Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Joliet filed a complaint seeking to acquire, by eminent domain, a low-income apartment complex that was owned and managed by the plaintiffs. Following almost 12 years of litigation, Joliet acquired fee simple title to the property in 2017. During the litigation, the apartment complex remained in operation; the plaintiffs paid the property taxes without filing any protest. In 2018, the plaintiffs filed a tax objection complaint, seeking the refund of over $6 million in property taxes paid between the date Joliet filed its condemnation complaint and the date it acquired the property. The plaintiffs maintained that “once title to property acquired by condemnation vests with the condemning authority, it vests retroactively to the date of filing the condemnation petition,” so the landowner is entitled to a refund for any taxes paid after the date of filing. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a refund.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, overruling the precedent on which the appellate court relied. The legal premises on which that case rested—that a taking occurs at the time a condemnation action is filed and that the valuation of the property is fixed at that point—no longer exists. The court rejected an argument that the act of filing a condemnation complaint burdened the property and it would be unfair to require the plaintiffs to pay the property taxes that accrued during the condemnation proceeding. View "MB Financial Bank, N.A. v. Brophy" on Justia Law

The Village alleged that the defendants breached a 2003 recorded annexation agreement executed by the Trustee that was then the legal owner of the property, which now consists of an annexed 114-acre subdivision. The Village alleged that the defendants were subject to the annexation agreement as successors to the Trustee when they purchased undeveloped portions of the property from Plank, which had acquired the property from the Trustee. The Village alleged that the defendants refused its request for a letter of credit in the amount proportionate to the number of lots the defendants owned in the subdivision, to secure the completion of roads in the subdivision.The defendants argued that, although the annexation agreement was a covenant that ran with the land, it did not confer successor status to an entity that purchased only a portion of the property subject to annexation, as opposed to the whole of the property. The Appellate Court reversed the dismissal of the action. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Reading the annexation agreement as a whole, the court found that its plain language required its provisions to be binding and enforceable on the parties’ successors. Defendants are successors in title to the landowner who agreed to those obligations. The obligations imposed upon any particular purchaser depend upon the obligations of the original developer that remain unsatisfied with respect to the specific parcel sold. View "Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings Co., LLC I" on Justia Law

The Condominium Property Act requires condominium unit sellers to obtain specific disclosure documents from the Association or its agent before a sale and to provide them to potential buyers on request. After entering into a standard sales contract with a potential buyer who requested those disclosures, Channon obtained them from Westward, a management agent hired by the Association’s board of managers. Westward charged $245 for the documents. Channon filed a class-action lawsuit, alleging that Westward violated section 22.1 of the Act by charging unreasonable fees for the statutorily required documents and violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.In response to a certified question, the Illinois Supreme Court held that section 22.1 does not provide an implied cause of action in favor of a condominium unit seller against a property manager, as an agent of an association or board of directors, based on allegations that the manager charged excessive fees for the production of information required to be disclosed under that statute. The standard for a court to imply a private right of action in a statute is quite high. That extraordinary step should be taken only when it is clearly needed to advance the statutory purpose and when the statute would “be ineffective, as a practical matter, unless a private right of action were implied.” View "Channon v. Westward Management, Inc." on Justia Law

Sheckler rented residential property from McIntosh. The lease provided McIntosh “shall maintain fire and other hazard insurance on the premises only” and that Sheckler was responsible for insurance on possessions contained in the premises. The lease's indemnification clause exculpated McIntosh from any damages or injury occurring on the premises. McIntosh obtained insurance from Auto-Owners; first-party dwelling coverage provided coverage for fire damage and third-party landlord liability coverage provided coverage for claims brought by third parties that the insured “becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of or arising out of bodily injury or property damage.” The third-party coverage provided a duty to defend any claim covered by the policy, excluding “property damage to property occupied or used by an insured or rented to or in the care of, any insured.” The policy listed McIntosh as the only named insured. McIntosh claims no money received from Sheckler was used to pay the annual premium.Sheckler notified McIntosh that the gas stove was not working. McIntosh placed a service call. The technician’s efforts resulted in a fire that caused substantial property damage. Auto-Owners paid McIntosh for damages incurred due to the fire and lost rental income and filed a subrogation action against the technician (Workman), who filed a third-party contribution complaint against Sheckler. Sheckler tendered the defense to Auto-Owners, which rejected the claim. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the rejection of Sheckler’s claim. An insurer’s duty to defend or indemnify does not extend to the tenant of an insured property against a third-party negligence contribution claim when the tenant is not identified as a person insured under the policy. View "Sheckler v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs own property on the non-navigable Mazon River in Grundy County and want to kayak on the River through the defendants' neighboring properties. They sought a declaration that they had the right as riparian owners to kayak along the entire length of the Mazon River, including through property owned by the defendants, “f[r]ee and clear from any claim of trespass.” The Mazon River is 28 miles long and is a tributary of the Illinois River.The circuit court, appellate court, and the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendants. Neither precedent nor Illinois common law grants a riparian owner on a non-navigable river or stream the right to use that waterway to cross the property of another riparian owner without that owner’s permission. The distinction between property boundaries on a lake versus a river or stream has been recognized in Illinois law for over a century. The Illinois common law “reasonable use” doctrine of water by riparian owners applies to direct consumptive or diversionary uses of the water, not the use of the surface water to enter the property of another riparian owner. View "Holm v. Kodat" on Justia Law

