Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Robert W. Oskin, Glenn Small, and Freddie Kanos (collectively "Appellants") contested the Master-in-Equity's ruling that the assignment of a note and mortgage on a Myrtle Beach property did not violate the South Carolina Fraudulent Conveyance Statute, and that a payment made to South Carolina Bank & Trust (SCB&T) did not result in a pay-off of the amount due under the note and mortgage. Oskin entered into a contract to broker the sale of Wild Wing Plantation and Golf Course on behalf of Respondent Stephen Johnson (Johnson). The contract obligated Johnson to pay Oskin a finder's fee upon closing. Oskin found a buyer for the property, and the deal was closed. Johnson, however, failed to pay the finder's fee, and Oskin brought suit successfully obtaining a judgment against Johnson. While the breach of contract action was pending, Johnson approached his uncle, Respondent Michael Brown, about jointly purchasing an oceanfront lot and home located in Myrtle Beach. Johnson and Brown co-signed a promissory note to jointly purchase the property. Title to the property was conveyed to Brown and Johnson as tenants in common. In addition to the SCB&T mortgage, the property was later encumbered by a second mortgage lien in favor of Ameris Bank. Initially, Johnson made the monthly interest-only payments on the SCB&T note until early 2008 when he could no longer afford to; Brown paid the remaining monthly payments. Faced with his nephew unable to make payments on the loan, and because the Myrtle Beach property was appraised at a value considerably less than what was owed, Brown's wife Joan Brown formed an LLC to obtain another loan to pay down debt owed to SCB&T. The parties disputed the motive for the formation of the LLC and the subsequent assignment of the note. Oskin's complaint centered enforcement of his judgment for the finder's fee and its subrogation to that of the various banks once notes on the property were reassigned. Finding no error with the Master-in-Equity's ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oskin v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Savannah Bank, N.A., (Bank) sought to foreclose on a property owned by Appellant Alphonse Stalliard. Appellant argued that he should not be held liable for a loan closed by a person acting on his behalf under a power of attorney. Appellant alleged, inter alia, that Bank did not conduct reasonable due diligence and did not verify Appellant's ability to pay. He filed a motion seeking additional time for discovery. The master-in-equity denied the motion and ruled in Bank's favor. Appellant appealed that decision, arguing that summary judgment was improper and that the master should have permitted additional time for discovery. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the master properly denied Appellant's motion. View "Savannah Bank v. Stalliard" on Justia Law

Appellant Library Associates purchased a building located at 404 King Street (404 King) which was formerly the main branch of the Charleston County Public Library. Charleston City Council adopted Zoning Ordinance 2007-147, which rezoned the entire 404 King property. Respondents Historic Charleston Foundation and Preservation Society of Charleston then brought this action to challenge the ordinance's legality. The master invalidated the ordinance finding it was unlawful spot zoning. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed: "Zoning ordinances are presumed valid and the person attacking one bears the burden of showing the zoning decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, and unjust. In passing on the validity of a zoning ordinance, it is not within a court's prerogative to pass upon the wisdom or expediency of the municipality's decision. Respondents did not meet their heavy burden here." View "Historic Charleston v. City of Charleston" on Justia Law

Carolina Park Associates, LLC, lost its interest in a parcel of real property through foreclosure. At the foreclosure sale, an affiliate of one of Carolina Park Associates’ members purchased the property. Appellant Republic-Charleston, the managing member of Carolina Park Associates, contended that the circuit court erred when it dismissed claims seeking to impose a constructive trust in the property and when it cancelled a lis pendens filed by Appellants. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Appellants failed to state a claim for which imposition of a constructive trust would have been an appropriate remedy because the facts alleged, even viewed in the light most favorable to them, did not present circumstances in which an equitable remedy was required or needed. Moreover, because dismissal of the claims seeking to impose a constructive trust on the Property was proper, cancellation of the lis pendens was proper. View "Carolina Park Associates v. Marino" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court certified the following question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: "In the case of a partial failure of title which is covered by an owner's title insurance policy, where the title defect cannot be removed, should the actual loss suffered by the insured as a result of that partial failure of title be measured by the diminution in value of the insured property as a result of the title defect as of the date of the purchase of the insured property, or as of the date of the discovery of the title defect?" The Court answered the question: consult the contract. "[W]here the insurance contract unambiguously identifies a date for measuring the diminution in value of the insured property or otherwise unambiguously provides for the method of valuation as a result of the title defect, such date or method is controlling. Where, as here, the insurance contract does not unambiguously identify a date for measuring the diminution in value of the insured property or otherwise unambiguously provide for the method of valuation as a result of the title defect, such ambiguity requires a construction allowing for the measure of damages most favorable to the insured. . . .In sum, although [the Court acknowledged] the apparent inequity in [its] answer to the certified question, the resolution of this question [was] not a matter of equity. Rather, [the] Court [was] faced with the task of construing an insurance policy, and in the presence of an ambiguity [it was] constrained to interpret it most favorably to the insured." View "Whitlock v. Stewart Title" on Justia Law

