Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in South Dakota Supreme Court
by
Steve and Monica Zirbel purchased two landlocked parcels along Lake Alice in Deuel County, South Dakota, with neither parcel abutting a maintained roadway. After discovering that their presumed section line right-of-way access had been vacated, as asserted by local officials, they attempted to negotiate with neighboring landowners for access easements. When negotiations failed, they applied to the Deuel County Board of County Commissioners for statutory access under SDCL chapter 31-22. The Board initially denied their application, reasoning the parcels were not “isolated” because Lake Alice provided public highway access. Upon appeal, the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit disagreed with the Board’s reasoning, finding the parcels to be isolated, and remanded the case for further proceedings.Following remand, the Board conducted site visits and obtained an appraisal to assess damages for proposed right-of-way routes. The Board ultimately selected a route and assessed substantial damages divided among affected landowners, also charging the Zirbels for the appraisal cost. The Zirbels appealed again to the circuit court, challenging the damages assessment, the appraisal cost, and alleging a conflict of interest for one Board member. The circuit court reviewed the Board’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard, affirmed the damages assessment and access route, but reversed the appraisal cost charge to the Zirbels.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, including a trial de novo. The Court held that the Board’s action was quasi-judicial, not quasi-legislative, requiring de novo review. The Court also directed the circuit court to determine whether the section line right-of-way had been lawfully vacated and whether the appraisal cost was a proper expense under SDCL 31-22-6. View "Zirbel v. Deuel County" on Justia Law

by
The plaintiff acquired real property via a tax deed after the previous owner, a limited liability company, failed to pay property taxes. The property had originally been purchased by two individuals who later transferred ownership to the LLC. When the LLC did not pay taxes for 2015, the county sold the property at a tax sale, with the plaintiff eventually purchasing the tax certificate and being assigned it in 2020. The plaintiff attempted to serve notice of intent to take a tax deed on the LLC at multiple addresses and ultimately provided the notice to the Minnesota Secretary of State, which accepted service as the LLC’s registered agent. The LLC did not redeem the property, and the county issued a tax deed to the plaintiff.The Seventh Judicial Circuit Court in Pennington County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the tax deed was void because notice was not personally served on the LLC. The plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court of South Dakota previously reversed that decision in Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC, holding that service on the Secretary of State constituted personal service. On remand, the plaintiff sought an order quieting title, but the circuit court denied this, later granting the defendants’ motion to make redemption and ordering the county to issue a certificate of redemption to the defendants. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the defendants were entitled to redeem the property. The Court held that the plaintiff properly acquired the tax deed under SDCL chapter 10-25 and followed the statutory procedure for quieting title under SDCL chapter 21-41. Because the LLC, the owner of record, did not timely redeem, the plaintiff owns the property in fee. The Court reversed the circuit court’s order granting redemption to the defendants and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC" on Justia Law

by
The case involves a dispute between neighboring property owners regarding an express easement for ingress and egress known as Canyon Creek Lane in Butte County, South Dakota. The express easement was created as part of a property sale and recorded, obligating each owner to contribute to maintenance costs. Tanya Lorenz acquired one of the parcels benefiting from the easement but later constructed her own driveway with direct access to Highway 34. Plaintiffs alleged that Tanya’s easement rights should be extinguished due to abandonment and lack of necessity, pointing to her nonuse, installation of a gate, lack of maintenance contributions, and creation of a new access. They also alleged nuisance conduct by Tanya.In the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, the court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their claims, finding Tanya had abandoned the easement and that it was extinguished due to lack of necessity. The court also found Tanya’s conduct constituted a nuisance, but did not award damages for that claim. At trial, the court determined Tanya was responsible for nine years of maintenance costs for the easement and awarded Plaintiffs $6,750 in damages. Tanya appealed the summary judgment and damages award.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that summary judgment on abandonment was improper because genuine issues of material fact remained regarding Tanya’s intent and use of the easement. The Court also reversed the extinguishment of the easement for lack of necessity, noting that such a condition does not apply to express easements unless specified in the agreement. Summary judgment on the nuisance claim was also reversed due to insufficient evidence of substantial or unreasonable interference. The Court affirmed the award of damages for maintenance costs and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Maher v. Lorenz" on Justia Law

