Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Nevada

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court setting aside a nonjudicial foreclosure sale by a unit-owners’ association (UOA), holding that title vested in the purchaser’s name and that there were no equitable grounds to set aside the sale. At issue in this appeal was whether a person conducting a sale under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116, governing nonjudicial foreclosure sales by a UOA, has the discretion to refuse to issue a foreclosure deed to the highest bidder at the sale after payment has been made when it is later determined that the delinquency amount may have been paid by the property owner before the sale. The Supreme Court held (1) each party in a quiet title action has the burden of demonstrating superior title in himself; (2) once a bid is accepted and payment is made, the foreclosure sale is complete and title vests in the purchaser; and (3) the standard for determining whether to set aside a sale on equitable grounds is whether there has been a showing of fraud, unfairness, or oppression affecting the sale. In the instant case, the purchaser in this case demonstrated superior title, and there were no equitable grounds to set aside the sale. View "Resources Group, LLC v. Nevada Ass’n Services, Inc" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment determining that a foreclosure sale extinguished a bank's deed of trust when an homeowner's association (HOA) agent told a deed of trust beneficiary's agent that it would reject a superpriority tender if made, holding that such a representation excludes the formal requirement of making a formal tender sufficient to preserve the first deed of trust under Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 427 P.3d 113 (2018). Here, the HOA told the deed of trust beneficiary that it would reject a superpriority tender if made. The district court ruled that the foreclosure sale extinguished Bank’s deed of trust and that the HOA's offer was insufficient to constitute a tender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an offer to make a payment at some point in the future cannot constitute a valid tender; (2) a formal tender is excused when the party entitled to payment represents that if a tender is made, it will be rejected; and (3) the deed of trust beneficiary’s agent was excused from making a formal tender in this case, and therefore, the foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Thomas Jessup, LLC Series VII" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that where an individual has been appointed special administrator of an estate that includes residential real property, the special administrator resides in the property as his or her primary residence, and the special administrator retains an ownership interest via intestate succession laws, the special administrator is entitled to participate in a foreclosure mediation program (FMP) regarding the decedent’s residential real property, despite the fact that the property was purchased in the decedent’s name only. Appellant was the decedent’s spouse and the special administrator of the decedent’s estate. When Respondent commenced foreclosure proceedings on the home the decedent purchased in her name only, Appellant requested foreclosure mediation through Nevada’s FMP. The mediator concluded that the property was not eligible for the FMP because Appellant was not an owner or grantor of the property and because the order appointing him as special administrator did not specifically authorize him to participate in the FMP. The district court denied Appellant’s petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant obtained an ownership interest in the property upon the decedent’s death, the property served as his primary residence, and his status as special administrator authorized him to take action to preserve the decedent’s estate, Appellant was entitled to participate in the FMP. View "Pascua v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed an order of the district court awarding attorney fees against a police department ordered to return a large amount of cash and other property seized pursuant to a criminal search warrant, holding that neither Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010(2)(a) nor section 18.010(2)(b) permitted the award of attorney fees. Section 18.010(2)(a) permits an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party in a civil action when that party recovers a money judgment in an amount less than $20,000. Plaintiff in this case sought an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 18.010(2) against the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) after her seized property was ordered to be returned. The district court awarded Plaintiff attorney fees under section 18.010(2)(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 18.010(2)(a) does not permit a fee award against LVMPD because an order to return seized cash is an order to return physical property, not a money judgment; and (2) the attorney fee award cannot be affirmed under section 18.010(2)(b) in the absence of any relevant findings or clear evidence that LVMPD brought or maintained its defense without reasonable ground. View "In re Execution of Search Warrants" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court ruling that the parties in this case were joint tenants with equal ownership interests in certain property, taking the opportunity of this case to clarify that the presumptions from Sack v. Tomlin, 871 P.2d 298 (Nev. 1994), concerning tenants in common apply to joint tenants. Elizabeth Howard and Shaughnan Hughes jointly applied for credit in anticipation of purchasing a home. Howard used the proceeds from a third-party settlement award to purchase the property and then executed a quitclaim deed naming herself and Hughes as joint tenants. During their ownership, Howard contributed in excess of $100,000 to the property, while Hughes contributed approximately $20,000. Hughes later filed a complaint to partition the property. The district court concluded that Howard and Hughes were joint tenants with equal ownership interests in the property. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted and applied the presumptions from Sack and Langevin v. York, 907 P.2d 981 (Nev. 1995); and (2) Hughes presented sufficient evidence of Howard’s donative intent at trial, thereby rebutting the secondary presumption that the parties did not own the property equally. View "Howard v. Hughes" on Justia Law

