Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Indiana
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In this case decided by the Indiana Supreme Court, plaintiff Dux North LLC, the owner of a landlocked property in rural Hamilton County, Indiana, sought an implied easement over adjacent property owned by defendants Jason and Sarah Morehouse. Dux North claimed either an implied easement by prior use or an implied easement of necessity over the Morehouse property. The court clarified that these two types of implied easements are conceptually different. For an implied easement by prior use, the claimed servitude must predate the severance creating the separate parcels. For an implied easement of necessity, the claimed necessity need to arise only at severance and not before. Thus, Dux North could seek relief under either implied easement, and the failure of one such easement does not necessarily defeat the other. Furthermore, the court held that an implied easement of necessity requires a showing that access to the property by another means is not just impractical but impossible. The court then reversed the trial court's judgment granting Dux North's motion for summary judgment on the easement-by-prior-use claim and denying the Morehouses' motion for partial summary judgment on the easement-of-necessity claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings to decide whether Dux North has an easement by prior use over the Morehouse property. View "Morehouse v. Dux North LLC" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around injury suffered by a swimmer, Dr. Jennifer Pennington, who collided with the corner of a swimming-pool wall at a health and fitness center owned and operated by Memorial Hospital of South Bend, doing business as Beacon Health and Fitness. The design and construction of the swimming pool was carried out by Spear Corporation and Panzica Building Corporation. The Penningtons filed a suit against Beacon, Spear, and Panzica, alleging negligent design, failure to warn, negligent maintenance and operation, negligent construction, and deprivation of companionship due to the injury. The trial court granted summary judgment to Panzica and Spear on all counts and to Beacon on some counts, but denied summary judgment to Beacon on the count of negligent maintenance and operation and failure to provide adequate warnings and instructions. The Indiana Supreme Court held that Beacon was not entitled to summary judgment on any count, except as to the single issue of the level of the water within Count III. The court affirmed summary judgment for Spear and Panzica, stating that the Penningtons failed to provide admissible evidence regarding Spear or Panzica's breach of their professional duty of care. However, the court found that there were issues of fact regarding Beacon's role in the pool’s design and its maintenance and operation that required a trial. View "Pennington v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this case before the Indiana Supreme Court, Thomas DeCola, the appellant, filed a suit to quiet title after purchasing property owned by Norfolk Southern Corporation, the appellee, at a tax sale. The property had fallen into tax delinquency. DeCola sought judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Norfolk had not received proper notice of the tax sale, the petition for tax deed, or its right of redemption. The trial court converted DeCola's motion into one for summary judgment because it considered evidence outside the pleadings. In its detailed order, the trial court denied DeCola's summary judgment motion, finding the tax deed void due to lack of sufficient notice to Norfolk.DeCola appealed the denial of summary judgment, claiming it was a final order. However, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the trial court's order denying summary judgment was not a final judgment because it did not resolve all claims as to all parties. The Court stated that the order did not meet any of the five definitions of a "final judgment" as laid out in Rule 2(H) of the appellate rules. Therefore, the Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "DeCola v. Norfolk Southern Corporation, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion filed by James and Phyllis Crowe seeking relief from the judgment of the trial court granting Savvy IN, LLC's petition to issue tax deeds for certain properties, holding that Savvy IN's certified and first-class mailed notice letters notifying the Crowes that Savvy IN purchased their properties at a tax sale satisfied the minimum requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Indiana law.In 2019, the Crowes received notice that their properties were sold in a tax sale due to their failure to pay 2018 property taxes. Savvy IN purchased the properties at a tax sale. When the Crowes passed the deadline to redeem the properties Savvy IN petitioned the trial court to direct the county auditor to issue tax deeds for the properties. The trial court granted the motion. The Crowes moved for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(B)(6) on the grounds that they did not receive notice letters, thus rendering the judgment and tax deeds void. