Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was a continuing dispute between Appellants, David and Connie Finneman and Rock Creek Farms Partnership (RCF), and Ann Arnoldy concerning the ownership of 16,700 acres of farmland. After a series of lawsuits, appeals, and various filings, the circuit court granted Arnoldy equitable ownership of the real estate outlined in two contracts for deed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, primarily, that the circuit court did not err in granting Arnoldy equitable ownership of the real estate in the contracts for deed and the right to cure the contracts for deed default under S.D. Codified Laws 21-50-3. View "L&L P'ship v. Rock Creek Farms" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for specific performance of Plaintiff’s option to purchase a ranch owned by Defendant. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiff owed him rent. After a trial, the circuit court (1) denied Plaintiff’s request for specific performance, concluding that Plaintiff had not performed all the conditions precedent on his part; and (2) concluded that the parties had an implied or express contract requiring Plaintiff to pay Defendant rent. The Supreme Court (1) held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding Plaintiff was the party who was materially at fault for the failure of the conditions and in therefore denying specific performance, but because the record did not reflect that the court considered whether specific performance was appropriate under the exception set forth in S.D. Codified Laws 21-9-5, the case was remanded for reconsideration of specific performance under this exception; and (2) the circuit court erred in concluding that either an express or an implied contract required Plaintiff to pay rent. View "Humble v. Wyant" on Justia Law

After Mary Lou Fox died, Plaintiff, Mary Lou's daughter and the administratrix of Mary Lou's estate, sued Mary Lou's former husband, Robert Fox. Plaintiff alleged that Mary Lou jointly owned 960 acres of farmland with Robert, that Robert deprived Mary Lou of her ownership interest in the land, and that Plaintiff was thereby deprived of an inheritance from Mary Lou. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Robert, concluding that Mary Lou had no ownership interest in the 960 acres. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that each cause of action brought by Plaintiff failed because Mary Lou had no claim to a right of ownership in the 960 acres and Plaintiff had no authority supporting her claims. View "Niesche v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who owned a landlocked parcel of land, brought suit against Defendant, claiming they had an implied easement over Defendant's land. The circuit court granted judgment for Plaintiffs, concluding that an easement implied from prior use existed. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, Plaintiffs argued for a common law implied easement by necessity. The circuit court found three separate grounds that prevented Plaintiffs from being entitled to an implied easement by necessity: (1) the requirements for an implied easement by necessity were not met, (2) an adequate remedy at law barred equitable relief, and (3) South Dakota's Marketable Title Act (SDMTA) barred the action because the severance occurred outside SDMTA's twenty-two year provision. The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that SDMTA barred Plaintiffs' action. View "Springer v. Cahoy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner of fourteen "recreational park trailers" that were used as cabins for lodging in a campground Plaintiff operated. Pennington County assessed the cabins as real property for ad valorem taxation purposes. The County Board of Equalization affirmed the assessment. On appeal, the circuit court reversed and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, concluding that the cabins were not taxable under S.D. Codified Laws 10-4-2. The County appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, when considered together, the facts of this case established that Plaintiff's cabins were "improvements to land" within the meaning of section 10-4-2(2). View "Rushmore Shadows, LLC v. Pennington County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

The Finnemans owned 17,000 acres of farmland that they deeded to Rock Creek Farms (RCF). RCF funded a series of redemptions of the property, and the Arnoldys purchased existing judgments on the property. Rabo Agrifinance and Rabo AgServices (Rabo) subsequently initiated foreclosure proceedings against the Finnemans, RCF, and all parties who had an interest in the land. The trial court entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure in the Rabo foreclosure proceedings and adjudged RCF as having the final owner's right of redemption as to the entirety of the property. The Arnoldys sought to have the judgment and decree of foreclosure set aside by filing a motion for relief pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-60(b). On May 26, the trial court granted the motion and vacated the portion of the judgment recognizing RCF's final redemption rights. RCF and the Finnemans sought relief from the May 26 order by filing separate motions pursuant to Rule 60(b). The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court judge correctly determined that a Rule 60(b) motion was not appropriate and denied relief in this case. View "Rabo Agrifinance, Inc. v. Rock Creek Farms" on Justia Law

Thomas Konrad accepted a loan from Bob Law upon the advice of attorney Douglas Kettering. Law and Kettering had been partners in at least one of Law's business ventures and had an attorney-client relationship. Thomas's parents (the Konrads) provided their land as collateral for Thomas's loan. Thomas later defaulted on the note. Seven months after Kettering passed away, Law brought suit to enforce the note and mortgage against Thomas and the Konrads. Law settled with Thomas and the Konrads. Law then sought to recover from the Kettering Estate the amounts outstanding on the note, claiming that Kettering's acts - including his conflict of interest with Law and his alleged fraudulent inducement of the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage - voided the note and mortgage, and therefore, the Estate was liable to Law for the interest due on the note. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the contract between Law and Thomas did not contravene public policy because it was drafted by an attorney who failed to disclose a conflicting attorney-client relationship; and (2) the theory that Kettering fraudulently induced the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage rested on mere speculation. View "Law Capital, Inc. v. Kettering" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a property owner, sought to expand the buildings on his property and, accordingly, asked the City to rezone a portion of his property zoned within the Flood Hazard Zoning District. The City denied the request along with Plaintiff's building permits because the proposed expansion extended to a portion of Plaintiff's property zoned within the Flood Hazard Zoning District. After unsuccessfully appealing to the Zoning Board of Adjustment, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the circuit court, which included a writ of certiorari, a request for declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, a civil rights claim, and a state constitutional claim. While the suit was pending, the City partially granted Plaintiff's rezone request. The circuit court subsequently denied Plaintiff's writ of certiorari and granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the remainder of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's writ of certiorari and granting summary judgment in favor of the City on Plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Parris v. City of Rapid City" on Justia Law

Appellees John Apland and others (collectively, Apland) and the Butte County Director of Equalization (Director) were involved in a dispute over the method Director used to calculate the value of Apland's rangeland property for tax purposes. In Apland I, the Supreme Court held that Director failed to comply with the Constitutional requirements of equality and uniformity and remanded with direction to Director to re-determine the property values after giving appropriate consideration and value to appurtenant and nontransferable water rights. On remand, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Apland, concluding that Director failed to comply with the directives in Apland I. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Director properly executed the directives of Apland I but that the record did not allow the Court to determine whether Director's method of valuation of Apland's property resulted in an equal and uniform assessment. View "Apland v. Bd. of Equalization for Butte County" on Justia Law

Upon Marcus Degen's purchase of a home, Marcus purchased a homeowner's insurance policy with Hanson Farm Mutual Insurance Company of South Dakota (HFMIC). Marcus, Tina Sellers, and Tina's two daughters moved into the house. One evening, while Marcus was leveling dirt on the property with a skid loader, Marcus hit and killed one of the girls, Adrianna. Tina pursued a wrongful death action against Marcus a year later. HFMIC filed a declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to determine whether it had an obligation to indemnify or defend Marcus in the underlying wrongful death action. The trial court ruled in favor of HFMIC, determining that Adrianna was in Marcus's care and was therefore excluded from coverage under a household exclusion contained in the policy. Both Tina, as the personal representative of her daughter's estate, and Marcus appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly concluded that the phrase "in your care" was unambiguous and in concluding that Adrianna was in Marcus's care; and (2) because she was in Marcus's care, Adrianna was excluded from coverage under the household exclusion contained in the policy. View "Hanson Farm Mut. Ins. Co. of S.D. v. Degen" on Justia Law