Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the intermediate court of appeals' (ICA) judgment on appeal with respect to defendant Nicole Jadan's counterclaim and vacated the district court's judgment, holding that the district court erred by failing to determine whether Jadan's participation in the court proceedings would be meaningful absent language assistance when it resolved her repeated requests for an interpreter.Cambridge Management filed a complaint for writ of possession against Jadan. Jadan counterclaimed for damages. The district court held nine hearings on the complaint and counterclaim. At eight of those court dates, Jadan either requested the assistance of a Polish interpreter or indicated to the court that she struggled with understanding and communicating in English. One judge agreed to appoint an interpreter midway through the district court proceedings, but subsequent court dates proceeded without the service of an interpreter. The court ruled in favor of Cambridge. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding that the district court's failure adequately to inquire into Jadan's language access needs was not harmless. View "Cambridge Management Inc. v. Jadan" on Justia Law

In this foreclosure action, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) concluding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellants' motion to extend time to file notice of appeal, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Appellants' appeal extension motion.On appeal, Appellants asserted that they were deprived of an opportunity to timely file a notice of appeal from the order denying foreclosure reconsideration because the circuit court staff provided incorrect information leading Appellants to believe that the thirty days to file the notice of appeal had not yet begun tolling. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment, holding (1) Haw. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B) motions to extend time for filing a notice of appeal are not properly filed as ex parte motions; (2) under the circumstances of this case, Appellants' motion to advance the hearing on their HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(B) hearing motion should have been granted; and (3) therefore, Appellants' notice of appeal was effective as to all issues on appeal over which the ICA had appellate jurisdiction based on Appellants' timely appeal of the circuit court's order denying reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment and foreclosure judgment. View "Wilmington Savings Fund Society v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) in this appeal, holding that the ICA erred when it vacated the jury's civil conspiracy verdict, when it vacated an order of the circuit court on judicial admissions and judicial estoppel, and when it vacated the jury's verdict on Plaintiff's nuisance, invasion of privacy, and malicious prosecution claims.In this dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants over an easement located on Defendants' property that escalated into numerous incidents of alleged wrongful conduct by both parties, both parties appealed a $616,000 jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The ICA vacated the circuit court's judgment, vacated the entire jury award, and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the circuit court made numerous errors. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury's award, holding (1) the ICA erred in vacating the circuit court's determination that Defendants judicially admitted to the existence of the easement and that its scope included vehicular ingress and egress; and (2) the ICA erred in several other respects. View "Ching v. Dung" on Justia Law

In response to a question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit the Supreme Court answered that the statute of limitations for a regulatory takings claim brought under the Hawai'i Constitution is six years pursuant to the catch-all statute of limitations in Haw. Rev. Stat. 657-1(4).The underlying dispute arose from the State Land Use Commission's (LUC) reclassification in 2011 of 1,060 acres of land in South Kohala on Hawai'i Island. In 2017, DW Aina Le'a Development (DW) filed this complaint alleging that the reclassification was an unconstitutional taking because the LUC failed to compensate DW for damages resulting from the land's reclassification. The federal district court dismissed the case, applying the two-year statute of limitations found in Haw. Rev. Stat. 657-7. LW appealed, arguing that the "catch-all" six-year statute of limitations applied to the action. The Ninth Circuit certified to the question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for a takings claim under the Hawai'i Constitution is six years pursuant to Haw. Rev. Code 657-1(4). View "DW Aina Le'a Development, LLC v. State Land Use Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that res judicata does not preclude a Haw. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment in a foreclosure proceeding and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion in this case.The circuit court found Appellant in default on her mortgage and granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent. Before a foreclosure sale took place, Appellant filed a Rule 60(b) motion, challenging Respondent's standing to bring a foreclosure action against her. The circuit court denied the motion. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed, ruling that res judicata precluded Appellant's post-judgment Rule 60(b) motion. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding (1) res judicata did not bar Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion; but (2) the circuit court properly denied the Rule 60(b) motion because there were no extraordinary circumstances warranting extraordinary relief under Rule 60(b)(6). View "Pennymac Corp. v. Godinez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the circuit court's final judgment granting and apportioning monetary damages to Native Hawaiian beneficiaries after ruling that the State breached its duties as trustee of the Hawaiian Home Lands Trust (Trust), holding that the Fair Market Rental Value (FMRV) model is an adequate method for approximating actual damages.Plaintiffs were a group of Native Hawaiian Trust beneficiaries who claimed that they incurred damages while on the waitlist to receive homestead land due to breaches of trust duties by the State. In 2009, the circuit court ruled that the State breached its duties as trustee of the Trust. In 2018, the circuit court entered a final judgment adopting a FMRV model by which it could estimate the actual loss each individual beneficiary incurred. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err by adopting the FMRV model; (2) incorrectly ruled that a beneficiary's damages did not begin to accrue until six years after the State received a beneficiary's homestead application; and (3) did not err in finding that the State breached its trust duties by failing to recover lands that were withdrawn from the Trust prior to statehood. View "Kalima v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) manifestly abused its discretion in setting the amount of a supersedeas bond as a condition of staying the enforcement of a judgment and writ of possession pending appeal.The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on its complaint for ejectment against Defendants. While Defendants' appeal was pending, Defendants moved for a stay of proceedings to enforce the judgment. The circuit court granted the request and required Defendants to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of $578,000. Defendants then filed a motion for a stay in the ICA. The ICA granted a stay on the condition that it would be effective upon the ICA's approval of a supersedeas bond in the amount of $250,000 (the stay order). Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus from the ICA's stay order, arguing that the amount of the supersedeas bond should not exceed $8,000. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) the ICA not apply relevant factors in setting the bond amount, and (2) the stay order lacked a reasonable timeframe in which Defendants would be required to post the bond. View "Kelepolo v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

