Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC leased land from Whitaker Farms, LLC for a peach orchard. After being locked out of the leased premises, Fitzgerald Farms sued Whitaker Farms for damages. A jury awarded compensatory damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part but reversed the trial court’s ruling that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages. On remand, a second jury awarded punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that statements made during a settlement negotiation by Whitaker Farms’s Chief Operating Officer to Fitzgerald Farms’s owner were properly admitted under OCGA § 24-4-408.The trial court initially ruled that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. On remand, the trial court conducted a second jury trial focused on punitive damages, where the jury awarded $500,000 in punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. Whitaker Farms appealed again, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting statements made during a settlement negotiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating that the statements were admissible to show Whitaker’s intent and state of mind.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals’s judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the statements made during the settlement negotiation were inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-408. The Court concluded that the statements were offered to prove Whitaker Farms’s liability for punitive damages, which is not permissible under the statute. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the admission of the statements was harmful and if a new trial on punitive damages is required. View "Whitaker Farms, LLC v. Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of property owners sued Columbia County over stormwater drainage issues that caused damage to their property. The property, purchased in 1996, contained a metal pipe used in the County's stormwater system. Over the years, heavy rains caused the pipe to fail multiple times, leading to significant property damage. The property owners sent a notice to the County in October 2013, outlining their claims, but the County declined to make repairs. The property owners then filed a lawsuit in March 2014, seeking damages and an injunction to prevent further damage.The trial court found in favor of the property owners, ruling that the County maintained a nuisance that amounted to a taking without just compensation. The court awarded damages and issued a permanent injunction against the County. The County appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed some parts of the trial court's decision and vacated others. The Court of Appeals vacated the damages award for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice and reversed the award of attorneys' fees. However, it upheld the injunction against the County.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the injunction, ruling that it exceeded the bounds of the Georgia Constitution's limited waiver of sovereign immunity. The Court directed the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court to consider a new injunction within the constitutional limits. The Supreme Court also concluded that it should not have granted certiorari on the issue of damages for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice, as the Court of Appeals' ruling was specific to the facts of this case and did not establish a general rule of law. The petition for certiorari on this issue was therefore denied. View "Satcher v. Columbia County" on Justia Law

In this case, property owners and residents of the Statham Lakefront Subdivision in Sumter County, Georgia, sought to require the county to repair roads in their subdivision. The county had not expressly accepted the roads as public roads, but the residents argued that the county had an obligation to maintain the roads because they had been open to the public since their creation. The trial court ruled that the county had no obligation to maintain the roads. The Court of Appeals vacated this decision, and remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether there was evidence of "recognition of the streets as public streets or acceptance of the dedication by the public."The Supreme Court of Georgia granted Sumter County's petition for certiorari. The court held that a county is not obligated to repair and maintain a road if county authorities have not accepted the land owner’s offer to dedicate the road to public use. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in directing the trial court to consider whether the public accepted the road as a public road. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia found ambiguity in the Court of Appeals's decision and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to clarify whether it was directing the trial court to consider if the county authorities or the general public recognized the roads as public. View "SUMTER COUNTY v. MORRIS" on Justia Law

Wise Business Forms, Inc. (“Wise”) was the nation’s fourth largest printer of business forms, and was headquartered in Forsyth County, Georgia. A 36-inch metal pipe (“Subject Pipe”) ran underneath Wise’s property and had been in place since 1985. Approximately twenty-five feet of the drainage pipe extended into a two-acre tract of land west of Wise’s property (“Corner Tract”). The Corner Tract was undeveloped and forms a natural detention basin into which a large vertical concrete drainage structure with a large stormwater outlet pipe (“Feeder Structure”) was constructed. Wise asserted in its complaint that water from the Feeder Structure on the Corner Tract was designed to flow through the Subject Pipe underneath Wise’s property. The McFarland Parkway Widening Project extended McFarland Road from two lanes to four lanes and was completed in 2000. Wise alleged in its complaint that this project resulted in a substantial increase of the surface and stormwater runoff flowing underneath its property. In 2020, Wise filed a complaint against Forsyth County and the Georgia Department of Transportation (the “DOT”) raising claims for per se taking of Wise’s property, inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance, attorney fees. Wise amended its complaint to add a claim for inverse condemnation by abatable nuisance. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to clarify the standards for determining when a claim for inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance accrues for purposes of applying the four-year statute of limitation set forth in OCGA § 9-3-30 (a). The Court concluded that, although the Court of Appeals articulated one of the correct standards to apply in determining when the applicable statute of limitation begins to run on a permanent nuisance claim, the Court of Appeals failed to construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party; erred in concluding there was only one harm in this case that was “immediately observable” to the plaintiff when the nuisance at issue was completed; and erred in concluding that the statute of limitation had run on the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. View "Wise Business Forms, Inc. v. Forsyth County, et al." on Justia Law

