Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the Plaintiff Allen Drescher's appeal of a Superior Court judgment declaring that he failed to establish an easement by prescription over a right-of-way owned by Defendant Sigurd W. Johannessen. At trial, Plaintiff was unsuccessful in his attempt to prove that the right-of-way at issue also constituted a dedicated public road. Though mindful of Plaintiff's intermittent use of the disputed right-of-way for almost twenty-five years to access his property, the Supreme Court found no error in the trial justice's determination that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate the requisite elements for a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence. Likewise, the Court held that the trial justice arrived at the proper conclusion in finding that the right-of-way was not a public road.

The issue before the Supreme Court was a dispute over the existence of an alleged prescriptive easement that was necessary for large commercial vehicles to get to the loading dock of a commercial building. The plaintiffs, Butterfly Realty and Dairyland, Inc., appealed the judgment entered against them on their claims for a prescriptive easement on the property of the defendant, James Romanella & Sons, Inc. (JR & Sons). Butterfly Realty purchased a parcel of land from Albert Romanella, who, at the time, was president and 50 percent shareholder of JR & Sons. On that same date, Albert Romanella also assigned to Butterfly Realty his lease for an adjacent lot. Dairyland, Inc. was the owner of another adjacent parcel. Access to the loading dock at the rear of Butterfly’s building was impossible without crossing onto JR & Sons' property to some degree because the commercial building was built so close to the common property line between the lots in question. Therefore, JR & Sons granted an express easement to Butterfly to provide access to the loading dock of Butterfly’s commercial building. After a delivery truck struck a building on JR & Sons' property, JR & Sons surveyed the area in May 2010 to determine the precise location of the express easement. Then, in an effort to encourage Butterfly to "come to some kind of agreement for * * * using all of [its] property all the time, JR & Sons installed “concrete pylons" along the southwestern borders of the express easement making it nearly impossible for trucks to continue to pull directly up to the loading dock as had been done previously. The trial justice denied Butterfly's claim for a prescriptive easement and denied both Butterfly and JR& Sons' requests for injunctive relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial justice misapplied the law with regard to Butterfly's use of the easement as "sufficiently hostile," and this misapplication sufficiently tainted the balance of the trial justice's decision. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Philip and Eileen Pelletier challenged a Superior Court judgment in favor of their neighbor Aphrodite Laureanno which dismissed their complaint for injunctive relief and monetary damages. The Pelletiers believed that a written and recorded agreement, entered into by the Pelletiers and Laureanno's predecessor-in-interest, created a permanent easement for parking on a small portion of Laureanno's adjacent property. Laureanno disagreed, and erected a fence, which served to obstruct the Pelletiers' long-standing parking there. After a trial on the merits, the trial justice concluded that the written agreement at issue did not grant an easement to the Pelletiers, but instead served merely as a revocable license. On appeal, the Pelletiers argued that the Superior Court erred in dismissing their complaint. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice was justified in his assessment of Mrs. Pelletier's testimony regarding the parties' intent in executing the driveway agreement. Conferring the requisite substantial deference to the trial justice's credibility determination at issue, the Court did not find the trial court's assessment as arbitrary or in error. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

Defendant Michael A. Langlois appealed a Superior Court's declaratory judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff Townhouses at Bonnet Shores Condominium Association. The judgment decreed that a lease agreement that Defendant had entered into violated the "Declaration of Condominium of Townhouses at Bonnet Shores Condominiums." Defendant asserted on appeal that the declaration was ambiguous and that, therefore, the trial justice incorrectly interpreted it to exclude the lease agreement. Upon review of the lease agreement in question, the Supreme Court concluded the trial justice did not incorrectly interpret the language, and affirmed that court's decision.