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In this appeal and cross-appeal from a final judgment in an action arising from the purchase of real property, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court, holding that Nevada law has not recognized implied restrictive covenants based on a common development scheme, and the Court declines to adopt the doctrine based on the record. Appellant purchased a residential lot adjoining Respondent’s residential lot (the Lot). The Lot also adjoined a golf course and included a small parcel of land that had previously been an out-of-bounds area between the golf course and the property. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s determination that Appellant cannot maintain an implied restrictive covenant upon the out-of-bounds parcel because the Court declines to recognize implied restrictive easements; (2) reversed the judgment of the district court that Appellant waived any claims it may have had against a real estate company, real estate agent, and developer for misrepresentations or failure to disclose information in the purchase process of the property; and (3) reversed the award of attorney fees and costs. View "Rosenberg Living Trust v. MacDonald Highlands Realty" on Justia Law

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In this quiet title dispute between the buyer at a homeowners association (HOA) lien foreclosure sale and the holder of the first deed of trust on the subject property, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the buyer of the property, holding that the buyer took title subject to the first deed of trust. Following the HOA lien foreclosure sale, the district court denied summary judgment to the first deed of trust holder in this quiet title action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a first deed of trust holder’s unconditional tender of the superpriority amount due results in the buyer at foreclosure taking the property subject to the deed of trust. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that Appellant’s deed of trust was extinguished by a valid foreclosure sale, holding that the district court properly concluded that the foreclosure sale should not be invalidated on equitable grounds, the sale did not constitute a fraudulent transfer, and the foreclosure should not be invalidated due to an irregularity in the foreclosure deed. The case concerned the competing rights to property that was purchased at a homeowners’ association foreclosure sale. Appellant was the beneficiary of a deed of trust on that property at the time of the sale. Respondent was the winning bidder at the sale. After a bench trial to determine whether Respondent or Appellant had superior title to the property, the district court quieted title in favor of Respondent, holding that Appellant’s deed of trust was extinguished pursuant to SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no unfairness or irregularity in the foreclosure process, and therefore, the district court correctly rejected Appellant’s equitable argument; (2) the foreclosure sale did not constitute a fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act; and (3) an irregularity in the foreclosure deed upon sale does not invalidate the foreclosure as a whole. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Radecki" on Justia Law

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At issue in this eminent domain proceeding was whether HQ Metro, LLC or Clark County was entitled to compensation for a permanent easement to the installation of electrical transmission lines on property that was owned by HQ Metro when the easement was obtained by Nevada Energy (NV Energy) but sold to Clark County before NV Energy physically entered the property to begin construction. The district court concluded that HQ Metro, as the property’s owner at the time of the taking, was entitled to compensation for the permanent easement and apportioned $775,000 to HQ Metro as damages for the permanent easement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the right to compensation vested when the district court entered the order granting immediate occupancy, which permitted NV Energy to permanently occupy the easement area and enjoined HQ Metro from interfering with that occupancy. View "Clark County v. HQ Metro, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, holding that, even before the October 1, 2015 amendment to Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.31168, the statute incorporated Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.090’s requirement that a homeowner’s association (HOA) provide notices of default and/or sale to persons or entities holding subordinate interests, even when such persons or entities did not request notice. Respondent-Bank filed a complaint in the federal district court of Nevada, naming as defendants an HOA and the current owner of property that was sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Respondent requested that the foreclosure sale did not extinguish its deed of trust and alleged that the sale violated due process because Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 116 lacked any pre-deprivation notice requirements. The federal district court then filed its order certifying the question of law above. The Supreme Court held that section 107.090, which governs trustee sales under a deed of trust, mandates notice to those holding subordinate interests, and by requiring application of section 107.090 during the HOA foreclosure process, section 116.31168(1) required notice to be provided to all holders of subordinate security interests prior to a HOA foreclosure sale. View "SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law