A resort community in North Georgia included a golf course next to a subdivision. The current owner of the resort wanted to redevelop the golf course into a residential property, and several homeowners in the subdivision sued to stop it. The trial court concluded that the homeowners had an easement in the golf course and granted a permanent injunction preventing the course from being put to any other use, and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings. Both courts below concluded that the homeowners acquired an easement in the golf course because their lots were bought with reference to a subdivision plat that designated a “golf course” next to the subdivision. The Supreme Court found that conclusion relied on a long line of decisions recognizing that easements in features like streets, parks, and lakes could be acquired on this basis, which amounted to an easement by express grant. But golf courses are different. Given the wide range of interests that an easement in a golf course could possibly include— interests in a view, access, use, or enjoyment, to name a few—merely designating a “golf course” on a subdivision plat and selling lots with reference to the plat "cannot give reasonable certainty as to the scope of a claimed easement." So, although subdivision owners might be able to acquire an easement in a given adjacent golf course, the intent to convey such an interest must be shown through evidence based in the relevant documents taken as a whole, rather than presumed based on the golf course’s mere designation on a plat. View "WS CE Resort Owner, LLC v. Holland, et al." on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether E. Howard Carson acquired a vested right to develop property in a particular manner based upon alleged assurances made to him by Tom Brown, the Forsyth County Planning Director. Carson was the principal for Red Bull Holdings II, LLC, the property owner in this case. In 2016, Carson met with Brown and discussed Carson’s plans to purchase approximately 17 acres of land and develop that property into 42 separate 9,000- square-foot residential lots. In his role as Planning Director, Brown was allowed to interpret the zoning code; however, he could not unilaterally promise or authorize the issuance of a building permit. The record further showed that Carson knew prior to that meeting that the zoning code allowed for 9,000-square-foot lots. During the meeting, Carson showed Brown a hand-drawn document depicting Carson’s proposed subdivision layout, and asked Brown to confirm whether the current zoning code allowed for his proposed development. Brown made no representations as to future zoning code changes that might impact the property, nor did he guarantee that Carson would be able to build as he proposed. Carson purchased the property and spent money obtaining the various plans and appraisals necessary to begin development. Then, in August 2016, the Forsyth County Board of Commissioners “imposed a moratorium on the acceptance of applications for land disturbance permits” for 9,000 -square-foot residential lots. Based on the record before the Supreme Court, it concluded Carson did not acquire a vested right; therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals holding to the contrary was reversed. The case was remanded with direction. View "Brown, et al. v. Carson, et al." on Justia Law

In February 2018, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself and a putative class of similarly situated persons against Defendants RCC Wesley Chapel Crossing, LLC, Little Giant Farmers Market Corporation, Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., River City Capital, LLC, and River City Capital Property Management, LLC for negligence, premises liability, false imprisonment, conversion, and violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Plaintiff claimed that Defendants “hired, authorized, or otherwise provided material support to” third parties that immobilized vehicles located on Defendants’ property with boots or similar devices, and required the owners or operators of the vehicles to pay a fee in order to have the immobilizing devices removed. Plaintiff moved to certify the action on behalf of a proposed class of similarly situated persons, claiming that between February 2013 and 2018, at least 250 persons “have been booted and have paid a fine for removal of said device” at the Wesley Chapel Lot. Following briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion, certifying the class. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether there was a common-law right that permits private property owners to immobilize vehicles that were not authorized to be on their property. The Court concluded that the common-law rights the defendants alluded to in the courts below – namely, the right to remove trespassing vehicles and an alleged right to impound trespassing vehicles – did not apply to the defendants’ vehicle immobilization practice. However, because the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that “the trial court did not err in finding no common law right to immobilize a vehicle absent an enabling statute or ordinance,” and any reliance on that conclusion in affirming the trial court’s order granting Plaintiff Forrest Allen’s motion for class certification, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with direction to remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the proposed class. View "RCC Wesley Chapel Crossing, LLC et al. v. Allen, et al." on Justia Law

