Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The underlying dispute in this case involved the repair of faulty windows and sliding glass doors in a condominium development, Shipyard Village Horizontal Property Regime (Shipyard Village), in Pawleys Island. Fifty co-owners of units in Buildings C & D of the development (Petitioners) appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse the trial court's finding that the business judgment rule did not apply to the conduct of the Board of Directors of the Shipyard Village Council of Co-Owners, Inc., and the trial court's decision granting Petitioners partial summary judgment on the issue of breach of the Board's duty to investigate. Finding no reversible erro, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision. View "Fisher v. Shipyard Village" on Justia Law

This action arose out of the foreclosure of a lien for delinquent homeowner association fees. Todd Alexander did not appeal the foreclosure; however, he moved to vacate the resulting sale. Alexander's motion to vacate the sale was denied and Alexander appealed. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, finding Alexander failed to comply with South Carolina Code section 18-9-170 to stay the sale and, therefore, the master-in-equity's issuance of the deed rendered the appeal moot. “Our jurisprudence establishes that, despite the master-in-equity's issuance of a deed, an appellate court may reach the merits of the appeal.” The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the issuance of a deed did not moot the appeal of a foreclosure sale and the appellate court here could reach the merits. View "Wachesaw Plantation v. Alexander" on Justia Law

In this familial dispute over property, it was uncontradicted that the decedent Kenneth Walker deeded to his sister, Catherine Brooks, approximately forty acres of property in two separate transfers before his death. The question was whether the property was deeded to Brooks freely, or subject to an equitable mortgage which would require her to return it to Decedent's estate. After review, the Supreme Court held that no equitable mortgage existed; accordingly, the Court remanded. View "Walker v. Brooks" on Justia Law

In approximately twenty years PCS Nitrogen, Inc. contributed to environmental contamination by manufacturing fertilizer and disturbing contaminated soil during various demolition activities. In 2003, Ashley II of Charleston, Inc. purchased 27.62 acres of the PCS's property. Since that time, Ashley II has incurred substantial costs in remediating the environmental contamination. In July 2008, Ashley II filed a complaint against PCS seeking a declaration of joint and several liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) due to costs of the environmental cleanup at the Site. Additionally, PCS asserted a third-party indemnification claim against the site's previous owner based on the indemnity provision in a 1966 purchase agreement, seeking indemnification for attorney's fees, costs, and litigation expenses incurred in establishing that the predecessor contributed to the contamination. The South Carolina Supreme Court anwered the following certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: "Does the rule that a contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from its own negligent acts, unless such intention is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms, apply when the indemnitee seeks contractual indemnification for costs and expenses resulting in part from its own strict liability acts? " In the context of the underlying claim in federal court, the South Carolina Court answered the question, "no." View "Ashley II v. PCS Nitrogen" on Justia Law

This case centered on a claim for equitable indemnification, which was denied by the trial court. Appellants were sued by adjacent property owners regarding environmental contamination. Appellants denied responsibility for the contamination and cross-claimed against the previous property owner, who was responsible for the damage. Because Appellants were not responsible for the ground contamination, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants but declined to award Appellants the attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the lawsuit. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "[t]he facts of this case clearly demonstrate that the attorney's fees and costs incurred by Appellants in defending the [plaintiffs'] lawsuit were the natural and probable consequences of [respondent's] breach of the purchase agreement." View "McCoy v. Greenwave Enterprises" on Justia Law

"Appellant and the Respondents are neighbors who obviously do not get along." Appellant Ursula Pallares brought suit alleging five claims against two of her neighbors, respondents Sharon Seinar and Lisa Maseng. Pallares claimed respondents had "mounted a campaign to harass and humiliate" her and to "drive her from her home." Pallares outlined four areas of conduct by one or both Respondents involving: (1) code violations; (2) nuisance animals; (3) a petition for a mental evaluation; and (4) requests for restraining orders, which Pallares averred gave rise to civil tort liability. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Respondents on Pallares's claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy. Pallares appealed, and the Supreme Court certified the case for review. Based on careful consideration of the facts in record, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment to Respondents on Pallares's claim for malicious prosecution. However, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on Pallares's claim for abuse of process. View "Pallares v. Seinar" on Justia Law