In this case arising from settlement negotiations between Plaintiff and Defendants relating to a dispute about water and mold damage to Plaintiff's condominium the Supreme Court remanded this case with instruction that the circuit court hold an evidentiary hearing to address issues of fact as to the terms and existence of a purported settlement agreement between the parties.At the close of a settlement conference, the circuit court and the parties acknowledged that the parties had reached a settlement. Plaintiff, however, refused to sign the settlement documents and proceeded to represent herself pro se. Defendants filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that the parties had entered into a binding settlement agreement but that the proposed written settlement agreement contained terms beyond those agreed to at the settlement conference. Therefore, the court struck those terms and created a revised settlement agreement. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the parties reached a valid settlement agreement and as to which terms the parties agreed to at the settlement conference, the circuit court should have granted Plaintiff's motion for an evidentiary hearing to resolve those issues. View "McKenna v. Association of Apartment Owners of Elima Lani" on Justia Law

In this case arising from the nonjudicial foreclosure of Petitioner's apartment based on unpaid assessments the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) partially affirming the trial court's dismissal of the Petitioner's claims against the apartment owners' association and the purchaser of the property for wrongful foreclosure, holding that the complaint stated a claim against both defendants.Petitioner's claim for wrongful foreclosure was based on the association's lack of a valid power of sale. The district court found that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 667, which governs foreclosures, contained a statutory bar that precluded Petitioner's claims. The ICA concluded that the statutory bar did not preclude Petitioner's claim for damages against the association but did not preclude Petitioner's claim to title of the property against the purchaser. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner's wrongful foreclosure claim was not limited by chapter 667, and chapter 667's provisions do not bar a claim of wrongful foreclosure based on the lack of a power of sale; and (2) therefore, the complaint did state a claim against both the association and the purchaser of the apartment. View "Sakal v. Association of Apartment Owners of Hawaiian Monarch" on Justia Law

In this certiorari proceeding arising out of a lawsuit brought by condominium owners whose unit was nonjudicially foreclosed by their association of apartment owners the Supreme Court held that the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) erred in affirming the circuit court's dismissal of the unfair or deceptive acts of practices (UDAP) claim, holding that the Plaintiffs' UDAP claim should not have been dismissed.Plaintiffs filed a complaint against their association (Association), by and through its board of directors (Board), asserting wrongful foreclosure and UDAP claims based on the Board's nonjudicial foreclosure and public sale of their condominium apartment due to unpaid assessment fees. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The ICA held that the circuit court (1) erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' wrongful foreclosure claim, and (2) correctly dismissed the UDAP claim as time-barred. The Supreme Court reversed as to the UDAP claim and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the ICA correctly reinstated the wrongful foreclosure claim because the Board lacked a power of sale; and (2) based on the applicable notice pleading standard, viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, it cannot be said that Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief. View "Malabe v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Executive Centre" on Justia Law