Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was a non-judicial foreclosure conducted pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 667 Part I, which was repealed by the legislature by Act 182. Russell Hungate, the property owner, filed a complaint and first amended complaint alleging that Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank) and David B. Rosen and his law office (collectively, Rosen), the attorney hired by Deutsche Bank to conduct the foreclosure of Hungate’s property, violated statutory, contractual, and common law duties and committed unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The circuit court granted Rosen’s motion to dismiss and then granted Deutsche Bank’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated in part the circuit court’s orders, holding (1) the circuit court erred in dismissing the majority to Hungate’s claims alleging Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 667 Part I violations against Deutsche Bank; (2) Duetsche Bank must use reasonable means to obtain the best price for a foreclosed property; and (3) the circuit court erred in dismissing Hungate’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices claim against Deutsche Bank, but property dismissed Hungate’s claim against Rosen. View "Hungate v. Rosen" on Justia Law

The Association of Apartment Owners (the AOAO) filed a notice of default and intention to foreclose a unit of the Century Center condominiums. The AOAO purchased the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and then filed a complaint for summary possession against Respondents. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under Haw. Rev. Stat. 604-5(d), which provides that the district court “shall not have cognizance of…actions in which the title to real estate comes in question.” The district court denied the motion and, after a hearing, filed a judgment for possession and a writ of possession in favor of the AOAO. Respondents appealed, arguing that because they established that title over the property was in question, the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over the case. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) agreed, vacated the district court’s judgment, and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Respondents’ affidavit asserting claim of title satisfied District Court Rules of Civil Procedure 12.1 and that the ICA did not err in considering as part of its analysis the quitclaim deed attached to the AOAO’s complaint. View "Association of Apartment Owners of Century Center, Inc. v. An" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a nonjudicial foreclosure on real property conducted pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 667-5. The circuit court entered final judgment in favor of the Mounts, the purchasers of the real property through the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, and U.S. Bank National Association. The final judgment was entered against the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. The circuit court ruled that a nonjudicial foreclosure conducted pursuant to section 667-5 is exempt from the time limits for presentation of claims against a decedent’s estate and that U.S. Bank did not violate section 667-5(c)(1) by failing to provide former co-personal representative Sesha Lovelace with information she requested regarding the required funds to reinstate the loan (“reinstatement figures”). The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s final judgment, holding (1) a nonjudicial foreclosure conducted pursuant to section 667-5 is not exempt from the time limits under Haw. Rev. Stat. 560:3-803 for presentation of claims against a decedent’s estate; and (2) the nonjudicial foreclosure was conducted in violation of section 667-5(c)(1) when U.S. Bank failed to provide Lovelace with loan reinstatement figures, and this failure rendered the nonjudicial foreclosure sale voidable at the Estate’s election unless the Mounts were innocent purchasers for value. Remanded. View "Mount v. Apao" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute over title to a parcel of land in Oahu. The ownership interests of Lesieli Teisina (Lesieli) and Peni Teisina (Peni), who held estates in common, were challenged by a co-owner of the property, Hovey Lambert, as the statutory period for adverse possession was ending. Lambert named Lesieli and other defendants but failed to name Peni. Lesieli and Peni, who later moved to intervene, asserted adverse possession as an affirmative defense. The circuit court concluded that Peni had no interest in the parcel and that Lesieli had only a minute interest in the parcel, thus implicitly rejecting the Teisinas’ adverse possession defense. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the Teisinas’ affirmative defense of adverse possession. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding that the ICA erred in affirming that portion of the circuit court order that implicitly rejected Peni’s adverse possession defense, as (1) the facts of this case satisfy the evidentiary burden on summary judgment of demonstrating compliance with the good faith requirement required in cases involving adverse possession against cotenants; and (2) the statutory period for adverse possession tolls for a named party to the litigation but continues to accrue for unnamed claimants. View "Lambert v. Waha " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Clarence Furuya and Lona Furuya, filed the underlying suit against Association of Apartment Owners of Pacific Monarch, Inc. (AOAO) raising issues related to their interests in an apartment unit located at the Pacific Monarch Condominium (Pacific Monarch) and 106 parking stalls appurtenant to the unit. The circuit court concluded that there was no enforceable contract between AOAO and the Furuyas for the purchase of the leased fee interests associated with the unit and the parking stalls. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) ultimately affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Furuyas failed to demonstrate error in the circuit court’s decision; and (2) the circuit court did not err in rejecting the Furuyas’ related claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and ultra vires act. View "Furuya v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Pacific Monarch, Inc." on Justia Law

