Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Missouri
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In September 2016, Sanford Sachtleben and Luciann Hruza (the Buyers) purchased a property in Missouri from Perry and Joanie Sullivan (the Sellers). Prior to the sale, the city of New Melle had sued the Sellers over a barn they had built on the property, alleging it violated city zoning ordinances. The Buyers were added as defendants to this lawsuit after they purchased the property. The Buyers demanded coverage from their title insurance company, Alliant National Title Insurance Co. (Alliant), but Alliant refused. The Buyers then sued Alliant, claiming it had breached the title insurance policy by refusing to defend them in the New Melle lawsuit.The case was first heard in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, where Alliant moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted Alliant's motion, concluding that the unambiguous language of the title insurance policy provided no coverage for the Buyers. The Buyers appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the title insurance policy was unambiguous and did not provide coverage for the Buyers. The court noted that the policy provided coverage only if a notice, describing any part of the land, was recorded in the public records setting forth the violation or intention to enforce. Since no such notice was recorded, the court concluded that the policy did not provide coverage. The court also rejected the Buyers' arguments that other provisions of the policy provided coverage, finding that these arguments were precluded by an exclusion in the policy. View "Sachtleben vs. Alliant National Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in a case involving the St. Louis County Assessor ("Assessor") and a group of St. Louis County commercial property owners, referred to as "Taxpayers." The Taxpayers alleged that their properties were assessed at a higher percentage of fair market value (FMV) than other commercial properties in the county. This claim is known as a "ratio discrimination" claim. The Taxpayers appealed their assessments to the local board of equalization ("BOE") and the Missouri State Tax Commission ("STC"). In some of the appeals, the BOE and STC did not change the Assessor's original FMV and assessed value, while in others, they ordered reductions in the estimated FMV of the property, resulting in a lower assessed value and decreased tax liability.The STC found that the Taxpayers did not provide substantial and persuasive evidence of discrimination. The Taxpayers then filed a petition for judicial review, and the circuit court reversed the STC's decision and order and remanded the case for retrial. The Assessor appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, which found that the STC's decision was authorized by law and supported by substantial evidence. The Court agreed with the STC that the Taxpayers did not provide persuasive evidence of discriminatory assessment. The Court held that the actual assessment level used to analyze a claim of discriminatory assessment and taxation is based on the assessed value that actually determines the tax liability. The Court also found that the STC did not abuse its discretion by denying certain discovery requests and quashing subpoenas for the deposition of the Assessor and several staff appraisers. The circuit court's judgment was vacated, and the STC's decision and order was reinstated. View "Crown Diversified Industries Corp. v. Zimmerman" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Missouri issued an opinion involving a dispute between Tyler Technologies, Inc., and several individual and corporate property owners. The property owners had filed a class-action petition alleging that Tyler Technologies negligently carried out its contractual obligations to assist Jackson County with the 2023 real property assessment. The property owners claimed that Tyler Technologies' failures resulted in some class members not receiving timely notice of increased assessments and others having their property assessments increase by more than 15 percent without a physical inspection.Tyler Technologies filed a motion to dismiss the allegations, arguing that the property owners failed to allege facts showing that Tyler Technologies owed them a duty of care. The circuit court overruled the motion to dismiss, prompting Tyler Technologies to file a petition for a writ of prohibition, which the Supreme Court of Missouri issued as a preliminary writ.After a review, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the property owners did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Tyler Technologies owed them a duty of care. The court noted that the duties the property owners described were statutory obligations of the county assessor, not private, third-party contractors like Tyler Technologies. The court also invoked the rule of privity, which generally states that a party to a contract does not owe a duty to a plaintiff who was not a party to the contract. In the court's view, disregarding this rule would expose Tyler Technologies to excessive and unlimited liability and potentially discourage contractors from entering into service contracts due to the fear of obligations and liabilities they would not voluntarily assume.Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that Tyler Technologies was entitled to dismissal of the disputed counts of the property owners' petition. The court made its preliminary writ of prohibition permanent, barring further action from the circuit court other than dismissing the contested counts with prejudice. View "State ex rel. Tyler Technologies, Inc. v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law

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In Missouri, Jackson County and its public officials sought a writ of mandamus to overturn a circuit court's order which had denied their motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by Jackson County property owners. The property owners alleged that the County had unlawfully increased assessed property values by failing to provide timely notice of increases and not conducting physical inspections for properties with increases of over 15%. The County argued that the property owners should have exhausted all available administrative remedies before filing the lawsuit.The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with the County's argument, stating that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires an aggrieved party to seek available administrative remedies before courts will act. The court found that the County's failure to provide timely notice did not prevent the property owners from pursuing administrative remedies. At the time they filed the lawsuit, they could have exercised their appellate rights to the County's Board of Equalization or the State Tax Commission, but they chose not to. