Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in South Carolina Supreme Court
CFRE v. Greenville County Assesor
In 2004, Sherry Ray formed CFRE, a single-member limited liability company with herself as the sole member. CFRE conducts no business and was formed solely for estate planning and asset protection purposes. To that end, Ray declined to have CFRE taxed as a corporation and, in 2006, deeded the title in her home to it. Because there was a conveyance by deed of the property, the Greenville County Assessor automatically commenced a reassessment of the property for the 2007 tax year. Accordingly, the property was subjected to the default property tax ratio of six percent until CFRE could prove entitlement to the lower ratio under section 12-43-220. When CFRE sought the four percent ratio, the Assessor denied it eligibility. CFRE, LLC appealed the decision of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that held that real estate owned by the company was not entitled to the residential tax ratio. Furthermore, CFRE argued the ALC erred in not sanctioning the Assessor for failing to respond to discovery requests from CFRE. While the Supreme Court held the ALC did not abuse its discretion in not sanctioning the Assessor, the Court reversed the ALC's conclusion regarding CFRE's entitlement to the legal residence tax ratio and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Clarendon County v. TYKAT
Appellant-Respondent Tykat, Inc. appealed an Administrative Law Court's (ALC) decision that upheld Clarendon County's tax assessment on real property Tykat leased from the South Carolina Public Service Authority. Tykat contended the leased property was exempt from tax because the South Carolina Public Service Authority is constitutionally exempt from paying taxes and because Tykat's use of the property may be classified as a public purpose. Clarendon County (through its Assessor) cross-appealed the Administrative Law Court's denial of its request for attorneys' fees and costs. Upon review of the lower court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the ALC. Based on the limited challenge raised by Tykat, its leasehold interest was subject to ad valorem taxation under the plain language of section 12-37-950 of the South Carolina Code (2000): "[t]hus, [the Court was] bound to apply the statute as written." Furthermore, the Court affirmed the denial of Clarendon County's request for attorneys' fees and costs.
Hilton Head Automotive, LLC v. So. Carolina Dept. of Transportation
In response to population growth and business development along U.S. Highway 278 in Beaufort County, the South Carolina Department of Transportation ("the Department") engaged experts for the purpose of streamlining the flow of traffic on that highway. The properties on the north side of Highway 278 agreed among themselves to share the cost of modifying and/or building private roads that would allow left turn access to all of their properties by way of the new median crossover. The properties on the south side of the highway, however, were unable to reach such an agreement. As a result, Appellant Hilton Head Automotive's (HHA) propertyâwhich is on the south side of the highwayâlost its immediate left turn access to and from Highway 278. Nonetheless, HHA retained direct right turn access to and from the eastbound lanes of Highway 278. HHA argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Department's reconfiguration of the median crossovers on U.S. Highway 278 was a taking because it deprived Appellant and its customers of the ability to enter or exit the highway by making a left turn. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the Department of Transportation.
Matrix Financial Services Corp. v. Frazer
Appellant Matthew Kundinger received a default judgment against Louis and Linda Frazer (the Frazers) before the Frazers closed a refinance mortgage with Matrix Financial Services Corporation (Matrix). In Matrix's foreclosure action, the master-in-equity granted Matrix equitable subrogation, giving the refinance mortgage priority over Appellant's judgment lien. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging his judgment had priority over Matrix's mortgage because it had been recorded first. Matrix, attempting to gain the primary priority position, then sought to have the refinance mortgage equitably subrogated to the rights of its January 2001 mortgage. The master-in-equity granted Matrix's request, and Appellant appealed that order. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that a lender that refinances its own debt is not entitled to equitable subrogation. The Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Carolina Chloride v. Richland County
Carolina Chloride, Inc. sued Richland County alleging the County incorrectly advised it of the legal zoning classification of its property and that it lost a potential sale of the property due to the zoning issue. The trial judge directed a verdict for the County on all of Carolina Chloride's claims. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded as to the claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation but upheld the directed verdict as to Carolina Chloride's remaining claims. On appeal, the County argued the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the directed verdict in its favor on Carolina Chloride's claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that "[a]lthough it is certainly unfortunate that a mistake occurred in this case, Carolina Chloride had no legal right to rely solely upon the representations of County personnel and should have consulted the official record to determine the legal zoning classification of its property. Carolina Chloride's owner and its broker are both experienced in business matters, but it appears that neither [the Company] nor his broker personally inspected the County's official records prior to making a sizable investment in developing the property." The Court reversed the appellate court's decision with respect to the directed verdict as to the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims. The Court affirmed the appellate court on all other matters.
Epstein v. Coastal Timber Co., Inc.