Lloyd Anastasi loaned $2.4 million to a third party in exchange for a mortgage on a property supposedly owned by that third party. Fidelity Insurance Company insured that the third party had good title, but the warranty deed purporting to give title to the third party was forged. Anastasi was sued by the owners of the property, and Fidelity accepted tender of the claim under a reservation of rights. Anastasi later filed a bad faith and breach of contract claim against Fidelity, alleging that the lawsuit was used by Fidelity to delay paying him under the title insurance policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Fidelity. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) remanded in part and vacated in part. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the ICA’s judgment insofar as it remanded to the circuit court an order allowing Fidelity to withhold certain documents that Anastasi requested during discovery under the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine; and (2) vacated the ICA’s judgment insofar it it concluded that Anastasi failed to show any genuine issue of material fact that Fidelity acted in bad faith. View "Anastasi v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Buyers bought a commercial property from Seller. Buyers subsequently filed a complaint against Seller challenging the adequacy of Seller’s disclosures. The circuit court dismissed the action without prejudice to allow the parties to engage in mediation. Because of a dispute between the parties regarding mediation, the mortgage payments were briefly interrupted. Seller subsequently brought a foreclosure action against Buyers. Seller then held a nonjudicial public foreclosure auction at which she purchased the property by submitting the highest bid. After a trial on Buyers’ claims for nondisclosure and misrepresentation, the circuit court ordered judgment in favor of Seller. The court also ordered judgment in favor of Seller and against Buyers on Seller’s counterclaims for breach of the note and mortgage and ejectment. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) Seller’s failure to disclose certain facts regarding the property’s sewer system was actionable under the nondisclosure and misrepresentation causes of action; and (2) Seller’s nonjudicial foreclosure of the property and ejectment of Buyers was wrongful. View "Santiago v. Tanaka" on Justia Law

Appellants, The Sierra Club and Senator Clayton Hee, challenged the Land Use Commission’s (LUC) reclassification of 1525 acres of Appellee D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes’ land from the agricultural state land use district to the urban state land use district. The circuit court affirmed the LUC’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision and order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the reclassification did not violate article XI, section 3 of the Hawai’i Constitution or Haw. Rev. Stat. 205-41 through -52; and (2) reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supported the LUC’s finding that the reclassification of the land at issue was consistent with the Hawai’i State Plan, would not substantially impair agricultural production, and was necessary for urban growth. View "Sierra Club v. D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

After Leigh Matsuyoshi fell behind on her mortgage payments, the property was auctioned off at a foreclosure sale. Thereafter, the mortgagee, who was also the purchaser of the foreclosed property, executed a quitclaim deed conveying the property to Kondaur Capital Corporation. Kondau filed a complaint for possession of the property against Matsuyoshi. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Kondaur. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) ultimately affirmed. Matsuyoshi appealed, citing Ulrich v. Security Investment Co. and arguing that the ICA misapplied the summary judgment standard by requiring her to present evidence when Kondaur had failed to present a prima facie case establishing that the sale of the property was valid. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) the duties set forth in Ulrich remain viable law and are applicable to non-judicial foreclosures of real property mortgages; (2) when a mortgagee acts as both the seller and the purchaser of property at a non-judicial foreclosure sale, that mortgagee or its quitclaim transferee bears the burden of proving compliance with the requirements of Ulrich; and (3) in this case, because Kondaur failed to satisfy its initial burden of showing that the foreclosure sale was conducted in compliance with the requirements of Ulrich, the burden never shifted to Matsuyoshi, and summary judgment was erroneously granted. View "Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Matsuyoshi" on Justia Law