At issue in this case was a 1966 property division that created Lot 733, an undeveloped parcel owned by Plaintiffs. When Plaintiffs requested a zoning certificate from the zoning enforcement officer for the town, the officer refused based on his belief that Lot 733 resulted from an illegal subdivision in contravention of the town zoning and subdivision regulations in force in 1966. The zoning board dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal. Plaintiffs then filed suit requesting that the zoning board's decision be overturned and that the court declare that Lot 733 was a lawful lot. The trial justice determined that the 1966 property division that created the disputed lot was proper. Defendants, owners of property adjoining Lot 733, appealed, arguing that the property division constituted an illegal subdivision because it lacked adequate street access. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court but on different grounds, holding that the creation of Lot 733 was not a subdivision.

Plaintiff Daniela Turacova and Ronald DeThomas (DeThomas) formed a limited liability company known as TAMA. After DeThomas passed away, a dispute arose regarding the buyout of his interest in TAMA. Because Plaintiff and Defendant, the Estate of DeThomas, were unable to agree upon the purchase price for DeThomas's fifty percent interest in TAMA, the superior court determined the fair market value of the property and construed several provisions of the TAMA operating agreement to fix the total amount that Plaintiff owed to the Estate. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Defendant in the amount of $658,573, including prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) disregarding the language of the parties' settlement agreement indicating that Plaintiff would have thirty days from the date of the property was valued in which to pay Defendant, as the settlement agreement did not supersede the provision in the operating agreement concerning the time for payment; and (2) awarding prejudgment interest.

The underlying action in this case concerned real property located in the City of Warwick that Defendant, Felix Carlone, dedicated to the City in 1979. Plaintiffs, Warwick Sewer Authority (WSA) and the City, brought a complaint for a declaratory judgment concerning the City's ownership of the property. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant appealed, contending that he dedicated the property on the condition that it be used as open space, that he maintained a reversionary interest in it, and that, therefore, genuine issues of material facts should have precluded the hearing justice from granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because no ambiguity existed on the face of the writings in this case, the parol evidence that Defendant presented rightly was not entertained by the hearing justice to vary the writings' terms; and (2) the property restrictions filed by Defendant with the City did not operate to restrict WSA from rezoning the dedicated land from open space to residential.

Plaintiff Thomas DePetrillo filed suit against Belo Holdings, Inc. and Citadel Broadcasting Company, challenging the validity of Citadel's right of first refusal to purchase a broadcasting tower and surrounding real estate owned by Belo. The superior court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff, as a stranger to the original lease agreement between Belo and Citadel, had no standing to challenge Citadel's right of first refusal or the effectiveness of its exercise. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff lacked authority to challenge the validity of the right of first refusal; and (2) Citadel's right of first refusal was enforceable as a matter of law.

Declarant Bowen Court Associates created a condominium by declaration in 1989. Declarant retained a ten-year reservation to withdraw a portion of the land from the condominium. In 1992 the owner of the property foreclosed on the property. Plaintiff Joseph Alessi later purchased the parcel. In 2001, Plaintiff sought to withdraw the parcel from the condomium, but the right to withdraw the parcel from the condominium had expired. Plaintiff then filed a complaint against Defendants, Bowen Court Condominium and the president of the condominium association, contending that Defendants erroneously refused to exclude withdrawable land from the condominium. After a hearing, the trial justice granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the right to exclude withdrawable real estate from a condominium after a foreclosure expires when the declarant's right to withdraw the real estate otherwise would have expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that title to unexercised declarant rights passed to the unit owners' association as a matter of law in 1999, when the right to exclude the real estate expired.

This case arose out of a dispute over real property in the City of Newport. Plaintiffs, four individuals, filed an action to clear title to a portion of the Washington Street Extension. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendants, Newport and its representatives, concluding that statutory abandonment is the exclusive means by which a municipality may abandon a public highway. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the Abandonment Statute is the only method by which a municipality may abandon a public highway; and (2) because the Abandonment Statute was not complied with, the trial court correctly found that Newport had not abandoned the Washington Street Extension.