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Savvy IN was entitled to the tax deeds issued by the trial court because the mailed notices satisfied the constitutional and statutory requirements. View "Crowe v. Savvy IN, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Reagan Outdoor Advertising in this appeal from the determination that Reagan's billboard had lost its legal nonconforming status, holding that the trial court correctly entered judgment for Reagan.An ordinance of the city of Noblesville bans pole signs, which are signs affixed to poles or other uprights installed in the ground. Reagan, whose billboards the city classifies as pole signs, was allowed signs to remain that pre-dated the ordinance if they were kept in good repair and not relocated. When Reagan repaired damage to one of the billboard's support posts the city issued a stop-work order before Reagan could reattach the sign's display, concluding that Reagan had relocated the sign, which therefore lost its legal nonconforming status. The zoning board of appeals affirmed, but the trial court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance's use of the word "relocate" was ambiguous and, consistent with this Court's interpretative canons, must be resolved in Reagan's favor. View "Noblesville Indiana Board of Zoning Appeals v. FMG Indianapolis, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of a school corporation that contractually agreed to make biannual payments to a company for access to a wind turbine, holding that the contract was void and unenforceable.Randolph Eastern School Corporation (RESC) contractually agreed to make biannual payments to Performance Services, Inc. for a wind-turbine project. As part of the contract, Performance agreed to provide RESC with financial benefits tied to the net revenue of the turbine. RESC, which never made any payments to Performance, brought this declaratory judgment action seeking to void the contract on the grounds that it constituted an illegal investment. The trial court granted RESC's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the contract constituted an unauthorized investment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the contract between RESC and Performance was void and unenforceable because it constituted an investment unauthorized by statute. View "Performance Services, Inc. v. Randolph Eastern School Corp." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial court concluding that a constitutional taking of Landowners' property occurred from government-induced flooding, holding that whether the flooding's interference was substantial enough to create a taking was a question left unresolved by the trial court's findings.In 2009, the Town of Linden and Montgomery County approved a drainage-improvement plan that called for a reconstruction project that included a drainage easement on Landowners' property. After completion of the project, portions of Landowners' property flooded after any heavy rainfall, encumbering their farming enterprise. Landowners sued the Town and County for inverse condemnation. After remand, the trial court concluded that the project amounted to a taking. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order, holding (1) the trial court properly analyzed the government-induced flooding as a permanent physical invasion; and (2) the statutory right of entry set forth in Ind. Code Ann. 36-9-27-33 does not exempt a county from liability for a takings claim. View "Town of Linden v. Birge" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court denying a motion for summary judgment brought by a contractor in this action seeking subrogation recovery and other relief, holding that the contractor was entitled to summary judgment.The company that had a sprinkler system installed and other commercial tenants in the building that was flooded when the sprinkler system malfunctioned incurred property damages. The company's insurer sued the contractor who performed the work on the sprinkler system for subrogation recovery, and the remaining commercial tenants sued the contractor to recover damages. The contractor filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contractor, as a matter of law, owed no duty to the non-contract tenants. View "U.S. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Erie Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the Gary Housing Authority and dismissing allegations that the Housing Authority's notice of its administrative taking of 624 Broadway, LLC's property was constitutionally deficient, holding that the deficient notice was not harmless.The Housing Authority only provided notice of its taking of 624 Broadway's property by publication, despite knowing how to contact the LLC. After 624 Broadway unsuccessfully requested the Housing Authority to postpone the meeting to its appraiser could assess the property 624 Broadway brought this complaint, alleging that the Housing Authority violated its federal due process rights. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Housing Authority. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Housing Authority's constitutionally deficient notice to 624 Broadway was prejudicial; and (2) 624 Broadway was entitled to a damages hearing. View "624 Broadway, LLC v. Gary Housing Authority" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court in this civil forfeiture action, holding that Appellant's designated evidence regarding the origins of much of his seized cash was sufficient to overcome the State's motion for summary judgment.The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in the State's favor regarding $8,923 in cash and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding (1) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the seized funds were a part of Appellant's alleged racketeering activity; (2) the Racketeering Forfeiture Statue does not permit a court to release the seized res subject to forfeiture to the defendant to fund a defense in the forfeiture action; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's request for appointed counsel, even if exceptional circumstances may have existed. View "Abbott v. State" on Justia Law