Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court answered certified questions seeking to clarify whether, in payment of royalties under an oil and gas lease, the lessor may be required to bear a portion of the post-production costs incurred in rendering the oil and gas marketable.Specifically, the district court asked whether Estate of Tawyne v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC, 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006) is still good law in West Virginia and then asked the Supreme Court to expound upon its holding in Tawney. The Supreme Court answered (1) Tawney is still good law; and (2) this Court defines to answer the reformulated question of what level of specificity Tawney requires of an oil and gas lease to permit the deduction of post-production costs from a lessor's royalty payments. View "SWN Production Co., LLC v. Kellam" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the circuit court granting partial summary judgment to Defendants in this real property dispute, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment.Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendants, claiming that they had a legal right to use a roadway that traversed land owned by Defendants. To support their claim, Plaintiffs relied on a 1905 map. The circuit court determined that it could not consider the map because it was not a "public record" and then granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court abused its discretion in refusing to admit or consider the 1905 map and that remand was required. View "Gregory v. Long" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting injunctive relief requiring Petitioners to remove a bridge and road that Respondent maintained after Petitioners brought this action for alleged flood damages caused to Respondent's property as a result of the construction of the road and bridge, arguing that they impeded the flow of Little Grave Creek, holding that the circuit court erred.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court properly found that Respondent had good cause for a delay in service; (2) the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that construction of the road and bridge was the proximate cause of Respondent's damages; (3) the circuit court erred in denying Petitioners' motion for summary judgment on the basis of the relevant statute of limitations; and (4) the circuit court's order granting injunctive relief failed to contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Reilley v. Board of Education of the County of Marshall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court determining that Petitioner's predecessors in interest (the Stephens) were not bona fide purchasers when they acquired the subject property at a trustee's sale, holding that the circuit court was clearly wrong.Petitioner, the owner of the subject property, sought a declaratory judgment that the property, which was purchased by her predecessors in interest at a trustee's sale following the original owner's default on a loan secured by a deed of trust, was free of covenants or restrictions that post-dated the execution of the deed of trust. The circuit court found that Respondents had an easement on the property, concluding that neither Petitioners nor her predecessors in interest were bona fide purchasers of the acreage and that Respondents had an easement in the subject property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court was clearly wrong in determining that the Stephens were not bona fide purchasers when they acquired the property at a trustee's sale; and (2) Petitioner took the property free and clear of all prior covenants and restrictions that post-dated the execution of the deed of trust. View "Goddard v. Hockman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court to the extent it granted summary judgment to James and Iris Shaffer in this real property dispute, holding that summary judgment was not proper in this case.Robert and Robin Goodwin and the Shaffers owned neighboring properties that were separated by an alley. The Goodwins were the legal owners of the alley. When the Goodwins erected a fence and building that obstructed the Shaffers' use of the alley the Shaffers the Shaffers filed the underlying lawsuit asserting causes of action for prescriptive easement, civil conspiracy, injunctive relief, private nuisance, and trespass. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Shaffers as to their prescriptive easement claim from 1973 to 1999. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in resolving genuine issues of material fact instead of simply determining whether there was a genuine issue of material fact. View "Goodwin v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court finding that the after-acquired title doctrine cured any irregularity in the assignment of the deed of trust on the subject property in this case, holding that the case must be dismissed for lack of standing.Petitioner filed suit against NPML Mortgage Acquisitions, LLC after he received a foreclosure notice stating that his real property located in Granville was going to be sold. Petitioner brought this suit, alleging that NPML Mortgage did not have a valid assignment of the deed of trust. The circuit court granted summary judgment for NPML Mortgage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a litigant who is not a party to a mortgage assignment or a party intended to benefit from the assignment lacks standing to challenge the assignment; and (2) Petitioner did not have standing to challenge the validity of the assignment of the deed of trust to NPML Mortgage. View "Pavone v. NPML Mortgage Acquisitions, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary and declaratory judgment order of the circuit court determining that Frank Bonacci and Brian Bonacci (together, the Bonacci brothers) were the owners of an undivided and unsevered oil and gas estate, holding that there was no error.The circuit court's order found that the Bonacci brothers were the owners of the undivided oil and gas estate at issue because the tax deeds through which Petitioners, two Florida limited liability companies, had allegedly obtained title to the same mineral estate were void. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in concluding that the underlying tax deeds were void. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax deeds were void and conveyed no interest in the oil and gas estate underlying the surface panel now owned by the Bonacci brothers. View "Orville Young, LLC v. Bonacci" on Justia Law

In these appeals arising from adverse jury verdicts rendered in separate trials following an automobile accident involving Joseph Jenkins and Tessa Jordan, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred in part.The first trial resulted in the jury's calculation of damages sustained by Jenkins and his wife as a result of the accident, which the parties stipulated was caused through the fault of Jordan. The Jenkins also sued Safeco Insurance Company of America and liberty Mutual Insurance Company (collectively, Safeco) for conversion. After a second trial on the Jenkins' claims for compensatory and punitive damages Safeco appealed the jury's determination that the Jenkins were entitled to punitive damages. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's order denying the Jordans' motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial and remanded that case for a new trial, holding that the jury should have been instructed on Jenkins' duty to mitigate the loss of his vehicle; and (2) reversed the court's order denying Safeco's motion to reduce the punitive damages award, holding that remand was necessary to review the punitive damages award for excessiveness. View "Jordan v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court concluding that the right of first refusal in a deed conveying land from the grantor to the grantee but containing a clause granting the grantee to give a "stranger" the right of first refusal to any future conveyance of the land was not void under the "stranger to the deed" rule.The "stranger to the deed" rule identifies someone who is neither a grantor nor a grantee to a conveyance as a "stranger" and posits that any property interest in favor of that stranger, and which is contained in a reservation or an exception, is void. The circuit court applied the "stranger to the deed" rule and ruled that the right of first refusal clause in the deed was void and unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a right of first refusal clause in a deed is neither an exception nor a reservation; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred when it applied the "stranger to the deed" rule and dismissed the complaint. View "Klein v. McCullough" on Justia Law

In this dispute over a party wall agreement between adjoining property owners the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment to all three defendants on Plaintiff's breach of the party wall agreement claim and summary judgment for two defendants on Plaintiff's negligence claim, holding that the circuit court did not err.Plaintiff owned a commercial building that shared a party wall with the adjacent property. Zen's Development, Uptown Properties, and Kenneth McBride, were the current or previous owners of the adjacent property. The circuit court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the breach of the party wall agreement claim and summary judgment to Uptown and McBride on the negligence claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her claims of error. View "Birchfield v. Zen's Development, LLC" on Justia Law