Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Thomas Konrad and Myron Stoebner entered into a contract for the sale of real property. Under the contract, the Stoebners agreed to sell Konrad nine parcels of real estate. The contract contained an arbitration clause. When the Stoebners refused to close on the sale of Parcel 7, Konrad sent the Stoebners a demand for arbitration. The arbitrator ruled that the Stoebners breached the contract and ordered the Stoebners to transfer Parcel 7 to Konrad. The Stoebners moved to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by disregarding the contractual definition of “transfer.” The circuit court denied the Stoebners’ application and confirmed the arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it confirmed the arbitration award in favor of Konrad because the arbitrator did not exceed his powers when he decided the issue submitted. View "Konrad v. Stoebner" on Justia Law

In 2005, Mother executed a power of attorney that appointed her son (Son) as her attorney-in-fact. Mother held a life estate in several properties to which her daughters (Daughters) held remainder interests. Prior to Mother’s death in 2013, Son had been leasing from Mother the land in which Daughters held remainder interests. In 2014, Daughters initiated this suit alleging that Son had breached his farmland lease by failing to pay rent on the property in which they received their remainder interests. The Estate also brought suit alleging that Son breached the fiduciary duties he owed to Mother. Prior to trial, the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude extrinsic evidence of Mother’s intent with regards to the power of attorney. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Daughters on the breach of contract claim and in favor of the Estate on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it prevented Son from introducing relevant evidence related to, inter alia, the circumstances surrounding Mother’s arrangement of leasing her land to her family without charging rent. Remanded for a new trial. View "Hein v. Zoss" on Justia Law

A landowner’s successor in interest, a landowner’s straw man, and judgment lien creditors engaged in competing attempts to redeem in two mortgage foreclosures. The successor in interest successfully redeemed from a judgment lien creditor in the first foreclosure, but a senior mortgagee started a second foreclosure. A second judgment lien creditor redeemed in the second foreclosure, and the second foreclosure court concluded that the landowner and successor in interest waived the right to an owner’s final right of redemption. On appeal from the second foreclosure court’s waiver ruling, the landowner and successor in interest lost the land to the second judgment lien creditor. In the first foreclosure court, the successor in interest and landowner made equitable claims for the recovery of redemption money paid and still in the custody of the sheriff. The circuit court concluded that the landowner and successor in interest had no equitable claim to the money and awarded the money on deposit to the judgment lien creditor from who the redemption had been made. The landowner and successor in interest appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Farmpro Services, Inc. v. Finneman" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Sully County Board of Adjustment granted a conditional use permit (CUP) to Ring-Neck Energy & Feed, LLC for an ethanol plant. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the circuit court alleging that the Board’s decision granting the CUP was illegal. Ring-Neck Energy intervened and moved to quash the writ and dismiss the petition as untimely. The circuit court determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the petition was untimely under S.D. Codified Laws 11-2-61. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners failed timely to appeal the Board’s decision to grant a CUP to Ring-Neck Energy. View "Hyde v. Sully County Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law

In 2007, Brant Lake enacted an ordinance regulating the use of public and private sewers and requiring connection to the public sewer. In 2014, Brant Lake notified Steven and Gloria Thornberry that, pursuant to the ordinance, they must install suitable toilet and sanitation facilities in their dwelling and connect those facilities to the main public sewer line within sixty days. When the Thornberrys had no taken any steps to connect to the main sewer system over a year later, Brant Lake brought this action seeking to enjoin the Thornberrys from using or occupying their property until they connected their dwelling to Brant Lake’s sewer line. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Thornberrys, concluding that the ordinance did not apply to the Thornberrys. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Brant Lake’s ordinances, as written, did not require the Thornberrys to connect to its public sewer system. View "Brant Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Thornberry" on Justia Law

