Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Carolina Chloride, Inc. sued Richland County alleging the County incorrectly advised it of the legal zoning classification of its property and that it lost a potential sale of the property due to the zoning issue.  The trial judge directed a verdict for the County on all of Carolina Chloride's claims.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded as to the claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation but upheld the directed verdict as to Carolina Chloride's remaining claims. On appeal, the County argued the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the directed verdict in its favor on Carolina Chloride's claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that "[a]lthough it is certainly unfortunate that a mistake occurred in this case, Carolina Chloride had no legal right to rely solely upon the representations of County personnel and should have consulted the official record to determine the legal zoning classification of its property.  Carolina Chloride's owner and its broker are both experienced in business matters, but it appears that neither [the Company] nor his broker personally inspected the County's official records prior to making a sizable investment in developing the property."  The Court reversed the appellate court's decision with respect to the directed verdict as to the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims. The Court affirmed the appellate court on all other matters.

Albert Epstein sued Coastal Timber Co., Inc. (Coastal) for damages, alleging that Coastal cut and removed standing timber that was subject to mortgages he held on property he owned. The circuit court found Mr. Epstein failed to properly secure an interest in the timber under South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Epstein appealed that decision, arguing that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Coastal after finding his mortgages did not constitute a lien on the standing timber cut by Coastal. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Epstein that the UCC did not convert all standing timber to goods and thereby divest him of his interest in the timber. The Court concluded that "the proper analysis is not one of cancellation but of priority. [...] any security interest later recorded on timber to be cut under a contract of sale would be junior to any existing interests. To hold otherwise would allow a mortgagor to unilaterally void an existing lien imposed by a mortgage on the real property, which includes the timber, simply by thereafter executing a contract to sell the timber." The Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Georgetown County League of Women Voters appealed an order that dismissed its action that sought a declaration that Respondent Smith Land Company had unlawfully filled wetlands and dismissed its request for an injunction requiring Smith to restore those wetlands. Respondent owns a .332 acre lot in Pawleys Island, .19 acres of which are isolated wetlands often referred to as Carolina Bays. Before developing the lot, Respondent notified both the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) of its plans. While the Corps cautioned respondent to notify DHEC before performing the work and respondent did so, it received no response from DHEC. Respondent then filled the wetlands. The League then filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and related equitable relief. After a hearing, the circuit court held that DHEC did not have jurisdiction over isolated wetlands, that Respondent complied with all requirements before filling the wetlands, and that the League could not maintain a private suit under the South Carolina Pollution Control Act. Finding that the circuit court erred in holding that: (1) the DHEC lacked jurisdiction to regulate the wetlands; (2) Respondent did not violate the Act; and (3) the Act does not create a private cause of action, the Supreme Court reversed the reversed the case and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Following the resolution of his partition action in probate court, Petitioner James Judy (James) filed a "waste" suit in circuit court against his brother, Respondent Ronnie Judy (Ronnie), for the destruction of a pond located on a tract of real property involved in the partition. A jury found in favor of James and awarded him damages. Ronnie appealed the jury's verdict, arguing the circuit court erred in declining to dismiss the suit against him on the basis of laches, collateral estoppel, or res judicata. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss Ronnie's suit on the basis of collateral estoppel and laches. However, the court reversed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss the suit on the basis of res judicata. The Supreme Court granted James's petition to review the appellate court's decision as to whether res judicata operated to preclude the waste lawsuit. James contended the prior probate court action was conducted for the limited purpose of partitioning the real property of the Estate. Because the subject matter of his waste claim was not identical to the partition action, James asserted that the requisite elements of res judicata were not satisfied. The Supreme Court found that because the tort duties that were breached and the evidence was the same in both the probate and waste proceedings, there was "identity of subject matter" for the purposes of res judicata. Yet in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, James attempted to "split" his cause of action for waste by pursuing and procuring another remedy in circuit court for an identical claim. Given the probate court could have fully adjudicated the waste cause of action, James was precluded from initiating a second lawsuit in the circuit court as this cause of action could have been raised in the former suit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision effectively dismissing James' appeal.