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that because the property owners failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing the lawsuit, the action must be dismissed, making permanent its preliminary writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Jackson County, Missouri v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Missouri Mining Commission awarding attorney fees and expenses in favor of Fowler Land Company and the Margaret Leist Revocable Trust (collectively, Landowners) after Landowners prevailed in litigation concerning the creation of water impoundments on their property, holding that the Commission erred in awarding fees and expenses.Alternative Fuels, Inc. (AFI) leased land from Landowners, who consented to AFI's creation of water impoundments on their property, but AFI constructed additional impoundments without consent. Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) initiated enforcement actions against AFI, after which AFI received approval for a permit revision. The Commission upheld the approval. The circuit court reversed. On remand, the Commission denied the permit revision application. Thereafter, Landowners filed an application for attorney fees and expenses arguing that they were the prevailing party and were entitled to attorney fees. The Commission granted the application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Landowners' fee application was untimely, and therefore, the Commission erred in awarding Landowners attorney fees and expenses. View "State ex rel. Dep't of Natural Resources v. Fowler Land Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the Missouri Constitution does not permit the General Assembly to limit the Conservation Commission's authority to expend and use conservation funds for constitutionally-enumerated purposes.The General Assembly enacted House Bill No. 2019 in 2020, appropriating $21 million to the Conservation Commission. The General Assembly, however, removed language from HB 2019 regarding use of the Commission's funds, including for land acquisition and payments in lieu of taxes (PILT). Later, the Commission attempted to withdraw funds to pay for a land acquisition and for PILT, but the Office of Administration denied the requests. The Commission and the Missouri Department of Conservation brought this action against the Attorney General and the Commissioner of the Office of Administration seeking declaratory relief to require certification of PILT payments. The circuit court ordered the Commissioner to certify the land purchase and PILT payments as requested. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in passing HB 2019, the General Assembly invaded the Commission's constitutional authority by attempting to limit the constitutionally-enumerated purposes for which the Commission could use its funds. View "Conservation Comm'n v. Bailey" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court dissolving a permanent injunction placing restrictions on Glendale Shooting Club, Inc.'s firing range operations, holding that the circuit court erred in entering summary judgment.In 1987, the circuit court entered injunctive relief limiting operation of the firing range. In 1988, the General Assembly enacted Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.294, which prohibited courts from enjoining the use or operating of firearm ranges on the basis of noise or sound emission. In 1998, Glendale moved to dissolve the permanent injunction. The circuit court dismissed the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for the circuit court to consider the effect of section 537.294 on the enforcement of the injunction. Following remand, Glendale entered into a settlement agreement precluding further litigation over the injunction for twenty years. After the twenty-year period expired, Glendale filed another petition to dissolve the permanent injunction pursuant to section 537.294. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Glendale. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that summary judgment was improper because Glenadale did not assert uncontroverted material facts demonstrating that the change in law rendered the continued enforcement of the injunction inequitable. View "Glendale Shooting Club, Inc. v. Landolt" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court reforming a property deed executed by Lillian and J.C. Singleton, as husband and wife, that divested Appellants' interest in the property, holding that the circuit court misapplied the law in reforming the deed.Lillian and J.C,. who were married and had three children, owned two tracts of land - Tract I and Tract II. The couple later instructed their attorney to prepare two warranty deeds, and the attorney did not know or meet with Appellants - Dennis, Keith, or Kelly - when preparing the deeds. After J.C. died, Lillian filed suit against Appellants asking the circuit court either set aside or reform the Tract I deed to reflect her interest that Dennis not receive a remainder interest in that tract, alleging that the deed mistakenly included Dennis in the conveyance. The circuit court entered judgment in Lillian's favor and ordered the Tract I deed to be reformed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) no mutual mistake occurred in this case, and the mistake was purely unilateral; and (2) under the circumstances, the circuit court misapplied long-standing state law when it ordered the deed at issue be reformed to divest Appellants of their remainder interest. View "Singleton v. Singleton" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and quashed an order of mandamus requiring the City of Creve Coeur to issue a conditional use permit (CUP), holding that the circuit court erroneously applied the law.Property Owners, which owned adjacent parcels of property in the City, entered into a contingent agreement to sell their property to QuikTrip, a sale that was contingent upon the City issuing a CUP allowing QuikTrip to construct a new service station. The City denied the application. The circuit court entered an order in mandamus finding that the City's ordinances required the City to issue the CUP. The Supreme Court reversed and quashed the mandamus order, holding that the circuit court improperly overrode the City's discretion in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 536.150.1. View "BG Olive & Graeser, LLC v. City of Creve Coeur" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Barbara and Alexis Branch on the Central Trust Bank's petition for a deficiency judgment in relation to a promissory note and security agreement financing the Branches' vehicle, holding that the circuit court erred.The Bank's pre-sale notice of disposition in this case stated the vehicle would be sold at a private sale. The circuit court, however, held that the dealer-sonly auction at which the vehicle was sold was a public sale and that the Bank failed to provide the Branches with "reasonable notification" after the sale of the vehicle. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court's finding that the Branches did not receive any pre-sale notice of the disposition was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the circuit court misstated the law when it required the Bank to provide the Branches with "reasonable notification" of the sale of the collateral. View "Central Trust Bank v. Branch" on Justia Law