Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this dispute was property that consisted of a one-car garage and the land on which it sat. The dispute involved several properties, including Lot 8A, the property formerly owned by Rocky Mattson, who used and maintained the garage. Ron Underhill, the record owner of the other properties involved in this dispute, brought suit against Mattson, Mattson's wife, and Carmen Walton, the current record owner of Lot 8A, to quiet title to the disputed property. Underhill also sought damages and punitive damages on the ground that Walton’s use of the garage amounted to conversion. The trial court concluded that Walton had acquired the disputed property by adverse possession through her predecessors in interest and that Underhill’s conversion claim was moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Underhill’s claims for quiet title and conversion. View "Underhill v. Mattson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendants owned abutting properties. This lawsuit centered on the drainage of water from Defendants’ property onto Plaintiffs’ property. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that Defendants caused an increased amount of drainage on Plaintiffs’ land by altering the natural flow of water across Defendants’ land. After a jury trial, Plaintiffs were awarded $9,950 in damages. Defendants requested judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to offer proof that Defendants caused the increase in drainage. The court denied the motions. The court subsequently granted Plaintiffs a permanent injunction ordering Defendants to pay an additional $28,936 to Plaintiffs for repairs and preventive landscaping. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err by Defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, as Plaintiffs’ testimony was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendants caused the water invasion; and (2) erred in granting the injunction, as S.D. Codified Laws 21-8-14 did not authorize the first half of the injunction, and, even if it did, the second half of the injunction was overbroad and an abuse of discretion. View "Magner v. Brinkman" on Justia Law

Attorney Irene Schrunk represented Mary Ellen Nylen in a divorce and was involved subsequent legal matters regarding Mary Ellen and her new husband, Mark Nylen. When Mark served Mary Ellen with a summons and complaint for divorce, Schrunk advised Mary Ellen that Schrunk could not represent her because Schrunk had represented Mark in the past. On July 31, 2014, Mary Ellen’s adult children, Molly and Brendon, commenced this action against Mary Ellen seeking a declaration that Mary Ellen had gifted them personal property. Molly and Brendon sought to depose Schrunk regarding communications she had with Mary Ellen between November 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014. Mary Ellen moved to prohibit the discovery, citing the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The circuit court determined that the initial communications were privileged but did not extend the privilege to communications and documents shared with Schrunk after January 1, 2014. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mary Ellen failed to meet her burden of proving entitlement to the attorney-client privilege after January 1, 2014, and Mary Ellen waived the privilege with respect to certain documents when she shared with Schrunk privileged communications between Mary Ellen and her current attorneys. View "Nylen v. Nylen" on Justia Law

After Elliott defaulted on his mortgage GMAC Mortgage sued to foreclose. The circuit court granted GMAC summary judgment on his right to foreclose, finding (1) Freddie Mac was the owner of the promissory note (Note), and GMAC was the Note’s holder and servicer; and (2) GMAC, as holder and service, had authority to enforce the Note. Elliott appealed, arguing that GMAC lacked standing at the time it initiated foreclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting GMAC’s motion for summary judgment because GMAC ultimately provided a properly indorsed bearer Note, mortgage, and evidence of default, thus providing evidence that GMAC had standing. View "Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Shane Liebig testified that he and Edward Kirchoff orally agreed that Kirchoff would purchase real property and later convey it to Liebig on certain terms. When Kirchoff did not convey the property to Liebig, Liebig sued for enforcement of the alleged purchase agreement and for fraud and deceit. Kirchoff counterclaimed, alleging unjust enrichment/quantum meruit. After a bench trial, the circuit court ruled that Liebig failed to establish a contractual right to purchase the property. A jury decided the remaining claims. The jury awarded Liebig compensatory and punitive damages on his fraud-and-deceit claim and awarded Kirchoff damages on his unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the parties never reached a meeting of the minds as to the material terms of the contract; (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Kirchoff’s motion for summary judgment on Liebig’s fraud-and-deceit claim; and (3) the jury’s award of damages on the fraud-and-deceit claim exceeded the amount Liebig was entitled to claim. Remanded for a new trial on damages related to Liebig’s fraud-and-deceit claim. View "Leibig v. Kirchoff" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned property located in Lincoln County that was unplatted and zoned for agricultural use. The property owner voluntarily petitioned for its annexation to the City of Sioux Falls. Sioux Falls subsequently adopted an annexation resolution under S.D. Codified Laws 9-4-1 annexing the property to be developed for a Walmart store. Neighbors of the property, joined as “Save Our Neighborhood,” petitioned the circuit court for writs of prohibition and certiorari, seeking to invalidate the City’s annexation resolution and to prohibit the City from rezoning the property. Petitioners argued that S.D. Codified Laws 9-4-5 required the City to obtain approval from the Lincoln County Board of County Commissioners before adopting a rule to annex the property. The circuit court denied the petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Petitioners’ writs of certiorari and prohibition, holding that the Legislature did not intend section 9-4-5 to apply to a resolution adopted for a voluntary petition for annexation under section 9-4-1. View "Save our Neighborhood v. City of Sioux Falls" on Justia Law

