Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Kathy Torbert petitioned the Alabama Department of Public Health ("the Department") for a declaratory ruling with respect to a proposed garbage-transfer station to be built near Torbert's home. Among other relief requested, Torbert sought a declaratory ruling under Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-11(b), regarding the meaning of the administrative regulations defining the minimum required buffer zones around a solid-waste-transfer station. Pertinent here was the starting point for measuring the required buffer zones. The Department rejected Torbert's proposed interpretation of the buffer-zone regulations. Torbert appealed the ruling to the Circuit Court. The circuit court remanded the case to the Department for additional factual findings, including the preparation of a revised land survey. On remand, the survey was prepared and the Department made the necessary findings and reaffirmed its previous ruling. The circuit court subsequently affirmed the Department's decision. Torbert appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment, without an opinion. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review, and found that the Department's interpretation of its regulations was arbitrary and unreasonable, and accordingly, reversed and remanded. "The Department could have adopted regulations specifically defining the area of transfer activities as the tipping floor or regulations measuring the buffer zones from the tipping floor. It did neither but, instead, attempted to circumvent the regulations in this case by using an unreasonable definition of the phrase 'area of transfer activities.'" View "Ex parte Kathy Torbert" on Justia Law

In 1985, South Alabama Sewer Service, Inc. ("SASS"), and Lake View Developers, Ltd. ("Lake View"), entered into an agreement where SASS would construct a sewer line from its waste-treatment facility to a new planned subdivision and golf course ("Lake View Estates). In 1989, Lake View filed for bankruptcy. The development and golf course, excluding lots that had already been sold, were placed in receivership. 1991, SASS and Lakeview Realty entered into a new sewer agreement. In July 2003, Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC ("BCSS"), purchased from SASS the sewer lines and sewer facilities servicing Lake View Estates. In 2004, BCSS purchased all the stock of SASS. Subsequent to BCSS's purchase of SASS and its facilities in Baldwin County, all monthly sewer fees related to Lake View Estates had been billed by and paid to BCSS. Sometime following its acquisition of SASS's sewer system, BCSS enacted a rate increase affecting customers in Lake View Estates. In 2014, multiple homeowner associations whose members were property owners in Lake View Estates, sued BCSS, generally asserting that BCSS had violated the sewer-service-rate provision of the 1991 agreement. The associations lost at trial on grounds that they lacked standing to sue to enforce the 1991 agreement. The Supreme Court disagreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "The Gardens at Glenlakes Property Owners Association, Inc., et al. v. Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC" on Justia Law

Arvest Bank petitioned for mandamus relief, seeking to have the Autauga Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Arvest's motion to quash a writ of execution obtained by Iberiabank f/k/a Capitalsouth Bank ("Iberia") against real property owned by Evelyn Niland ("Evelyn"). Thomas Karrh, II transferred the property Iberia wanted to sell to Evelyn and her husband Raymond Niland as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The Nilands quitclaimed the property to Evelyn, removing Raymond from the title. Raymond stopped paying an existing debt to Iberia. Iberia obtained a judgment against Raymond for close to $125,000. Iberia filed a lien against all of Raymond's property. Evelyn transferred the property back to herself and Raymond, attempting to create a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. At the same time Evelyn tried this transfer, she and her husband executed a mortgage to Arvest Bank. Iberia secured a writ of execution against the property; Arvest intervened to try to quash a sheriff's sale of the property. Raymond died shortly thereafter. The trial court granted the intervention and stayed the sale proceedings, but after Iberia opposed these actions, the sheriff's sale was permitted to proceed. Finding that Evelyn indeed did create a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, the Supreme Court found that Iberia's interest was extinguished with Raymond's death, and that Iberia could not attach its writ to the property. The order denying Arvest's motion to quash the writ of execution was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to grant Arvest's request. View "Ex parte Arvest Bank." on Justia Law

The Town of Mosses and its chief of police Jimmy Harris, separately petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Lowndes Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Geraldine Grant Bryson. The Court consolidated their petitions for the purpose of writing one opinion. At the time of the events giving rise to this action, Bryson operated an entertainment venue known as "The Spot." Bryson described "The Spot" as a "community center for all activities." Bryson requested that the Town grant her a liquor license, but the Town's council denied her request. In 2010, Bryson rented "The Spot" to a deejay, who planned to host a "beer bash" on its premises. Approximately 200 people turned out for the event even though the entertainment portion of the event was ultimately canceled by the deejay. Although Bryson, who was at "The Spot" on the night of the event, testified that she did not see anyone consuming alcoholic beverages at the event, she acknowledged that the deejay hosting the event had brought alcohol that he planned to "give ... away [to] the community for showing support for the center." The mayor saw one of the deejay's flyers promoting the event. The mayor, in turn, notified Harris. Harris saw one of the flyers, organized a task force of officers from multiple law-enforcement agencies, and entered "The Spot," observing alcohol being consumed. Bryson was ultimately arrested for selling alcohol without a license. The charges against Bryson were later dismissed because the Town was unable to produce a witness who could testify to paying an admission to "The Spot" and drinking alcohol on the premises. Bryson sued the Town and Harris asserting claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and slander. When the trial court denied the Town and Harris' motions to dismiss, they sought mandamus relief. The Alabama Supreme Court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Harris's summary-judgment motion as to the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims and to enter a summary-judgment for Harris on those grounds. To the extent Harris sought mandamus review of intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment, libel, and slander, the petition was denied. The trial court was further directed to vacate its order denying the Town's summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment for the Town as to each claim asserted against it. View "Ex parte Town of Mosses." on Justia Law