In 2005, Winyah Bay Holdings, LLC held an event aimed at selling marsh-front lots located in South Island Plantation, an affluent, unbuilt housing development. Winyah conducted the sale by lottery, and geared the event toward on-the-spot sales. Winyah had Wachovia Bank and two unrelated realty and marketing companies (the Realtors) set up booths to promote financing the lot sales. Respondents alleged that Winyah, the Realtors, and Wachovia further enticed potential buyers by promising that "day docks, roads, infrastructure, pool [sic], marsh walks, and other amenities would be in place within 18 months of the lottery." Respondents William and Judith Blackburn claimed these promises got them to participate in the lottery. Over six months later, Respondent William Blackburn delivered a promissory note to Wachovia in the amount of $463,967 to finance the purchase of one of the lots. The note was secured by a mortgage and unconditional personal guaranties executed by Tammy Winner, Watson Felder, and Respondents. Sometime in 2008, Respondents failed to make payments on the note. Wachovia then filed a foreclosure action. Respondents answered, asserting counterclaims against Wachovia, cross-claims against the South Island Plantation Association, Incorporated (the HOA), and a third-party complaint against the Seller and the Realtors. At issue here were the counterclaims against Wachovia, which included claims for negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, breach of contract/breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud/fraud in the inducement, breach of contract/negligence, breach of contract, civil conspiracy, illegality of contract, and violations of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (the SCUTPA). Wachovia appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse the circuit court's determination that Respondents' counterclaims were within the scope of a jury trial waiver in the property sales documents. The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the appellate courts' judgment finding that the waivers were executed knowingly and voluntarily; however, the Court reversed the portion finding that the outrageous and unforeseeable torts exception to arbitration applies in the jury trial waiver context, and found instead that Respondents waived their right to a jury trial on all of their counterclaims. View "Wachovia Bank v. Blackburn" on Justia Law

In 2006, DLI Properties, LLC (DLI), hired Allen Tate, a real estate brokerage firm, and Faile, Allen Tate's licensee, to serve as its agents in connection with the sale of certain real property in Lancaster, South Carolina. Petitioners, using Sharon Davis of Davis Integrity Realty, Inc. as their broker, offered to purchase the property. Petitioners sued Respondents alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (the SCUTPA) based on DLI's acceptance of an offer on the property and Faile's representation that DLI would accept Petitioner's offer. Petitioners claimed Respondents made misrepresentations concerning the validity and effectiveness of their agreement to purchase the property. Petitioners asserted Respondents had a duty of care to communicate truthful information to Petitioners, and breached that duty by failing to disclose the ultimately successful offer, and the fact that DLI had not signed Petitioners' offer. Petitioners further alleged Respondents demonstrated a pattern of behavior sufficient to establish a SCUTPA violation. Petitioners appealed the circuit court's decision that granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondents. After careful consideration of the circumstances of the deal, the Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the appellate court erred only by not addressing the merits of Petitioners' appeal. On the merits, the Court affirmed the circuit court as modified. View "Woodson v. DLI Properties" on Justia Law

In December 2004, Atlantic Carolina Retail, LLC loaned $3,075,000 to Monarch Development, LLC. Atlantic collateralized the loan by taking a mortgage on three properties. Atlantic purchased a title insurance policy from First American Title Insurance Company to insure these mortgage interests against potential title defects. Subsequently, Atlantic assigned the mortgages and secured debt to Preservation Capital Consultants, LLC. In 2008, Monarch Development sold its parcel and paid Preservation Capital money to release its lien on that property. Then, Monarch defaulted on its loan agreement with Preservation Capital. Preservation Capital discovered Monarch Development never owned the parcel; instead, Monarch Holdings owned it. Monarch Holdings later transferred the property to a third party without payment or notice to Preservation Capital. Preservation Capital ultimately foreclosed. Atlantic purchased the property at the foreclosure sale by way of a credit bid. After foreclosing on the parcel, Monarch Development owed Preservation Capital a remaining balance. Preservation Capital filed a claim under its policy with First American for the amount it was unable to collect on the one of the other parcels due to the title defect. First American denied coverage. Preservation Capital filed this action when First American refused its claim. Both parties moved for summary judgment. First American Title Insurance Company appealed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Preservation Capital. First American argued the circuit court misconstrued the terms of the title insurance policy in finding Preservation Capital was entitled to recover under the policy. Finding the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Preservation Capital, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Preservation Capital v. First American" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was a court of appeals' finding that Wachovia Bank, N.A. committed the unauthorized practice of law in closing a home equity loan in 2001. In 2001, Michael Coffey obtained a home equity line of credit from the Bank, using a Hilton Head Island home as collateral. While the mortgage documents the Bank prepared contained language that Michael owned the home, he was not on the title to the home. It belonged to his wife Ann alone. Ann did not sign the line of credit papers. The money was used to purchase a sailboat, the title of which placed in the name of A&M Partners, a company both Michael and Ann jointly owned. Michael made payments on the boat from a personal checking account. He died in 2005, and Ann continued to make payments from the same personal checking account until she decided to sell the boat through a broker. The Broker checked the status of the Bank's loan. It informed Ann that there was no lien or mortgage on the boat. Believing that the boat was then paid for, she sold the boat in 2006 and stopped making payments. Six months later, the Bank filed a foreclosure action against Michael's estate. Ann moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted her motion for summary judgment, citing the Bank's failure to perform due diligence to see that Michael did not own the property the Bank used as collateral for the loan. Finding that the Bank never held a valid mortgage, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant summary judgment. View "Wachovia Bank v. Coffey" on Justia Law