Appellant Jay Warren appealed an order that denied his Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b)(1), SCRCP motions, as well as his independent motion to set aside a judgment sale. On appeal, he contested only the denial of his motion to set aside. Warren is a state bail bondsman, and Respondent Arrow Bonding Company is also in the bond business. Warren agreed to be responsible if a mutual client forfeited a surety bond issued by Respondent. In October 2006, Respondent obtained a $5,120.00 judgment against Warren after the client forfeited. In August 2007, the clerk issued a Judgment Execution, and on September 19, 2007, the sheriff issued an Execution Account Statement. In this statement, he reported receiving a $1,000 payment from Warren, from which he deducted his $52.50 fee, leaving $947.50 to be applied against the debt. After deducting the $947.50 and adding the interest accrued as of September 19, 2007, Warren's judgment debt stood at $4,705.15. In January 2008, Respondent brought an action to foreclose its judgment lien. Warren did not answer, and the clerk granted Respondent's motions, ordering entry of the default against Warren, and referring the matter to the Master-in-Equity. On the sales day, Warren went to the sheriff's office and tendered the amount due under the original judgment, not the amount then due in light of the accumulated interest and other fees. The Master issued a deed to Respondent, who bought all of Warren's properties, which were sold at the sale as a single lot, leaving a deficiency. Warren filed a motion to set aside the default order under Rule 55(c) and/or Rule 60(b), and to set aside the foreclosure deed. The Master denied all relief requested, and denied the request to reconsider his decision. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Master did not err in refusing to set aside the sale or by selling the properties as a single lot. View "Arrow Bonding Company v. Warren" on Justia Law

Stephen E. Lipscomb ("Appellant"), the manager of SEL Properties, LLC ("SEL") appealed a jury verdict against him for tortious interference with a contract entered into by SEL with Dutch Fork Development Group, II, LLC and Dutch Fork Realty, LLC (collectively "Respondents"). Appellant contended that he could not be held individually liable in tort for a contract that was breached by SEL. Alternatively, Appellant challenged the jury's award of $3,000,000 in actual damages to Respondents on grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in charging the jury that lost customers and lost goodwill were elements of damages as there was no evidence of such damages; and (2) that the award was improper and should have been reduced as the actual damages for the tort claim were "coextensive" with or subsumed in the jury's award of actual damages to Respondents for the breach of contract claim against SEL. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict as to the claim of tortious interference with a contract. Accordingly, the Court reversed the jury's award of damages. View "Dutch Fork Development v. SEL Properties" on Justia Law

Appellant RFT Management Co., L.L.C. (RFT) brought this action against respondents Tinsley & Adams, L.L.P. and attorney Welborn D. Adams (collectively, Law Firm) based on their legal representation of RFT during the closing of its purchase of two real estate investment properties in Greenwood County. RFT alleged claims for (1) professional negligence (legal malpractice), (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act1 (UTPA), and (4) aiding and abetting a securities violation in contravention of the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act of 2005 (SCUSA). The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Law Firm on RFT's causes of action regarding the UTPA and SCUSA, and it merged RFT's breach of fiduciary claim with its legal malpractice claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Law Firm on RFT's remaining claim for legal malpractice. RFT appealed, and the Supreme Court certified the case from the Court of Appeals for its review. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court with respect to all issues brought on appeal. View "RFT Management Co. v. Tinsley & Adams" on Justia Law

Two issues came before the Supreme Court in this case: (1) whether an assignee of a note and mortgage has a right to surplus funds generated by the foreclosure of a prior mortgage on the property; and (2) whether that assignee is barred from recovering the surplus funds because the note and mortgage assigned to it allegedly were closed without attorney participation. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the assignee may recover the surplus funds even though it was not a lienholder of record at the time of the sale. The Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify its decision in "Matrix Financial Services Corp. v. Frazer," (714 S.E.2d 532 (2011)), and held that because the mortgage at issue in this case was filed before "Matrix," whether it was closed without the services of an attorney would not bar the assignee from receiving the surplus funds. View "BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P. v. Kinder " on Justia Law

Brentwood Homes, Inc. and the other appellants in this case (collectively "Brentwood Homes") appealed a circuit court's order denying a motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration in a lawsuit filed by Petitioner Fred Bradley that arose out of his purchase of a home in South Carolina. Although Brentwood Homes conceded the Home Purchase Agreement did not meet the technical requirements of the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act (the "UAA"), it claimed the court erred in denying the motion because the transaction involved interstate commerce and thus was subject to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the essential character of the Agreement was strictly for the purchase of a completed residential dwelling and not the construction, the Court found the FAA did not apply. Furthermore, the existence of the national warranty and Bradley's use of out-of-state financing did not negate the intrastate nature of the transaction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying Brentwood Homes' motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration as Brentwood Homes failed to offer sufficient evidence that the transaction involved interstate commerce to subject the Agreement to the FAA.