In 1980, Joseph and C. Elaine Lingscheit transferred 240 acres in fee simple to their seven children. In 2001, the Lingscheits executed a warranty deed conveying in fee simple 240 acres to their son, Brian. The 2001 deed, however, mistakenly conveyed 80 acres that had previously been conveyed to all seven children. The Lingscheits held only a life estate interest in these 80 acres. During the probate proceedings, the children learned their parents had twice transferred the 80-acre tract of land and that their parents owned, in fee simple, a different 80-acre tract of land that was never transferred. Two siblings, Brian and Bradley, brought suit against the remaining siblings asking the circuit court to reform and revise the 2001 warranty deed, contending that the Lingscheits intended to convey to Brian the 80 acres owned by the Lingscheits in fee simple. The trial court declined to reform the 2001 deed and ruled that this deed transferred to Brian a life estate interest in 80 acres. The SupremeCourt affirmed, holding that Brian did not present clear and convincing evidence that the 2001 deed failed to express the intent of the Lingscheits. View "Hines v. Hines" on Justia Law

Belmont, Inc., a meat and produce business, leased unfinished commercial real estate space from Tri-City Associates, LP, the owner and developer of a shopping center. The parties later filed claims against each other for breach of the lease. After a court trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Belmont on all claims, concluding that Tri-City materially breached the lease by failing to deliver the space in “broom clean” condition and failing to complete its allocated portion of the initiated construction, and that these failures excused Belmont from performance. Tri-City appealed, arguing, among other things, that it was excused by Belmont’s failure to give notice of the breach and an opportunity to cure under a notice-and-cure provision in the lease. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that conflicting authority and the circuit court’s failure to address the notice-and-cure provision prevented effective appellate review. Remanded to the circuit court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on the effect of Belmont’s failure to give notice of breach and an opportunity to cure. View "Tri-City Assocs., LP v. Belmont, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1967, Severt Kvalheim conveyed certain real property to Gordon Holsti by warranty deed. Kvalheim reserved fifty percent of the mineral rights for himself. That same year, Kvalheim executed a will devising to each of his heirs a one-eighth interest in his estate. Kvalheim died in 1969. In 2007, Gordon Holsti conveyed the surface estate to his sons (the Holstis). Believing Kvalheim’s mineral interest had lapsed and been abandoned because of nonuse, the Holstis published a notice of lapse of mineral interest in the official county newspaper. When no one filed a statement of claim asserting ownership of the mineral interest severed from the property, the Holstis brought a quiet title action. The circuit court ruled that the Holstis were the owners of the entire mineral interest, concluding (1) Kvalheim’s mineral interest had been abandoned under section S.D. Codified Laws 43-30A-2, -3; and (2) the Holstis gave proper notice of the lapse of the mineral interest even though they did not serve notice of the lapse on Kvalheim’s heirs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the mineral interests were not abandoned under section 43-30A-2. Remanded. View "Holsti v. Kimber" on Justia Law

In 2003, Appellants entered into a mortgage with Countrywide Home Loans that secured a promissory note in the amount of $165,750 and encumbered certain property. Plaintiffs later refinanced the loan by executing a promissory note in favor of Countrywide in the amount of $236,900 and executed a mortgage in the property in favor of BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP. In 2009, Appellants defaulted under the terms of the subject note and mortgage. In 2011, BAC filed an amended complaint to foreclose the mortgage. The circuit court granted BAC’s motion for summary judgment. The court also awarded attorney fees to BAC and reformed the mortgage by changing the legal description. The property was subsequently sold to BAC at a sheriff’s sale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in granting BAC summary judgment to foreclose the mortgage; (2) the circuit court did not err in awarding BAC attorney fees and costs; and (3) the circuit court’s revision of the mortgage reflected the true intention of the parties and therefore, was not error. View "BAC Homes Loans Servicing, LP v. Trancynger" on Justia Law