Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A group of developers, collectively referred to as "The Preserve," entered into an agreement in 2011 to purchase land in Richmond, Rhode Island, with the intention of operating an outdoor shooting range and gun club. The town council and planning board initially supported the project, but a subsequent zoning ordinance amendment prohibited such uses. The Preserve was not notified of these changes. In 2016, a new zoning district was created, once again permitting indoor and outdoor shooting ranges. The Preserve claimed that the two-year delay caused substantial revenue loss. They also alleged that the town imposed arbitrary fees, delayed the approval process, and engaged in other discriminatory practices that increased their costs and hindered their development efforts.The Superior Court dismissed The Preserve's claims for violations of substantive due process, tortious interference with contract and prospective business advantages, civil liability for crimes and offenses, and a violation of the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. The court found that the claims were either barred by the statute of limitations or failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court held that the claims for civil liability for crimes and offenses and civil RICO were barred by a three-year statute of limitations because they were considered torts. The court also found that the statute of limitations was not tolled for the tortious interference claims, as the harm allegedly present was merely the consequence of separate and distinct acts that had occurred prior to the final approval of the land development for the resort. Therefore, all of The Preserve's claims were time-barred. View "The Preserve at Boulder Hills, LLC v. Kenyon" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, PennyMac Loan Services, LLC, a mortgage company, held a mortgage interest in a property in Coventry, Rhode Island. The mortgagor, Domenico Companatico, failed to pay 2018 fire district taxes, leading to a tax sale auction where the property was sold to Roosevelt Associates, RIGP. Roosevelt later filed a petition to foreclose any right of redemption, and the Superior Court clerk issued a citation notifying interested parties. The citation did not include a street address for the property. Despite receiving the citation, PennyMac failed to respond and was defaulted. A Superior Court justice entered a final decree foreclosing the right of redemption, and Roosevelt sold the property to Coventry Fire District 5-19, RIGP, which later sold it to Clarke Road Associates, RIGP.PennyMac filed an action to challenge the foreclosure decree, arguing that the citation failed to provide adequate notice, thus denying PennyMac its right to procedural due process. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and a second trial justice concluded that PennyMac had received adequate notice of the petition to foreclose all rights of redemption. The justice also found that the fire district taxes constituted a superior lien on the property and that PennyMac is statutorily barred from asserting a violation of the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the amended judgment of the Superior Court. The court found that the citation, despite lacking a street address, did not constitute a denial of due process. The court also concluded that PennyMac's claim under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act was barred due to its failure to raise any objection during the foreclosure proceeding. Finally, the court determined that the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota did not alter the outcome of this case. View "PennyMac Loan Services, LLC v. Roosevelt Associates, RIGP" on Justia Law

The case involves Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB DBA Christiana Trust as Trustee for HLSS Mortgage Master Trust, by PennyMac Loan Services, LLC (plaintiff), and Power Realty, RIGP a/k/a Power Realty Group, RIGP, Douglas H. Smith, and TMC Keywest LLC (defendants). The plaintiff, a mortgage company, failed to pay municipal taxes on a property in Coventry, Rhode Island, which it had obtained title to in 2016. As a result, the town conducted a tax-sale auction in 2019, and Power Realty acquired the property. Power Realty then filed a petition to foreclose any right of redemption, which was granted by the Superior Court. The plaintiff challenged the foreclosure decree, arguing that the notice of the petition was inadequate.The Superior Court had granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the plaintiff had received adequate notice of the petition to foreclose all rights of redemption. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found that the citation provided to the plaintiff contained all the necessary components required by law, including a description of the land, the name of the petitioner, and a statement of the nature of the petition. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the citation's failure to include the street address for the property deprived the plaintiff of meaningful notice. The court concluded that the plaintiff, a sophisticated mortgage company, could and should have investigated the matter further upon receipt of the citation. The court also found that the plaintiff's argument based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota did not alter the outcome of the case. View "Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Power Realty, RIGP" on Justia Law