Appellants the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM), and the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League appealed a final order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that granted Respondent Jerry Risher's "critical area permit" application to construct a bridge over a portion of wetlands contained within his property on Fripp Island. Respondent owns less than a half-acre, half of which is "upland high ground" or build-able property. The remainder of the property partially surrounds the build-able portion and is composed of wetlands. One year prior to Respondent's purchase of the lot, his predecessor in title applied to the DHEC and was approved for a critical area permit to construct a vehicular bridge across the non-build-able wetland portion of the lot to connect with the nearest vehicular road. In 2006, Respondent began to construct a bridge similar to the one previously submitted and approved by his predecessor in title. To that end, Respondent submitted a permit application to OCRM. OCRM took the matter under advisement but ultimately denied Respondent's application based on its finding that the upland build-able portion of the lot qualified as a coastal island which was too small to allow bridge access. After exhausting DHEC's review options, Respondent filed a request for review by the ALC. A hearing was held, and the ALC issued an order reversing DHEC's denial of Respondent's permit request. DHEC appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that there was insufficient evidence before the ALC to reverse its decision. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence sufficient to support the ALC's decision. The Court affirmed the ALC's decision in support of Respondent.

The Town of Rockville is listed in the National Register of Historic Places. Appellant Marc Merrill owns a historic home in Rockville. The property abuts a marsh. Appellant obtained a permit from the state Office of Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) to construct a dock and walkway on property he owned in Respondent Town of Rockville (Rockville). He then sought approval to construct the dock from the Rockville Design Review Board DRB which, pursuant to a newly adopted municipal ordinance, had to approve the construction of any dock or walkway already permitted by OCRM. The DRB declined to approve construction, and Appellant unsuccessfully appealed to circuit court. Although appellants raised numerous issues on appeal, the Supreme Court addressed only whether the evidence presented to the DRB was sufficient to support its conclusion that Appellant's proposed dock and walkway would impede a scenic rural view. Upon consideration of the DRB's review of Appellant's dock proposal, the Court found that there was simply nothing in the record to support the DRB's finding. Accordingly, the Court reversed both the DRB's and circuit court's decisions in this case, and remanded it for further proceedings.

Appellant Don Phillips was the sole shareholder and officer in Crystal Lake Land Developers, Inc.(CLLD). In 1979, CLLD began developing Crystal Pines, and deeded all the roads in Crystal Pines to the Crystal Lake Road Company. In the mid 1980s, the Road Company operated as a simple homeowners association, but eventually changed its name to Crystal Pines Homeowners Association (HOA). CLLD attempted to execute a second deed to reflect the change of the Road Companyâs name to the HOA. The second deed stated that the HOA would be responsible for fixing the roads in Crystal Pines. In 1980, CLLD constructed a boat ramp that many of the homeowners used regularly. In 2004, CLLD gated and locked the boat ramp, and later conveyed title of the ramp to his son. The son then transferred title of the ramp to the Crystal Pines Yacht Club, which continued to keep the ramp locked from the residents. The HOA filed suit against Phillips, CLLD and the Yacht Club over who was responsible for maintaining Crystal Pinesâ roads, and for access to the boat ramp. The master-in-equity ruled in favor of the HOA, and Phillips, CLLD and the Yacht Club appealed. The Supreme Court found the deed in question unambiguous pertaining to who was responsible for fixing the roads. The Court found that CLLD and Phillips are not responsible for maintaining all of Crystal Pinesâ roads, only those roads they damage as a result of their development efforts. However, the Court found the mater did not err in finding that the HOA had established a prescriptive easement in its use of the boat ramp. The Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower courtâs decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that which it reversed.

"The Hamlets" is a subdivision within Crowfield Plantation. Covenants for the subdivision were drafted and recorded in 1991. The covenants created an Architectural Review Board that would enforce the terms of the covenants of the subdivision. Respondents John and Pamela Matsell live in the Hamlets, and their lot abuts a golf course. Their next door neighbors built a fence that covers the majority of the backyard that can be seen from the street that fronts the property, in violation of the covenants. In 2007, the Matsells filed a complaint with the Architectural Review Board to have the Board order the neighbors to remove the fence. When the Board did not comply, the Matsells filed their complaint with the circuit court. The Board argued that it had discretion in interpreting and enforcing the subdivision covenants. The trial court read the "clear language" of the covenants, and found the fence was in violation. The court granted the Matsells summary judgment, and the Board appealed. The Supreme Court found the language of the covenants was plain and unambiguous, and did not allow for a fence that could be seen from the street. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision granting the Matsells summary judgment.