Richard Watters petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its order denying his motion for a summary judgment as to count one of an amended complaint filed by Michael Gamble, in Gamble's capacity as administrator of the Estate of Barbara Ruth Findley Long ("Long"), deceased. Count one asserted a legal-malpractice claim against Watters under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act ("the ALSLA"), alleging breach of a fiduciary duty. This proceeding involved title to real property located in Conecuh County, which was owned by Robert Findley at the time of his death. Long retained Watters & Associates, of which Watters was a partner, to represent her "in obtaining estate assets" of Findley, her deceased father. Watters filed suit seeking a declaration of Long's ownership in family property located in Conecuh County. The Circuit Court declaring that Long owned a one-sixth interest (approximately 30 acres) in the Conecuh County property Shortly thereafter, Long discharged Watters from any further representation in the declaratory-judgment action. Watters filed an attorney's lien against the Conecuh property to secure the payment of his attorney fees. Family members eventually quitclaimed their interests to Long. Taxes for 2006 weren't paid on the property, and Long's cousin Larry Findley purchased the property at a tax sale. According to Watters, Long asked him for a loan to redeem the property from the tax sale. Watters told Long that Langley would not record the quitclaim deed if Long repaid the loan within 30 days of redeeming the property; that, in the event the deed was recorded, any claim Watters might have against Long for services rendered regarding her deceased father's estate would be satisfied; and that Watters and Long agreed to terms concerning the loan arrangement. This arrangement was never reduced to writing. Long executed a quitclaim deed prepared by Watters, conveying title to the Conecuh property to "Langley & Watters, LLP." In 2010, Watters submitted to the Conecuh Probate Court a letter, enclosing "his client's" application for redemption of the Conecuh property. Long died on April 2, 2013, and a few months later, the Conecuh Probate Court appointed Gamble as administrator of Long's estate. Gamble filed a complaint against Watters, asserting claims of legal malpractice among other things. After review of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Watters had another adequate remedy (i.e., an appeal) other than a writ of mandamus. Therefore, the Court denied relief. View "Ex parte Richard L. Watters." on Justia Law

Once Upon a Time,LLC ("OUAT"), appealed by permission a circuit court decision denying OUAT's motion seeking a summary judgment on the third-party complaint filed against it by Chappelle Properties, LLC ("Chappelle"). Chappelle owned a building in Birmingham containing at least two commercial retail spaces. Chappelle and OUAT entered into a commercial lease agreement in which Chappelle agreed to lease one of the commercial retail spaces to OUAT. The agreement contained an indemnity clause. Deborah Anderson worked for OUAT as a sales clerk. In late 2011, the OUAT retail space was flooded with contaminated water. Certain items of OUAT's inventory were moved from the OUAT retail space to Chappelle's vacant commercial retail space. Although Anderson was not working on the day of the incident, in the days following she counted inventory that had been moved to the vacant retail space. In late 2013, Anderson filed a complaint alleging that she had suffered a bacterial infection caused by her handling the allegedly contaminated OUAT inventory stored in the vacant retail space following the flood of the OUAT-leased retail space. In 2014, Chappelle filed a third-party complaint against OUAT and its managers that sought, among other things, indemnification pursuant to the indemnity clause in the agreement. OUAT alleged that the indemnity clause in the agreement did not cover the claims asserted by Anderson in her complaint. After review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying OUAT's summary-judgment motion. The Court held that the indemnity clause should not have been interpreted to include incidents occurring in the vacant retail space. View "Once Upon a Time, LLC v. Chappelle Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2005, Water's Edge, LLC purchased lots 62-69 of "Re-Subdivision A" in Baldwin County, commonly referred to as Gulf Shores Yacht Club and Marina ("the property"). Fairfield Financial Services, Inc. loaned Water's Edge $12.8 million of the $13 million needed to purchase the property. In 2006, Fairfield notified Water's Edge that it would not renew Water's Edge's loan. The members of Water's Edge authorized the managers to seek new financing. In December 2006, Vision Bank agreed to loan Water's Edge $14.5 million. Vision Bank later merged with SE Property Holdings, LLC ("SEPH"). Certain members of Water's Edge signed agreements guaranteeing all of Water's Edge's debt to SEPH. In October 2008, SEPH notified Water's Edge that the loans were in default. In October 2010, SEPH sued Water's Edge and 28 individuals, including the guarantors, based on the promissory notes and guaranty agreements pertaining to the various loans issued over the years. The trial took place in late 2014. The trial court did not submit the case to the jury, but instead discharged the jury and entered an order granting SEPH's motion for a JML. The trial court found the guarantors and the other defendants jointly and severally liable on continuing unlimited guaranty agreements. The trial court found each of them individually liable for differing amounts based on continuing limited guaranty agreements they had signed. A month later, the trial court revised its earlier order, taking into account settlements and declarations of bankruptcy that certain guarantors had declared. The guarantors timely filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, which the trial court denied. The guarantors then appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial court's judgment was not final because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to dismiss SEPH's claims against one of the guarantors, and the trial court did not certify its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). "An order entered in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void as to the debtor, thus leaving the claims against [one of the guarantors] pending and rendering the judgment nonfinal. A nonfinal judgment will not support an appeal." View "Gaddy v. SE Property Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