This case was brought before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island to resolve a dispute between neighbors over property views. The plaintiffs, Thomas Knudsen, Trustee, Ciara Ladnier, and Edward Knudsen, Trustees, own property that rests on a hill with a view of the Sakonnet River. The defendant, Dr. Gregory DeJean, owns property that borders the plaintiffs' property and sits downhill from it. In 1989, the parties' predecessors entered into a restrictive covenant agreeing to certain building height restrictions and land maintenance obligations to preserve the existing views. Over time, however, Dr. DeJean has allowed new landscaping and existing vegetation to grow, diminishing the plaintiffs' view.In response, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration of their rights to maintain the agreement and enjoy the water views, as well as an injunction restraining Dr. DeJean from violating the agreement. The Superior Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, granting them declaratory and injunctive relief. The court ordered Dr. DeJean to make a variety of changes to his property to restore the plaintiffs' view to the condition it was in as of 1989.Dr. DeJean appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, arguing that the lower court had erred in its interpretation of the agreement and in its application of the legal defense of laches. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, finding that Dr. DeJean had violated the restrictive covenant and that the trial justice had not erred in dismissing his laches defense. Thus, Dr. DeJean was ordered to maintain his property in a way that preserved the plaintiffs' view. View "Knudsen v. DeJean" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Lourenco DoCouto, appealed a decision by the Superior Court of Rhode Island that dismissed his case against defendants Blue Water Realty, LLC and Louis Bachetti. The dispute centered around a property DoCouto claimed he had an option to purchase. DoCouto argued that the Superior Court erred in applying the doctrine of res judicata, dismissing his complaint for failure to timely serve defendants, and in determining that the District Court had jurisdiction over his equitable claims in the eviction proceedings.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court found that the parties in the eviction proceedings were the same or in privity with the parties in the present case. It also determined that DoCouto’s counterclaim in the eviction proceedings had alleged the same facts and arose out of the same transactions as those set forth in the current complaints. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata applied, barring DoCouto’s claims.Moreover, the court disagreed with DoCouto’s claim that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over his equitable claims. As the eviction action pertained to a lease agreement, the court held that the District Court had the requisite jurisdiction over DoCouto’s equitable claims according to the Rhode Island statute. Lastly, the court rejected DoCouto’s argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over his request for compensatory damages for services rendered because the amount in controversy exceeded the statutory limit relative to District Court jurisdiction. The statutory maximum set forth had no bearing on the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over landlord-tenant cases such as this one. View "DoCouto v. Blue Water Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute among neighbors over the use and ownership of a private road in Rhode Island. The plaintiffs, Merlyn P. O’Keefe and Mary Ellen O’Keefe, who own the residential lot farthest from the main road, sought injunction relief and claimed adverse possession over the private road. The private road was part of a residential compound, known as White Horn Acres, and each party owned an undivided one-sixth interest in the private road and the six residential lots in the compound. The plaintiffs observed multiple obstructions in the private road over the years, some of which were removed during the course of the lawsuit.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, denying the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and their claims for adverse possession. The court found no evidence that the defendants' obstructions excluded the plaintiffs from enjoying their equal privileges in the private road. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, or that the balance of the equities favored injunctive relief. Regarding the adverse possession claims, the court found that the plaintiffs did not provide clear and convincing evidence of acts of possession that excluded the rights of the other cotenants. The defendants regularly used the cul-de-sac and believed it was their right to do so. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims for adverse possession related to the cul-de-sac were denied. View "Merlyn O'Keefe v. Myrth York" on Justia Law