Albert Epstein sued Coastal Timber Co., Inc. (Coastal) for damages, alleging that Coastal cut and removed standing timber that was subject to mortgages he held on property he owned. The circuit court found Mr. Epstein failed to properly secure an interest in the timber under South Carolina's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Epstein appealed that decision, arguing that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Coastal after finding his mortgages did not constitute a lien on the standing timber cut by Coastal. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Epstein that the UCC did not convert all standing timber to goods and thereby divest him of his interest in the timber. The Court concluded that "the proper analysis is not one of cancellation but of priority. [...] any security interest later recorded on timber to be cut under a contract of sale would be junior to any existing interests. To hold otherwise would allow a mortgagor to unilaterally void an existing lien imposed by a mortgage on the real property, which includes the timber, simply by thereafter executing a contract to sell the timber." The Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Georgetown County League of Women Voters v. Smith Land Co.
Appellant Georgetown County League of Women Voters appealed an order that dismissed its action that sought a declaration that Respondent Smith Land Company had unlawfully filled wetlands and dismissed its request for an injunction requiring Smith to restore those wetlands. Respondent owns a .332 acre lot in Pawleys Island, .19 acres of which are isolated wetlands often referred to as Carolina Bays. Before developing the lot, Respondent notified both the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) of its plans. While the Corps cautioned respondent to notify DHEC before performing the work and respondent did so, it received no response from DHEC. Respondent then filled the wetlands. The League then filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and related equitable relief. After a hearing, the circuit court held that DHEC did not have jurisdiction over isolated wetlands, that Respondent complied with all requirements before filling the wetlands, and that the League could not maintain a private suit under the South Carolina Pollution Control Act. Finding that the circuit court erred in holding that: (1) the DHEC lacked jurisdiction to regulate the wetlands; (2) Respondent did not violate the Act; and (3) the Act does not create a private cause of action, the Supreme Court reversed the reversed the case and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Judy v. Judy
Following the resolution of his partition action in probate court, Petitioner James Judy (James) filed a "waste" suit in circuit court against his brother, Respondent Ronnie Judy (Ronnie), for the destruction of a pond located on a tract of real property involved in the partition. A jury found in favor of James and awarded him damages. Ronnie appealed the jury's verdict, arguing the circuit court erred in declining to dismiss the suit against him on the basis of laches, collateral estoppel, or res judicata. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss Ronnie's suit on the basis of collateral estoppel and laches. However, the court reversed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss the suit on the basis of res judicata. The Supreme Court granted James's petition to review the appellate court's decision as to whether res judicata operated to preclude the waste lawsuit. James contended the prior probate court action was conducted for the limited purpose of partitioning the real property of the Estate. Because the subject matter of his waste claim was not identical to the partition action, James asserted that the requisite elements of res judicata were not satisfied. The Supreme Court found that because the tort duties that were breached and the evidence was the same in both the probate and waste proceedings, there was "identity of subject matter" for the purposes of res judicata. Yet in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, James attempted to "split" his cause of action for waste by pursuing and procuring another remedy in circuit court for an identical claim. Given the probate court could have fully adjudicated the waste cause of action, James was precluded from initiating a second lawsuit in the circuit court as this cause of action could have been raised in the former suit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision effectively dismissing James' appeal.
Risher v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control
Appellants the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM), and the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League appealed a final order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that granted Respondent Jerry Risher's "critical area permit" application to construct a bridge over a portion of wetlands contained within his property on Fripp Island. Respondent owns less than a half-acre, half of which is "upland high ground" or build-able property. The remainder of the property partially surrounds the build-able portion and is composed of wetlands. One year prior to Respondent's purchase of the lot, his predecessor in title applied to the DHEC and was approved for a critical area permit to construct a vehicular bridge across the non-build-able wetland portion of the lot to connect with the nearest vehicular road. In 2006, Respondent began to construct a bridge similar to the one previously submitted and approved by his predecessor in title. To that end, Respondent submitted a permit application to OCRM. OCRM took the matter under advisement but ultimately denied Respondent's application based on its finding that the upland build-able portion of the lot qualified as a coastal island which was too small to allow bridge access. After exhausting DHEC's review options, Respondent filed a request for review by the ALC. A hearing was held, and the ALC issued an order reversing DHEC's denial of Respondent's permit request. DHEC appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that there was insufficient evidence before the ALC to reverse its decision. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence sufficient to support the ALC's decision. The Court affirmed the ALC's decision in support of Respondent.
Rockville Haven v. Town of Rockville
The Town of Rockville is listed in the National Register of Historic Places. Appellant Marc Merrill owns a historic home in Rockville. The property abuts a marsh. Appellant obtained a permit from the state Office of Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) to construct a dock and walkway on property he owned in Respondent Town of Rockville (Rockville). He then sought approval to construct the dock from the Rockville Design Review Board DRB which, pursuant to a newly adopted municipal ordinance, had to approve the construction of any dock or walkway already permitted by OCRM. The DRB declined to approve construction, and Appellant unsuccessfully appealed to circuit court. Although appellants raised numerous issues on appeal, the Supreme Court addressed only whether the evidence presented to the DRB was sufficient to support its conclusion that Appellant's proposed dock and walkway would impede a scenic rural view. Upon consideration of the DRB's review of Appellant's dock proposal, the Court found that there was simply nothing in the record to support the DRB's finding. Accordingly, the Court reversed both the DRB's and circuit court's decisions in this case, and remanded it for further proceedings.