by
The case involves a dispute among members of the O’Farrell family and related entities regarding farmland, family trusts, and a sale of land to a third-party corporation. Paul O’Farrell, having longstanding involvement with the family land and farming operations, brought a lawsuit naming himself, his estate, and Skyline Cattle Company as plaintiffs. He asserted claims for declaratory relief, rescission of a land sale to Grand Valley Hutterian Brethren, Inc., and damages for alleged torts. Paul argued he was acting not only in his individual capacity but also on behalf of the Estate of Victoria O’Farrell, VOR, Inc., and the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust, based on allegations of undue influence and mismanagement involving his brother Kelly and his father Raymond.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Grant County, South Dakota, previously granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing VOR and the Estate as plaintiffs on the grounds that Paul lacked authority to act on their behalf. The court also denied Paul’s request to conduct further discovery under Rule 56(f), his motion to amend the complaint, and his request for a physical and mental examination of Raymond under Rule 35(a). The court additionally awarded attorney fees to certain defendants, finding Paul’s action frivolous.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, agreeing that Paul lacked authority to sue on behalf of VOR and the Estate and could not seek rescission of the land sale as he was not a party to the contract. The Supreme Court also affirmed the denial of additional discovery. However, it vacated the circuit court’s denial of the motion to amend the complaint (insofar as it prevented joining VOR and Raymond as defendants), the denial of the Rule 35(a) examination, and the award of attorney fees, finding those decisions either premature or not sufficiently supported by the record. View "Estate Of O'Farrell v. O'Farrell" on Justia Law

by
A residential subdivision in Black Hawk, South Dakota, known as Hideaway Hills, was constructed atop land with a history of both underground and surface gypsum mining. The State of South Dakota, through the South Dakota Cement Plant Commission, purchased the property, conducted surface mining, and reclaimed the land to pasture before selling it at public auction, while retaining subsurface mineral rights. Subsequent private owners and developers, aware of prior mining activity, developed the land into residential lots. Years later, residents began experiencing foundational problems and sinkholes, which culminated in a significant sinkhole event in 2020, leading to evacuation and property devaluation.After previous lawsuits against various parties were dismissed, a class action was brought in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, against the State and related entities. The plaintiffs alleged inverse condemnation, asserting that the State’s reclamation and retention of subsurface rights amounted to a taking or damaging of private property for public use under the South Dakota Constitution. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the State, holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were, in essence, tort claims barred by sovereign immunity.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a viable inverse condemnation claim because the alleged governmental actions occurred while the State owned the property, and thus did not implicate “private property.” The Court further found that the State’s activities were not for “public use” within the meaning of the state constitution, as the retained mineral rights did not confer a public right of use. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the State. View "Morse v. State" on Justia Law

by
Two neighboring property owners with lakefront lots in the Ramona Beach subdivision became involved in a dispute over the boundary between their properties. The plaintiffs, who purchased their lots in 2005, claimed that they had acquired ownership of a strip of land through adverse possession. This disputed area included portions of two garages that had been built by previous owners and which physically encroach onto the defendants’ lots. The defendants acquired their lots in 2015 and, after conducting a survey, discovered the encroachments. The dispute escalated after the defendants sought to build a new garage, prompting the plaintiffs to initiate a lawsuit to prevent construction and assert adverse possession over the contested land.The Fifth Judicial Circuit Court held a bench trial, heard live and deposition testimony, and reviewed documentary evidence. The court found that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden to prove adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence, specifically concluding that there was no substantial enclosure or usual cultivation or improvement of the disputed land as required by law. However, the court granted the plaintiffs prescriptive easements for the portions of the garages that encroached onto the defendants’ property, though it limited the easements to the actual areas occupied by the garages and immediate areas necessary for their maintenance. The court denied the plaintiffs’ further requests to expand the easements and to add an additional easement for lake access.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court’s findings and legal conclusions, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish adverse possession, and that the prescriptive easements for the garages were properly granted and appropriately limited. The Supreme Court also found that the plaintiffs’ additional claim for a lake access easement was not properly preserved for appeal and was therefore waived. View "Luzier v. Hemmah" on Justia Law

by
The county commission in a South Dakota county adopted an ordinance amending its zoning regulations. The key change was to substitute the “board of adjustment” in place of the “county commission” and “planning and zoning board” as the authority to consider conditional use permit (CUP) applications and variances. Save Centennial Valley Association, a local group, submitted a petition to the county auditor seeking to refer the ordinance to a public vote, arguing that the amendments were legislative actions subject to referendum under state law. The auditor, after consulting with the commission, rejected the petition, determining the ordinance was administrative and not subject to referendum. The petitioners then requested a writ of mandamus from the circuit court to compel the auditor to refer the ordinance to a vote.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, considered the pleadings and granted judgment on the pleadings to the county, denying the request for mandamus. The court found that the ordinance did not constitute a legislative decision and was therefore not subject to the referendum process. The petitioners appealed this determination.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the matter de novo, considering whether the ordinance was legislative or administrative under SDCL 7-18A-15.1. The court held that the ordinance merely executed a plan already adopted by the governing body or by the Legislature and did not create a new rule or policy. The court also clarified that decisions on CUPs, whether made by the commission or the board of adjustment, are quasi-judicial and not subject to referendum. Therefore, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the ordinance was an administrative decision not subject to the referendum process, and the petitioners were not entitled to mandamus relief. View "Save Centennial Valley Association v. Mcgruder" on Justia Law