This case concerns a foreclosure proceeding related to a property in Bristol, Rhode Island. The plaintiff, Steven Serenska, obtained a mortgage from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and defaulted on his payments. Wells Fargo and HSBC Bank USA, National Association as Trustee, initiated foreclosure proceedings. The plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging that there was an ambiguity in the mortgage document and that he had not received proper notice before the foreclosure.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that there was no ambiguity in the mortgage contract. The court found that the notice of default sent to the plaintiff strictly complied with the requirements of the mortgage agreement. The court noted that the plaintiff's alleged prejudice (claiming he would have paid the sum due had he received notice of the deadline for reinstating the mortgage) was irrelevant in this context. The court also found that an issue raised by the plaintiff on appeal (concerning additional language in the notice of default) was not properly presented before the lower court and was therefore waived.The court thus affirmed the order of the Superior Court granting the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. View "Serenska v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2006, Ronald A. Gosset borrowed $275,000 against his property, which he owned as a joint tenant with his daughters, Mellissa and Verity Gosset. Both daughters signed the mortgage but not the underlying note. When Ronald Gosset passed away and the loan was in default, The Bank of New York Mellon, as the current note and mortgage holder, moved for summary judgment and for permission to conduct a foreclosure sale on the property. The defendants argued that they were not in default since they never signed the note and bore no financial obligations to the plaintiff. Moreover, they contended that the claims against their deceased father couldn't be addressed until a representative for his estate was appointed.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the plaintiff presented uncontested evidence demonstrating it is the holder of the note and mortgage, and that the note is currently in default. Furthermore, under the terms of the mortgage, the mortgage itself is also in default. The defendants, who are referred to as "Borrowers" in the mortgage, failed to present evidence challenging these assertions. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, ruling that there were no genuine issues of material fact and the plaintiff is entitled to conduct a foreclosure sale on the property securing its promissory note. The court clarified that the judgment does not provide for an award of damages against any defendant, it only authorizes the plaintiff to foreclose its mortgage. View "The Bank of New York Mellon v. Gosset" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, plaintiffs Mark Quillen and Dawn Quillen entered into a Purchase and Sales Agreement (P & S Agreement) with defendant Clint Cox to purchase a property for a total sale price of $632,000, which included a $31,000 deposit. An issue arose when the parties' chosen escrow agent, Beycome Brokerage Realty, refused to accept the deposit, leading to an amendment in the agreement that allowed the plaintiffs to submit the deposit to a different brokerage firm, Trusthill. This amendment led to a dispute with the defendant claiming the plaintiffs failed to meet the deposit requirement, thereby breaching the contract.The trial justice in the Superior Court found that the defendant had prevented the plaintiffs from effectuating delivery of the deposit, thereby eliminating the condition precedent. The court also found that the plaintiffs were ready, willing, and able to purchase the property. Despite the defendant's claims, the court concluded that plaintiffs had met all their obligations under the contract. The court ordered specific performance, directing the defendant to transfer the property to the plaintiffs. The defendant's counterclaims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and damages were dismissed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court held that the trial justice correctly determined that the plaintiffs timely and properly delivered the deposit in accordance with the amended agreement. The court also agreed with the trial justice's finding that the plaintiffs were ready, willing, and able to purchase the property. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the trial justice failed to apply the clear and convincing standard in her factual findings, noting that the defendant failed to raise this issue in the lower court. The court also dismissed the defendant's contention that he was entitled to the deposit as damages, as the court found no evidence of breach on the part of the plaintiffs. View "Quillen v. Cox" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by a landlord, Carline Vilbon, against her tenant, Judy Vargas, in an eviction action. The landlord had sought possession of the rental property and reasonable use and occupancy damages from the termination date through the date Vargas vacated the property. The Superior Court granted Vilbon possession but dismissed her claim for use and occupancy as well as for money damages. Vilbon appealed the Superior Court's decision to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the order of the Superior Court. The court found that without a transcript of the proceedings, it could not determine whether the trial justice had abused his discretion in either dismissing Vilbon’s claims or denying her motion to vacate the consent order. The court held that the burden of furnishing the court with the necessary records to enable it to pass on the alleged error lay with the party alleging the error. As such, the court concluded that Vilbon's failure to provide an adequate transcript was fatal to her claims. View "Vilbon v. Vargas" on Justia Law