On February 15, 2018, GAN filed a petition for a tax deed to acquire property it purchased at Cook County’s 2016 annual tax sale for the tax year 2014. On April 24, 2018, GAN assigned its interest in the property to Blossom63. On May 6, 2018, Longmeadow, the owner of the property, transferred its interest in the property to Devonshire. On May 17, Devonshire sought to intervene in the tax deed proceedings and moved to vacate Blossom63’s tax deed on the ground Blossom63 failed to strictly comply with the notice requirements of the Property Tax Code, 35 ILCS 200/22-5.On May 18, the circuit court granted the petition for a tax deed. The county clerk issued Blossom63 a tax deed. On June 19, 2019, the circuit court granted Devonshire’s motion to vacate the order issuing a tax deed to Blossom63. The appellate court reversed, finding Blossom63’s notice strictly complied with the Tax Code. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Blossom63 strictly complied with section 22-5 by listing the delinquent tax year for which the sale was held without listing the additional delinquent tax years for which it paid taxes to complete the sale. View "In re Application of the County Collector" on Justia Law

In 2011, PNC filed a foreclosure complaint against Kusmierz. PNC retained Metro to serve the summons. Magida, a Metro employee, attempted to serve Kusmierz at the subject Lombard address but the property was a vacant lot. Magida served Kusmierz in Palatine. Days later, PNC obtained the appointment of Metro as a special process server. PNC then filed affidavits of service. Kusmierz failed to appear. On February 28, 2012, the court entered an order of default and a judgment of foreclosure and sale. PNC complied with all statutory notice requirements, and the property was sold at a judicial sale back to PNC. The court confirmed the judicial sale. Notices of the proceedings were mailed to the Palatine address. In 2013, third parties purchased the property from PNC for $24,000 and constructed a home on the property with mortgage loans totaling $292,650.In 2018, more than seven years after being served with the foreclosure complaint and summons, Kusmierz sought relief from void judgments under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f), alleging improper service because the process server was not appointed by the court at the time of service, in violation of section 2-202(a). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, applying both laches and the bona fide purchaser protections in section 2-1401(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure. View "PNC Bank, National Association v. Kusmierz" on Justia Law

The School Board sought equitable relief from Crest Hill ordinances creating a real property tax increment financing (TIF) district and attendant redevelopment plan and project, pursuant to the Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act (65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-1). The Board complained that Crest Hill violated the TIF Act by including parcels of realty in the redevelopment project area that were not contiguous. An excluded parcel is owned by the utility company, is located outside the incorporated boundaries of the municipality and the boundaries of the redevelopment project area, and physically separates the parcels the municipality found to be contiguous for purposes of including them in the redevelopment project area.The circuit court granted Crest Hill summary judgment. The Appellate Court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the reversal. A public-utility-right-of-way exception to the contiguity requirement for annexation, found in the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7-1-1), does not apply as an exception to contiguity required by the TIF Act. This case does not involve contiguous properties running parallel and adjacent to each other in a reasonably substantial physical sense, wherein a public utility owns a right-of-way, or easement, to pass through one or both of the physically adjacent properties. View "Board of Education of Richland School District No. 88A v. City of Crest Hill" on Justia Law

The real estate taxes on Brown’s mineral rights were not paid. In 2013, the Hamilton County collector sold the delinquent taxes. Castleman extended the taxes’ redemption date to October 10, 2015, and filed a petition for a tax deed on June 22, 2015. An October 2015 order under Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/22-40(a)) directed the clerk to issue a tax deed to Castleman. Castleman assigned the tax sale certificate to Groome. Brown sold the mineral rights to SI by quitclaim deed. In November 2015, SI moved to vacate the section 22-40(a) order. The trial court dismissed for lack of standing. Meanwhile, Groome recorded a tax deed in February 2016. In June 2017, SI sought a writ of mandamus against the Hamilton County clerk who conceded that the 2016 Groome deed did not comport with the underlying section 22-40(a) order, which directed the deed to be issued to Castleman. The court granted SI’s requests. Castleman and Groome were not parties in the mandamus proceedings.The appellate court found the motion to vacate the section 22-40(a) order "a nullity.” The Hamilton County clerk issued Castleman a “Corrective Tax Deed” in October 2017, in compliance with the original section 22-40(a) order. SI filed a “Section 22-85 Motion to Void Tax Deed” and a “[Section] 2-1401/22-45 Petition to Vacate the October 2015 Order Directing Issuance of Tax Deed.” The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of both counts.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. A tax deed issued and was recorded within the mandatory time limit. The deed’s failure to name the proper party created a conflict between the deed and the section 22-40(a) order. While timely filing may result in the tax deed becoming “absolutely void,” 35 ILCS 200/22-85, the conflict with the order does not. The court’s mandamus order is properly viewed as reforming and correcting the 2016 tax deed to comport with the section 22-40(a) order. View "In re Application for a Tax Deed" on Justia Law

In filing mortgage foreclosure cases, the plaintiffs each paid a $50 “add on” filing fee under section 15-1504.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of section 15-1504.1 and of sections 7.30 and 7.31 of the Illinois Housing Development Act, 20 ILCS 3805/7.30, 7.31, which created foreclosure prevention and property rehabilitation programs funded by the fee.The trial court, following a remand, held that the fee violated the equal protection, due process, and uniformity clauses of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the fee violates the constitutional right to obtain justice freely. The $50 filing charge established under section 15-1504.1, although called a “fee,” is, in fact, a litigation tax; it has no direct relation to expenses of a petitioner’s litigation and no relation to the services rendered. The court determined that the plaintiffs paid the fee under duress; the voluntary payment doctrine did not apply. View "Walker v. Chasteen" on Justia Law