by
A California company repurposed decommissioned military bunkers in South Dakota as survival shelters, offering them for sale or long-term lease. In 2020, an individual entered into a 99-year lease with the company for one of these bunkers, paying $35,000 upfront. The lease agreement incorporated a set of community rules, which the company reserved the right to modify with 30 days’ written notice. In 2021, the company amended the rules to expressly prohibit the brandishing of firearms except in designated areas. In 2023, the lessee was alleged to have brandished a firearm during an altercation, prompting the company to issue notices to vacate and, ultimately, to file a forcible entry and detainer action when the lessee secured the bunker but refused to return possession.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Fall River County granted summary judgment in favor of the lessee. The court reasoned that the lease was illusory because the company could unilaterally modify the rules at any time, leaving the lessee with no recourse. The court concluded that this rendered the entire lease void and unenforceable, thereby preventing the company from evicting the lessee under the lease.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment order. The Supreme Court held that the lease agreement was supported by valid consideration and was not illusory merely because the company retained the right to modify community rules, as such modifications were constrained by requirements of reasonableness and good faith. The Court ruled that the ability to modify rules, when exercised subject to notice and implied duties of good faith and fair dealing, does not make the underlying contract unenforceable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vivos Xpoint v. Sindorf" on Justia Law

by
Leslie and Karen Turgeon own property in Spearfish, South Dakota, which can only be accessed by the Thoen Stone Road. The City of Spearfish owns the Thoen Stone Monument and the surrounding parkland, and has maintained a locked gate at the northern entrance of the Road for over forty years, providing keys to certain property owners, including the Turgeons. The Turgeons occasionally experienced issues with the key, hindering their access. They filed a declaratory action seeking a determination that the Road is a public right-of-way, asking the court to order the City to remove the gate and any other obstructions, and to enjoin the City from restricting access for themselves and the public.The Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court determined that earlier documents (the 1953 Easement, 1971 Agreement, and 1972 Warranty Deed) did not manifest an intent to dedicate the Road for public use. The court found that the 2012 Plat expressly dedicated the Road as a public right-of-way but concluded that the City had not accepted this dedication, either expressly or impliedly, in part because the locked gate was inconsistent with public use. On this basis, the court granted summary judgment to the City and denied all relief to the Turgeons.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision that the Road was not dedicated for public use until the 2012 Plat, and that there was no express acceptance of dedication by the City. However, it reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment regarding implied acceptance, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the City impliedly accepted the dedication of the Road as a public right-of-way. The case was remanded for trial on this issue. View "Turgeon v. City Of Spearfish" on Justia Law

by
Jay Bryant initiated an action to partition a 40-acre parcel of land, originally conveyed in 1978 to his parents, Lenora and Paul Bryant, as joint tenants. Upon their divorce in 1991, a property settlement stipulated that Paul would receive the parcel as his own, and Lenora would receive a different property. Although the divorce decree incorporated this agreement, Lenora never deeded her interest in the 40 acres to Paul. Paul subsequently transferred his interest to a third party, who then conveyed the property to Jay and his brother Jed. After Paul’s death in 2021 and during probate, a title report revealed that Lenora still legally owned an undivided one-half interest in the property.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, allowed Jay to amend his complaint to add Lenora and bifurcated the quiet title and partition actions. At trial, the court took judicial notice of the divorce file and stipulation and reviewed the chain of warranty deeds. After considering testimony and evidence, the circuit court found that Jay and Jed had a legal interest in the property and that Lenora’s claim was inconsistent with her prior agreement. The court applied judicial estoppel to preclude Lenora from asserting a continuing interest, extinguished her claim, and quieted title in favor of Jay and Jed. The court issued a final judgment on the quiet title action under SDCL 15-6-54(b).The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that Jay had standing under SDCL 21-41-1 to pursue a quiet title action and that the claim was not barred by the 20-year statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-6. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s application of judicial estoppel, concluding Lenora was precluded from asserting an ownership interest after accepting the benefits of the stipulated property settlement. The circuit court’s judgment quieting title in favor of Jay and Jed was affirmed. View "Bryant v. Bryant" on Justia Law