Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Walter Henderson brought a quiet title action to claim ownership of an undivided thirty percent interest in a mineral estate. Following a court trial, which confirmed Walter's ownership of the mineral interest in fee, Walter's half-sister, Susan Henderson, individually and as representative of her deceased mother, Dora Henderson, appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that Walter's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-13(1) and 15-3-2. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly quieted title in Walter's favor and concluded that Walter was the owner of the thirty percent mineral interest described in an agreement between Walter and his father. View "Estate of Henderson v. Estate of Henderson" on Justia Law

Terry Leonhardt and his wife, Cindy, alleged that they entered into an oral lease with Terry's father, Delbert Leonhardt, which was to extend for the lives of Delbert and his wife, Ellen. They claimed the oral lease contained a right of first refusal that Terry could exercise after the death of both Delbert and Ellen. Delbert later entered into a written lease with his grandson, Matthew Oswald. The written lease encompassed some of the farmland Terry and Cindy alleged was part of their oral lease with Delbert. Terry and Cindy initiated a declaratory judgment action against Delbert, seeking a declaration that the oral lease and right of first refusal were valid. Matthew intervened in the lawsuit. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Delbert and Matthew on the ground that the lease was invalid under the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to provide them with notice that it would consider granting summary judgment on a legal theory different from the legal theory advances by Delbert and Matthew in their summary judgment pleadings and brief, and Terry and Cindy were prejudiced by the error. View "Leonhardt v. Leonhardt" on Justia Law

James Kesling executed a holographic will. After James died, the will was admitted into probate and James's three daughters were appointed as co-personal representatives of James's estate. Both the Estate and James's wife, Sandra, petitioned the circuit court to construe the will. The circuit court granted the Estate's motion for summary judgment. Sandra appealed, arguing that the will was ambiguous, and thus, the court erred by not considering extrinsic evidence as to James's intent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) James's intent was clearly expressed within the four corners of his holographic will and extrinsic evidence was not needed; and (2) the unambiguous language of the will demonstrated James's intent to give Sandra a life estate in his property with his three daughters as remaindermen. View "In re Estate of Kesling" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court interpreted a trust instrument to decide whether the death of Betty Plouf triggered the offset provision of the Plouf Family Trust, and thus, instantaneously satisfied the mortgage lien the Trust held on the home of a beneficiary. The trial court held that it did. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court had inherent authority to revisit an earlier order finding that the Trust had a first-priority lien; (2) the trial court did not err in ruling that the unambiguous terms of the Trust mandated an offset at the time of Betty's death, thus extinguishing the underlying mortgage; and (3) neither party was entitled to appellate attorney fees. View "SBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Plouf Family Trust" on Justia Law

Arla Johnson deeded farmland to her daughter Linda, and son-in-law, Claude Miller. Linda subsequently filed for divorce from Claude. Arla then sued Claude, claiming she was fraudulently induced by him into deeding the land. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Claude. Claude appealed the denial of his motion for attorney’s fees. On appeal, Claude argued Arla's suit was malicious and frivolous, and therefore when the trial court ruled in his favor, he was entitled to attorney's fees. The Supreme Court deferred to the trial court's discretion when it decided the suit was not malicious or frivolous, and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Johnson v. Miller" on Justia Law

This foreclosure action involved a dispute between two creditors, Wells Fargo Financial South Dakota, Inc. and Highmark Federal Credit Union about the priority of their respective mortgage liens against a property. Both parties asserted that they were entitled to first priority. The trial court found that, despite Highmark's statutory priority, under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, Wells Fargo was entitled to first priority. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) equity in this case did not require the trial court to pierce the South Dakota recording statutes; and (2) because Highmark filed its lien on the property prior to Wells Fargo, Highmark had priority.

Rachelle Hunter received a loan from Highmark Federal Credit Union to purchase a home and property. A flood damaged the home a few years later, and Hunter had no flood insurance. Hunter filed suit against Highmark, arguing that Highmark was negligent in failing to warn her to purchase flood insurance and in failing to purchase the insurance at her expense. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Highmark. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hunter's negligence claim failed as a matter of law because she could not show that Highmark owed her a duty, and accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate.

In the early 1990s, Kevin Costner commissioned Peggy Detmers and Detmers Studios, Inc. (collectively, Detmers) to design several sculptures, intending to display them at the entrance of a luxury resort called The Dunbar that Costner had envisioned. Subsequently, Costner and The Dunber (collectively, Costner) and Detmers entered into a binding contract in which Costner would provide Detmers additional compensation. Paragraph three of the agreement provided that if The Dunbar was not built within ten years or the sculptures were not "agreeably displayed elsewhere," Costner would give Detmers fifty percent of the profits from the sale of the sculptures. The sculptures were later placed on Costner's project called Tatanka. Detmers later brought suit against Costners, seeking a declaratory judgment that she did not agree to the placement of the sculptures as required by paragraph three of the parties' contract. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Costner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) determining that the sculptures were "agreeably displayed elsewhere," in the absence of a guarantee from Costner that The Dunbar would be built; and (2) concluding that Tatanka was "elsewhere" under the language of the contract.

Dale, Dorothy, Roger, and Daniel Springer owned a forty-acre parcel of property. Andy Cahoy owned an adjoining forty-acre parcel. After the Springers purchased their parcel, they began using Cahoy's parcel to access their property. When Cahoy prohibited the Springers from crossing Cahoy's parcel, the Springers filed suit, claiming an implied easement on Cahoy's parcel. The circuit court concluded that an easement implied from prior use existed with certain limitations. Both parties appealed, and the appeals were consolidated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Springers failed to present clear and convincing evidence of an easement implied from prior use. Remanded.

Heidi Schumacher signed a renewed lease with Meadowland Apartments. Meadowland later filed an eviction action against Schumacher, alleging that she was in material non-compliance with the lease because Schumacher kept a disruptive dog in her apartment. The magistrate court found that Schumacher's conduct constituted sufficient grounds for termination of the lease. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the magistrate court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Schumacher's motion for a continuance, as Schumacher was given a reasonable opportunity to secure evidence on her behalf; (2) did not abuse its discretion in considering evidence of incidents that occurred prior to the term of Schumacher's most recent lease with Meadowland; and (3) did not err in finding that Meadowland provided reasonable accommodations for Schumacher's disability as required under the Fair Housing Amendments Act.