This nearly two-decade-old case "is a veteran of numerous appellate campaigns." Pavilion Development, LLC's attempted redemption of the property at issue gave rise to five opinions from the Alabama Supreme Court. E.B. Investments, L.L.C. ("EB Investments"), appealed a Circuit Court holding that Pavilion was entitled to redeem certain property in Madison County in which EB Investments and other parties held legal interests (appeal no. 1141259). Pavilion filed a separate appeal naming as appellees JBJ Partnership, Pace Properties ("Pace"), James P. Pace, individually and as personal representative of the estate of James E. Pace, and William Byron Pace and challenged certain aspects of the same order, namely, the amount it had to pay redeem the property (appeal no. 1141416). The appeals were consolidated for the purpose of issuing one opinion. As to EB Investments' appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed the appeal in part. As to Pavilion's appeal, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "E.B. Investments, L.L.C. v. Pavilion Development, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs James Jordan, Sara Jordan Muschamp, and William Jordan (as representative of the estate of Emma K. Jordan, deceased) sued the Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc. ("TJF") for: (1) misrepresentation; (2) "slander, libel, and trade infringement"; (3) fraud; (4) wantonness; (5) suppression; (6) negligence; (7) breach of contract; and (8) tortious interference with business relations. TJF was a nonprofit organization that owned and curated a museum in Monticello, the historic home of Thomas Jefferson. In 1957, Juliet Cantrell lent TJF a "filing press" for display at Monticello. Cantrell passed away in 1976 and bequeathed the filing press, which was then on loan to TJF, and the dressing table to Emma. In 1977, Emma lent TJF the dressing table for use in the museum. Certain "loan agreements" were executed with TJF when the furniture was lent to TJF, and there were subsequent loan agreements executed by Emma, James, and Sara. The loan agreements were silent as to whether TJF had the authority to perform any "conservation" work on the furniture without first obtaining permission from plaintiffs. In November 2007, plaintiffs removed the furniture from Monticello and shipped it to Sotheby's in New York with the intent to sell it. Sotheby's "research consultants" questioned the authenticity of the dressing table, and determined that the filing press was not in sufficiently original condition to be offered for bid. Sotheby's declined to place either piece of furniture for sale at auction; according to plaintiffs, Sotheby's found that the value of the dressing table had been "destroyed" and that the filing press then had a market value of $20,000 to $30,000, whereas "its fair market value would be around $4 million" had TFJ not performed conversation work on it. Only the claims (6), (7), and (8) above were presented to the jury; the remaining claims were disposed of before the case went to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of TJF on all three counts, and the trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, in pertinent part, that TJF did not disclose that it had insurance and that, therefore, "the venire was not properly qualified as to insurance." The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion. TJF appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it granted the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, and affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it granted TJF's motion for a JML on the plaintiffs' suppression claim. View "Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc. v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Regions Bank appealed a final judgment dismissing its action against BP P.L.C., BP Corporation North America, Inc., and BP America Inc. (collectively, "BP"). In 2010, an explosion and fire occurred aboard the Deepwater Horizon, an offshore-drilling rig, located off the coast of Louisiana. The incident led to a massive discharge of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, which, in turn, spawned an expansive clean-up and response operation by BP and various governmental agencies. Regions owned coastal real property located in Baldwin County, Alabama. Regions filed this trespass action against BP in Alabama Circuit Court, alleging BP occupied Regions' property, without authorization, for its spill-response operation; that BP moved equipment and structures onto the property without permission; and that BP erected fences and barriers on the property, again, without permission. Regions further alleged that BP stored hazardous materials and waste on the property and that those hazardous materials and waste damaged the property. BP filed a Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., "motion to dismiss" Regions' trespass action on the ground that it was subject to the class-action settlement approved in the multidistrict litigation (MDL) and, therefore, that dismissal was warranted on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found "clear and unequivocal" exceptions to the MDL economic-and-property-damage-settlement class, and concluded that Regions was not a member of the settlement class. Therefore, its trespass claim was not adjudicated as part of the MDL class-action settlement. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court for dismissing Regions' action on the ground of res judicata. View "Regions Bank v. BP P.L.C. et al." on Justia Law