Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion filed by James and Phyllis Crowe seeking relief from the judgment of the trial court granting Savvy IN, LLC's petition to issue tax deeds for certain properties, holding that Savvy IN's certified and first-class mailed notice letters notifying the Crowes that Savvy IN purchased their properties at a tax sale satisfied the minimum requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Indiana law.In 2019, the Crowes received notice that their properties were sold in a tax sale due to their failure to pay 2018 property taxes. Savvy IN purchased the properties at a tax sale. When the Crowes passed the deadline to redeem the properties Savvy IN petitioned the trial court to direct the county auditor to issue tax deeds for the properties. The trial court granted the motion. The Crowes moved for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(B)(6) on the grounds that they did not receive notice letters, thus rendering the judgment and tax deeds void. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Savvy IN was entitled to the tax deeds issued by the trial court because the mailed notices satisfied the constitutional and statutory requirements. View "Crowe v. Savvy IN, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Reagan Outdoor Advertising in this appeal from the determination that Reagan's billboard had lost its legal nonconforming status, holding that the trial court correctly entered judgment for Reagan.An ordinance of the city of Noblesville bans pole signs, which are signs affixed to poles or other uprights installed in the ground. Reagan, whose billboards the city classifies as pole signs, was allowed signs to remain that pre-dated the ordinance if they were kept in good repair and not relocated. When Reagan repaired damage to one of the billboard's support posts the city issued a stop-work order before Reagan could reattach the sign's display, concluding that Reagan had relocated the sign, which therefore lost its legal nonconforming status. The zoning board of appeals affirmed, but the trial court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance's use of the word "relocate" was ambiguous and, consistent with this Court's interpretative canons, must be resolved in Reagan's favor. View "Noblesville Indiana Board of Zoning Appeals v. FMG Indianapolis, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of a school corporation that contractually agreed to make biannual payments to a company for access to a wind turbine, holding that the contract was void and unenforceable.Randolph Eastern School Corporation (RESC) contractually agreed to make biannual payments to Performance Services, Inc. for a wind-turbine project. As part of the contract, Performance agreed to provide RESC with financial benefits tied to the net revenue of the turbine. RESC, which never made any payments to Performance, brought this declaratory judgment action seeking to void the contract on the grounds that it constituted an illegal investment. The trial court granted RESC's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the contract constituted an unauthorized investment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the contract between RESC and Performance was void and unenforceable because it constituted an investment unauthorized by statute. View "Performance Services, Inc. v. Randolph Eastern School Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial court concluding that a constitutional taking of Landowners' property occurred from government-induced flooding, holding that whether the flooding's interference was substantial enough to create a taking was a question left unresolved by the trial court's findings.In 2009, the Town of Linden and Montgomery County approved a drainage-improvement plan that called for a reconstruction project that included a drainage easement on Landowners' property. After completion of the project, portions of Landowners' property flooded after any heavy rainfall, encumbering their farming enterprise. Landowners sued the Town and County for inverse condemnation. After remand, the trial court concluded that the project amounted to a taking. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order, holding (1) the trial court properly analyzed the government-induced flooding as a permanent physical invasion; and (2) the statutory right of entry set forth in Ind. Code Ann. 36-9-27-33 does not exempt a county from liability for a takings claim. View "Town of Linden v. Birge" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court denying a motion for summary judgment brought by a contractor in this action seeking subrogation recovery and other relief, holding that the contractor was entitled to summary judgment.The company that had a sprinkler system installed and other commercial tenants in the building that was flooded when the sprinkler system malfunctioned incurred property damages. The company's insurer sued the contractor who performed the work on the sprinkler system for subrogation recovery, and the remaining commercial tenants sued the contractor to recover damages. The contractor filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contractor, as a matter of law, owed no duty to the non-contract tenants. View "U.S. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Erie Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the Gary Housing Authority and dismissing allegations that the Housing Authority's notice of its administrative taking of 624 Broadway, LLC's property was constitutionally deficient, holding that the deficient notice was not harmless.The Housing Authority only provided notice of its taking of 624 Broadway's property by publication, despite knowing how to contact the LLC. After 624 Broadway unsuccessfully requested the Housing Authority to postpone the meeting to its appraiser could assess the property 624 Broadway brought this complaint, alleging that the Housing Authority violated its federal due process rights. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Housing Authority. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Housing Authority's constitutionally deficient notice to 624 Broadway was prejudicial; and (2) 624 Broadway was entitled to a damages hearing. View "624 Broadway, LLC v. Gary Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court in this civil forfeiture action, holding that Appellant's designated evidence regarding the origins of much of his seized cash was sufficient to overcome the State's motion for summary judgment.The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in the State's favor regarding $8,923 in cash and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding (1) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the seized funds were a part of Appellant's alleged racketeering activity; (2) the Racketeering Forfeiture Statue does not permit a court to release the seized res subject to forfeiture to the defendant to fund a defense in the forfeiture action; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's request for appointed counsel, even if exceptional circumstances may have existed. View "Abbott v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the trial court granting dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and negligence as to four of the defendants, holding that the complaint included facts capable of supporting relief on Plaintiff's implied-warranty-of-habitability claims against two of the defendants.Plaintiff, a homeowners' association, sued Defendants after discovering defects at a condominium complex. Four of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that they were not subject to the implied warranty of habitability because they were not builder-vendors and that the negligence claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff alleged facts capable of supporting relief on its implied-warranty-of-habitability claims against two of the defendants; and (2) Plaintiff alleged facts capable of supporting relief on its negligence claim. View "Residences at Ivy Quad Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Ivy Quad Development, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this property valuation matter for further proceedings, holding that the use of a now-defunct tax appeal form challenging assessments to certain homeowners' association lands for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 was proper.Petitioners, homeowners' associations located in Marion County, filed petitions for correction of an error (Form 133) alleging that property tax assessments from the years 2001 through 2003 were illegal because certain common areas of the properties were so encumbered by restrictions that the land had no value. The Marion County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals denied the forms. The Tax Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding in part that the HOAs' claim was not proper for a Form 133. The Supreme Court reversed in part and summarily affirmed in part, holding that Form 133 was a proper avenue to challenge the application of a discount to common land within the HOAs' property. View "Muir Woods Section One Ass'n Inc. v. Marion County Assessor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ruled that the forfeiture of Tyson Timbs's his white Land Rover was unconstitutional, holding that Timbs met his high burden to show that the harshness of his Land Rover's forfeiture was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the underlying offense and his culpability for the vehicle's misuse.The State filed a civil forfeiture complaint alleging that Timbs had used his Land Rover to illegally purchase, possess, and deal narcotics. The trial court entered judgment for Timbs. The case made its way up to the Supreme Court of the United States. On remand, the Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment includes both instrumentality and proportionality limitations for use-based in rem fines like the forfeiture of Timbs's vehicle and that such fines are constitutional if two requirements are met. The Supreme Court held that the forfeiture fell within the Excessive Fines Clauses's instrumentality limit but remanded for the trial court to determine whether the harshness of the forfeiture penalty was grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense. The trial court determined that Timbs had shown gross disproportionality. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Timbs met his burden to show gross disproportionality and that the Land Rover's forfeiture was unconstitutional. View "State v. Timbs" on Justia Law