At issue in this dispute was property that consisted of a one-car garage and the land on which it sat. The dispute involved several properties, including Lot 8A, the property formerly owned by Rocky Mattson, who used and maintained the garage. Ron Underhill, the record owner of the other properties involved in this dispute, brought suit against Mattson, Mattson's wife, and Carmen Walton, the current record owner of Lot 8A, to quiet title to the disputed property. Underhill also sought damages and punitive damages on the ground that Walton’s use of the garage amounted to conversion. The trial court concluded that Walton had acquired the disputed property by adverse possession through her predecessors in interest and that Underhill’s conversion claim was moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Underhill’s claims for quiet title and conversion. View "Underhill v. Mattson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendants owned abutting properties. This lawsuit centered on the drainage of water from Defendants’ property onto Plaintiffs’ property. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that Defendants caused an increased amount of drainage on Plaintiffs’ land by altering the natural flow of water across Defendants’ land. After a jury trial, Plaintiffs were awarded $9,950 in damages. Defendants requested judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to offer proof that Defendants caused the increase in drainage. The court denied the motions. The court subsequently granted Plaintiffs a permanent injunction ordering Defendants to pay an additional $28,936 to Plaintiffs for repairs and preventive landscaping. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err by Defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, as Plaintiffs’ testimony was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendants caused the water invasion; and (2) erred in granting the injunction, as S.D. Codified Laws 21-8-14 did not authorize the first half of the injunction, and, even if it did, the second half of the injunction was overbroad and an abuse of discretion. View "Magner v. Brinkman" on Justia Law

Attorney Irene Schrunk represented Mary Ellen Nylen in a divorce and was involved subsequent legal matters regarding Mary Ellen and her new husband, Mark Nylen. When Mark served Mary Ellen with a summons and complaint for divorce, Schrunk advised Mary Ellen that Schrunk could not represent her because Schrunk had represented Mark in the past. On July 31, 2014, Mary Ellen’s adult children, Molly and Brendon, commenced this action against Mary Ellen seeking a declaration that Mary Ellen had gifted them personal property. Molly and Brendon sought to depose Schrunk regarding communications she had with Mary Ellen between November 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014. Mary Ellen moved to prohibit the discovery, citing the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The circuit court determined that the initial communications were privileged but did not extend the privilege to communications and documents shared with Schrunk after January 1, 2014. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mary Ellen failed to meet her burden of proving entitlement to the attorney-client privilege after January 1, 2014, and Mary Ellen waived the privilege with respect to certain documents when she shared with Schrunk privileged communications between Mary Ellen and her current attorneys. View "Nylen v. Nylen" on Justia Law

After Elliott defaulted on his mortgage GMAC Mortgage sued to foreclose. The circuit court granted GMAC summary judgment on his right to foreclose, finding (1) Freddie Mac was the owner of the promissory note (Note), and GMAC was the Note’s holder and servicer; and (2) GMAC, as holder and service, had authority to enforce the Note. Elliott appealed, arguing that GMAC lacked standing at the time it initiated foreclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting GMAC’s motion for summary judgment because GMAC ultimately provided a properly indorsed bearer Note, mortgage, and evidence of default, thus providing evidence that GMAC had standing. View "Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Shane Liebig testified that he and Edward Kirchoff orally agreed that Kirchoff would purchase real property and later convey it to Liebig on certain terms. When Kirchoff did not convey the property to Liebig, Liebig sued for enforcement of the alleged purchase agreement and for fraud and deceit. Kirchoff counterclaimed, alleging unjust enrichment/quantum meruit. After a bench trial, the circuit court ruled that Liebig failed to establish a contractual right to purchase the property. A jury decided the remaining claims. The jury awarded Liebig compensatory and punitive damages on his fraud-and-deceit claim and awarded Kirchoff damages on his unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the parties never reached a meeting of the minds as to the material terms of the contract; (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Kirchoff’s motion for summary judgment on Liebig’s fraud-and-deceit claim; and (3) the jury’s award of damages on the fraud-and-deceit claim exceeded the amount Liebig was entitled to claim. Remanded for a new trial on damages related to Liebig’s fraud-and-deceit claim. View "Leibig v. Kirchoff" on Justia Law