Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage on his property. After Plaintiff defaulted on the loan, foreclosure proceedings commenced. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Then then-holder of the mortgage sought relief from the automatic stay imposed by bankruptcy law. Relief from the stay was given in two bankruptcy cases filed by Plaintiff, the second of which was initiated after a foreclosure sale had been completed. Plaintiff then filed an action seeking a declaration that the foreclosure deed was void and that he owned the property in fee simple absolute. The superior court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff based on the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was precluded from raising issues regarding the foreclosure again in the superior court after the propriety of the foreclosure was examined by the bankruptcy court and the foreclosure sale was declared valid. View "Reynolds v. First NLC Fin. Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied to the Town of Scituate building official for a building permit to build a single-family home on an unimproved lot. The building official denied the permit, citing numerous deficiencies with Petitioner's plans, including a lack of street frontage. Petitioner appealed the denial and, alternatively, applied for a dimensional variance. The town zoning board denied the appeal and the request for a dimensional variance. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, concluding that the zoning board abused its discretion in determining that a frontage requirement was required for Petitioner's property. Remanded. View "Iadevaia v. Town of Scituate Zoning Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Plaintiff executed a promissory note to Dollar Mortgage Corporation (DMC) secured by a mortgage on Plaintiff's real property. The mortgage was held by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as the mortgagee and nominee for DMC. Eventually, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company became the holder of Plaintiff's note as custodian for OneWest Bank. Later, MERS assigned Plaintiff's mortgage to the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). AFter Plaintiff defaulted on his mortgage, FNMA purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Plaintiff subsequently file this action seeking declaratory relief as to the validity of the foreclosure sale and the ownership of the property, an order quieting title to the property, and damages for negligent misrepresentation. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding, among other things, that Plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the validity of the assignment of the mortgage because he was a stranger to the assignment. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to challenge the validity of the assignment of the mortgage; and (2) the superior court did not err in the remainder of its judgment. View "Mruk v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

A stone wall demarcated the boundary between Plaintiff's and Defendant's property. After Plaintiff discovered that a large portion of the stone wall had been destroyed and a significant number of trees on his property were missing, Plaintiff sought to recover damages from Defendant for the unauthorized removal of his trees and the theft of portions of the stone wall. After a jury trial, the trial court granted judgments as a matter of law in Defendant's favor. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial justice abused her discretion in precluding expert testimony on the subject of historic stone walls, and the exclusion constituted reversible error; and (2) the trial justice committed prejudicial error in granting a judgment as a matter of law in Defendant's favor. View "Morabit v. Hoag" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that she possessed a prescriptive easement and an easement by implication over Defendant's property. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that she had an easement giving her the right to use a paved driveway on Defendant's property. The trial court justice found that Plaintiff had acknowledged Defendant's superior title, that she had not occupied the disputed property with hostility and under a claim of right, that she had used the disputed property openly but not notoriously, and that she did not establish an easement by implication. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the superior court with respect to Plaintiff's claim of an easement by implication; but (2) vacated the judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claim of a prescriptive easement, holding that the superior court erred in finding that Plaintiff (i) had not established that she used the disputed property in a hostile manner under a claim of right, and (ii) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that her use of the disputed property was notorious in nature. Remanded. View "Caluori v. Dexter Credit Union" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff failed to pay taxes on property she owned, Defendant purchased the property at a tax sale. Over a year after the tax sale, Defendant filed a petition to foreclose Plaintiff's right of redemption. The superior court granted Defendant's motion and entered a final decree foreclosing Plaintiff's right of redemption and vesting legal title in the property to Defendant. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action seeking to vacate the final decree. The trial justice granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish under R.I. Gen. Laws 44-9-24 that she did not receive notice of the petition to foreclose or that no taxes were owed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff was not deprived of due process because of an irregularity in the notices of the petition to foreclose because the irregularity was neither substantial nor misleading; and (2) Plaintiff's argument that a final decree could not have entered without a default having first entered against her was unavailing because the explicit language of section 44-9-30 clearly provides that a default is not a prerequisite to the entry of a final decree foreclosing the right of redemption. View "Johnson v. QBAR Assocs." on Justia Law

Property Owner owned two adjacent lots, a house lot and a vacant lot. Property Owner mortgaged certain real property to Option One Mortgage Corporation. Property Owner then conveyed its house lot to an individual who, in turn, granted a mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS). Aurora Loan Services, LLC was the servicer for MERS. Aurora later informed Option One that it intended to foreclose on the house lot. Option One filed a complaint seeking a declaration that Option One had a valid first lien encumbrance on the house lot that was superior to the Aurora mortgage. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Option One. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Option One mortgage was a valid first lien on the house lot where (1) there was no dispute the Option One mortgage was properly recorded in the town records so any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, including Aurora, was charged with constructive notice of the Option One mortgage; and (2) a prior deed reference in the Option One mortgage description was sufficient to put a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee on notice that the Option One mortgage was intended to encumber both the house lot and the vacant lot. View "Option One Mortgage Corp. v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was two properties consisting of neighboring condominiums. In 2005, Defendants placed barriers in Plaintiffs' claimed right of way, which impeded vehicle access and foot traffic. After Defendants refused to remove the barrier, Plaintiffs sued Defendants, alleging that, according to a condominium declaration, Plaintiffs had an express easement over the right of way, or, in the alternative, they had an implied or prescriptive easement over the right of way. After a trial, the trial justice ruled in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgment of the superior court with respect to its determination that Defendants did not have a claim of an implied easement by reservation over the right of way, as the trial justice did not make any findings or legal conclusions with respect to whether Plaintiffs had an implied easement by grant over the claimed right of way; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. Remanded. View "Wellington Condo. Ass'n v. Wellington Cove Condo. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a condominium unit owner in a condominium community comprised of three sub-condominium residential areas. Plaintiff filed an application for approval to demolish his existing unit and rebuild a larger unit. After America Condominium Association asserted that Plaintiff did not own the land on which he sought to expand, Plaintiff filed a complaint against America seeking a declaratory judgment that he had sufficient interest to file an application regarding the expansion of his unit onto adjoining land. Plaintiff then brought an action against the larger condominium association and the other sub-condominium associations in the community, essentially parroting the allegations set forth in the America action. In both actions, the hearing justice concluded that Plaintiff had standing to file his application for the expansion of his unit but that Plaintiff's proposed expansion required the unanimous consent of the other 153 unit owners. The Supreme Court primarily affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to file the application for expansion; but (2) pursuant to the Condominium Act, the unanimous consent of all of the unit owners must be obtained before Plaintiff could carry out his unit expansion. View "Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition to foreclose the right of redemption arising from a tax sale of certain property. The petition indicated that Respondents, including Perfecto Iron Works, held an interest in the property and that Respondents were provided notice of the petition. Neither Petitioner nor her attorney received a copy of Perfecto's answer, and thus, believing no responsive pleading had been filed, Petitioner filed a motion for entry of default. After a hearing, a final decree was entered vesting legal and equitable title to the property in Petitioner. Perfecto subsequently filed a motion to vacate the default and final decree. A trial justice granted the motion, concluding that the default was erroneously entered because Perfecto's answer was timely filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice properly vacated the default decree when, in fact, Perfecto had answered the petition and had done so in a timely manner. View "Rafaelian v. Perfecto Iron Works, Inc." on Justia Law