Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to reinstate Happy Creek, Inc.'s original water rights' priority dates in equity, holding that, under the extraordinary circumstances of this case, the district court properly granted equitable relief for Happy Creek. As mandated by Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.410 the State Engineer canceled Happy Creek's ground water permits after Happy Creek's agent missed a filing deadline by a few weeks. Accordingly, Happy Creek lost more than fifty years of priority in water rights despite having invested $1 million in improving water-use efficiency and having met the other substantive criteria for maintaining priority of its water rights. Happy Creek's groundwater rights were in an over-appropriated basin, and therefore, Happy Creek was threatened with complete loss of use of water. The district court granted equitable relief by restoring Happy Creek's original senior priority dates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pursuant to State Engineer v. American National Insurance Co., 498 P.2d 1329 (Nev. 1972), and its progeny, the district court properly granted Happy Creek equitable relief. View "State Engineer v. Happy Creek, Inc." on Justia Law

In this action to quiet title the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) owned the subject loan at the time of a homeowner association's (HOA) foreclosure sale such that the HOA sale purchaser took title to the property subject to the first deed of trust by operation of the 12 U.S.C. 4617(j)(3), commonly known as the Federal Foreclosure Bar, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. Before the Court in this appeal were two issues related to the Federal Foreclosure Bar. The Supreme Court held (1) Nevada's recording statutes impose no requirement that Freddie Mac must be identified as the beneficiary on the publicly recorded deed of trust to establish its ownership interest in the subject loan; and (2) Freddie Mac's loan servicer did need not produce either the actual loan servicing agreement with Freddie Mac or the original promissory note to establish Freddie Mac's ownership interest in the loan because the loan provider introduced properly authenticated business records establishing that ownership interest. View "Daisy Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In this action to quiet title to real property the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowner, holding that the homeowner complied with the redemption statute allowing homeowners, holders of a recorded security interest, and successors in interest to redeem property within a sixty-day time frame after a homeowners' association (HOA) foreclosure sale. Appellant purchased property owned by Homeowner at an HOA foreclosure sale. Within sixty days of the foreclosure sale, Homeowner notified Nevada Association Services (NAS), the entity that conducted the sale, that he intended to redeem the property pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.31166(3). Homeowner provided the redemption amount, and Appellant received a check for the full redemption amount. Appellant, however, rejected the check. Appellant brought this action seeking quiet title to the property. The district court granted summary judgment to Homeowner, terminated the foreclosure sale, and quieted title in favor of Homeowner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) NAS complied with the plain language of section 116.31166(3), whether or not it explicitly invoked the statute; and (2) Homeowner substantially complied with the HOA foreclosure sale notice of redemption provision. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9050 W Warm Springs 2079 v. Nevada Ass'n Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents, a real estate appraisal company and a professional real estate appraiser, as to Appellants' allegations that Respondents' negligence prevented them from refinancing their home loan, holding that Appellants' claims lacked evidentiary support and were based on little more than conclusory allegations and accusations. After purchasing a home, Appellants brought this action against Respondents asserting claims for professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of the statutory duty to disclose a material fact, and breach of contract as third-party beneficiaries. Specifically, Appellants alleged that Respondents negligently relied on inaccurate information in calculating the home's size and market value, which resulted in a misleading appraisal report and inflated purchase price. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed and took the opportunity of this case to emphasize the important role of summary judgment in promoting sound judicial economy. View "Boesiger v. Desert Appraisals, LLC" on Justia Law

In this homeowner's association (HOA) lien foreclosure dispute the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court holding that a lien foreclosure sale extinguished the first deed of trust and quieting title in favor of the foreclosure sale buyer's successor, holding that a remand was required to determine whether, given a notice defect, the first deed of trust holder deserved relief from the sale. The HOA in this case did not give the first deed of trust holder the notice of default required by Nevada law to foreclose a superpriority lien. The district court quieted title in favor of the foreclosure sale buyer's successor despite the HOA's failure, finding that the first deed of trust holder was not entitled to notice at the address specified in the deed of trust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred when it ruled that the first deed of trust holder was not entitled to notice of default because it had not requested it; (2) the failure to mail the first deed of trust holder the notice of default at the address given for it in the recorded deed of trust violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.31168 and Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.090(3); and (3) the district court erred in finding that the foreclosure sale buyer was a bona fide purchaser for value. View "U.S. Bank, National Ass'n ND v. Resources Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the