Cathy Mixon sued the Georgia Department of Transportation (“GDOT,” or “the State”), claiming nuisance and inverse condemnation based on alleged flooding on her property following a road-widening project. Mixon claimed GDOT’s failure to maintain its storm water drainage systems resulted in regular flooding, drainage, and erosion problems “within and around” her property. Her complaint sought “just and adequate compensation” for the alleged taking, other money damages, attorney fees, and a permanent injunction “to prevent future nuisance and continual trespass[.]” GDOT moved to dismiss, which the trial court granted in part and denied in part. In particular, the trial court dismissed any claims arising from professional negligence (due to the lack of an expert affidavit, as required by OCGA 9-11-9.1) and any claims arising more than four years prior to the filing of the complaint (due to the applicable statute of limitations). The trial court otherwise denied GDOT’s motion. Among other things, the trial court rejected GDOT’s argument that sovereign immunity barred Mixon’s claims. The Court of Appeals granted GDOT’s application for interlocutory appeal and then affirmed, holding in relevant part that the trial court did not err in ruling that sovereign immunity is waived for Mixon’s claims for damages and injunctive relief. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed: because Mixon’s claim for injunctive relief ... fell into at least one of the two categories of situations in which the Just Compensation Provision acted as a waiver of sovereign immunity for injunctive relief. View "Dept. of Transportation v. Mixon" on Justia Law

Manuel Hernandez was shot and seriously injured by unknown assailants as he approached the doorway to his apartment. Hernandez filed suit against the owner of the apartment complex, Terraces at Brookhaven, and the operator of the complex, Star Residential, LLC (collectively “Star Residential”), asserting, among other things, a nuisance claim under the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (the “Gang Act”). Hernandez claimed that he was entitled to treble damages (i.e., three times the actual damages he sustained in the shooting) and punitive damages under OCGA 16-15-7(c) because his injuries occurred as a result of a criminal street gang creating a public nuisance on Star Residential’s property. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Star Residential's motion to dismiss, holding, in relevant part, that whether to hold a property owner liable under OCGA 16-15-7(c) of the Gang Act for maintaining a public nuisance was always a question for the factfinder to decide, and not for the court. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Star Residential’s petition for a writ of certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed the civil liability provision of OCGA 16-15-7(c). After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the statute was incorrect: "there is nothing in the language of subsection (c) to indicate that the General Assembly intended for a jury to usurp the judiciary’s role of determining the meaning of the statute at issue. ... This means only that, once a legally appropriate cause of action is submitted to the factfinder for decision, that factfinder must be instructed on the legislative intent codified in OCGA 16-15-2 in order to determine if the circumstances of the case warrant the imposition of liability under OCGA 16-15-7(c). The statute simply does not say that a factfinder must determine the meaning of subsection (c) in the first instance, which is a role reserved for the courts." View "Star Residential, LLC et al. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the surviving spouse of Franklin Callens and the administrator of his estate, sued defendants, the owner and manager of an apartment complex where Callens was killed during an armed robbery. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants were negligent in failing adequately to secure their premises from criminal activity. Defendants prevailed at trial, and Plaintiffs appealed, contending, in relevant part, that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction on the law applicable to “licensees” in premises liability cases. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on that issue. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari review on the issue of whether the trial court erred in charging the jury on what duty a landowner owed a licensee, when there was evidence showing that plaintiffs' decedent was a guest of a lawful tenant of the landowner. The Supreme Court found the trial court did not err in charging the jury, and therefore affirmed the appellate and trial courts. View "Cham et al. v. ECI Management Corp. et al." on Justia Law