgage was intended to encumber both the house lot and the vacant lot. View "Option One Mortgage Corp. v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was two properties consisting of neighboring condominiums. In 2005, Defendants placed barriers in Plaintiffs' claimed right of way, which impeded vehicle access and foot traffic. After Defendants refused to remove the barrier, Plaintiffs sued Defendants, alleging that, according to a condominium declaration, Plaintiffs had an express easement over the right of way, or, in the alternative, they had an implied or prescriptive easement over the right of way. After a trial, the trial justice ruled in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgment of the superior court with respect to its determination that Defendants did not have a claim of an implied easement by reservation over the right of way, as the trial justice did not make any findings or legal conclusions with respect to whether Plaintiffs had an implied easement by grant over the claimed right of way; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. Remanded. View "Wellington Condo. Ass'n v. Wellington Cove Condo. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a condominium unit owner in a condominium community comprised of three sub-condominium residential areas. Plaintiff filed an application for approval to demolish his existing unit and rebuild a larger unit. After America Condominium Association asserted that Plaintiff did not own the land on which he sought to expand, Plaintiff filed a complaint against America seeking a declaratory judgment that he had sufficient interest to file an application regarding the expansion of his unit onto adjoining land. Plaintiff then brought an action against the larger condominium association and the other sub-condominium associations in the community, essentially parroting the allegations set forth in the America action. In both actions, the hearing justice concluded that Plaintiff had standing to file his application for the expansion of his unit but that Plaintiff's proposed expansion required the unanimous consent of the other 153 unit owners. The Supreme Court primarily affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to file the application for expansion; but (2) pursuant to the Condominium Act, the unanimous consent of all of the unit owners must be obtained before Plaintiff could carry out his unit expansion. View "Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition to foreclose the right of redemption arising from a tax sale of certain property. The petition indicated that Respondents, including Perfecto Iron Works, held an interest in the property and that Respondents were provided notice of the petition. Neither Petitioner nor her attorney received a copy of Perfecto's answer, and thus, believing no responsive pleading had been filed, Petitioner filed a motion for entry of default. After a hearing, a final decree was entered vesting legal and equitable title to the property in Petitioner. Perfecto subsequently filed a motion to vacate the default and final decree. A trial justice granted the motion, concluding that the default was erroneously entered because Perfecto's answer was timely filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice properly vacated the default decree when, in fact, Perfecto had answered the petition and had done so in a timely manner. View "Rafaelian v. Perfecto Iron Works, Inc." on Justia Law

RICS executed a note secured by a mortgage on real estate. Meanwhile, TLA entered into a contract with RICS to provide architectural and engineering services for the project and recorded two documents related to its work on the project. Subsequently, TLA filed a petition to enforce its mechanics' lien. No claimant timely entered an appearance in TLA's mechanics' lien litigation to preserve the priority of their claims. Months later, Petra purchased the note and mortgage, which had not been recorded by the previous owner. Meanwhile, the superior court entered a consent order signed by RICS and TLS in the mechanics' lien litigation. RICS subsequently conveyed the property, and the court placed the property into receivership. Petra later filed a motion to file an answer and statement of claim out of time in the mechanics' lien proceedings. The court granted the motion, thereby restoring the mortgage's priority over TLA's mechanics' lien. The property was sold to Petra through a receivership action. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's grant of Petra's motion, thereby restoring the priority of TLA's mechanics' lien, holding that the motion justice erred in determining that Petra's failure to file a timely statement of claim was the result of "excusable neglect." View "R.I. Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Harris Mill, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the interpretation of a clause concerning the allocation of real estate taxes contained in a written lease between Inland American Retail Management and Cinemaworld of Florida. Inland and Cinemaworld were successors-in-interest to a ground lease for the rental of what is now a movie theater in a shopping center. Under the terms of the lease, Cinemaworld incurred certain liabilities and expenses. Pursuant to a clause in the lease, Cinemaworld was required to pay an amount equal to the real estate taxes "levied, assessed, or otherwise imposed" against the movie theater. Inland filed a complaint for breach of the lease for Cinemaworld's alleged failure to make timely payments as required by the lease. The superior court granted partial summary judgment in Cinemaworld's favor with respect to its motion seeking an accounting, ruling that the formula allocating Cinemaworld's reasonable share of real estate taxes should be based on the square footage of its leased premises. Inland appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the interpretation of the parties' lease. View "Inland Am. Retail Mgmt. LLC v. Cinemaworld of Fla., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a purchase and sales agreement agreeing to buy Defendant's property and deposited ten percent of the purchase price with Defendant's real estate agent until closing. Defendant signed the agreement but also made certain handwritten alterations to the contract. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging that Defendant's handwritten alterations were material changes that constituted a counter-offer, not an acceptance of Plaintiffs' offer to purchase the property. The jury found there was never a valid contract between the parties and Plaintiffs were entitled to the return of their deposit. The trial court added prejudgment interest to the judgment. Defendant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs were not entitled to interest on their deposit. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the award of prejudgment interest in this case, holding that Plaintiffs' deposit did not fall within the category of "pecuniary damages" under R.I. Gen. Laws 9-21-10(a), and therefore, Plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest. View "Andrews v. Plouff" on Justia Law

The underlying litigation arose from a real estate dispute between Plaintiff and several neighbors of Plaintiff (collectively, Codefendants). Codefendants retained attorneys (Attorney Defendants) to represent them in the property dispute. Attorney Defendants filed a notice of intent on behalf of Codefendants asserting Codefendants' right to their own property. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants and later amended his complaint setting forth claims against Attorney Defendants for slander and title and intentional interference with prospective advantage. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Attorney Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to establish an essential element of his claim of slander of title; and (2) the notice of intent could not be said to constitute an improper act of interference, and therefore, Attorney Defendants were entitled to summary judgment with respect to the intentional interference claim. View "Beauregard v. Gouin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought permits from the City of Providence so they might restore electrical meters at the property they owned. The property was located in an area of the City that was zoned for no more than two-family dwelling units. The City conducted an inspection of the property, which revealed the property was being used as a three-family dwelling, and therefore, it was not in compliance with zoning ordinances. Plaintiffs filed an appeal of the City official's determination that their property was an illegal three-family dwelling. The zoning board affirmed. Plaintiffs appealed and sought a declaration that their use of the property was a legal nonconforming use. The trial justice denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice (1) did not abuse his discretion in declining to declare that Plaintiffs' property was a legal nonconforming use; (2) did not err in declining to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the City; and (3) did not err in declining to allow Plaintiffs to rely upon the doctrine of laches as a basis for ruling that the City should not be permitted to enforce the provision of the zoning ordinance that prohibits using the property in a three-family manner. View "Cigarrilha v. City of Providence" on Justia Law