State Engineer granting Intermountain Water Supply Ltd., which held water rights permits to transmit water to Lemmon Valley for municipal use, an extension of time in which to apply the water to beneficial use, holding that the anti-speculation doctrine applies to requests for extensions of time and that Intermountain failed to show reasonable diligence to apply the water to beneficial use. In its extension request, Intermountain submitted an affidavit claiming that it had an option agreement with two unidentified "worldwide engineering and construction firms." The Supreme Court held (1) a generic option contract does not save an applicant from the anti-speculation doctrine, and the State Engineer abused his discretion in determining that Intermountain's averred option agreements satisfied the anti-speculation doctrine; and (2) there was insufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate reasonable diligence under Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.380(3)-(4) and Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State, 944 P.2d 835, 841 (Nev. 1997). View "Sierra Pacific Industries v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court setting aside a nonjudicial foreclosure sale by a unit-owners’ association (UOA), holding that title vested in the purchaser’s name and that there were no equitable grounds to set aside the sale. At issue in this appeal was whether a person conducting a sale under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116, governing nonjudicial foreclosure sales by a UOA, has the discretion to refuse to issue a foreclosure deed to the highest bidder at the sale after payment has been made when it is later determined that the delinquency amount may have been paid by the property owner before the sale. The Supreme Court held (1) each party in a quiet title action has the burden of demonstrating superior title in himself; (2) once a bid is accepted and payment is made, the foreclosure sale is complete and title vests in the purchaser; and (3) the standard for determining whether to set aside a sale on equitable grounds is whether there has been a showing of fraud, unfairness, or oppression affecting the sale. In the instant case, the purchaser in this case demonstrated superior title, and there were no equitable grounds to set aside the sale. View "Resources Group, LLC v. Nevada Ass’n Services, Inc" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment determining that a foreclosure sale extinguished a bank's deed of trust when an homeowner's association (HOA) agent told a deed of trust beneficiary's agent that it would reject a superpriority tender if made, holding that such a representation excludes the formal requirement of making a formal tender sufficient to preserve the first deed of trust under Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 427 P.3d 113 (2018). Here, the HOA told the deed of trust beneficiary that it would reject a superpriority tender if made. The district court ruled that the foreclosure sale extinguished Bank’s deed of trust and that the HOA's offer was insufficient to constitute a tender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an offer to make a payment at some point in the future cannot constitute a valid tender; (2) a formal tender is excused when the party entitled to payment represents that if a tender is made, it will be rejected; and (3) the deed of trust beneficiary’s agent was excused from making a formal tender in this case, and therefore, the foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Thomas Jessup, LLC Series VII" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that where an individual has been appointed special administrator of an estate that includes residential real property, the special administrator resides in the property as his or her primary residence, and the special administrator retains an ownership interest via intestate succession laws, the special administrator is entitled to participate in a foreclosure mediation program (FMP) regarding the decedent’s residential real property, despite the fact that the property was purchased in the decedent’s name only. Appellant was the decedent’s spouse and the special administrator of the decedent’s estate. When Respondent commenced foreclosure proceedings on the home the decedent purchased in her name only, Appellant requested foreclosure mediation through Nevada’s FMP. The mediator concluded that the property was not eligible for the FMP because Appellant was not an owner or grantor of the property and because the order appointing him as special administrator did not specifically authorize him to participate in the FMP. The district court denied Appellant’s petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant obtained an ownership interest in the property upon the decedent’s death, the property served as his primary residence, and his status as special administrator authorized him to take action to preserve the decedent’s estate, Appellant was entitled to participate in the FMP. View "Pascua v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed an order of the district court awarding attorney fees against a police department ordered to return a large amount of cash and other property seized pursuant to a criminal search warrant, holding that neither Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010(2)(a) nor section 18.010(2)(b) permitted the award of attorney fees. Section 18.010(2)(a) permits an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party in a civil action when that party recovers a money judgment in an amount less than $20,000. Plaintiff in this case sought an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 18.010(2) against the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) after her seized property was ordered to be returned. The district court awarded Plaintiff attorney fees under section 18.010(2)(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 18.010(2)(a) does not permit a fee award against LVMPD because an order to return seized cash is an order to return physical property, not a money judgment; and (2) the attorney fee award cannot be affirmed under section 18.010(2)(b) in the absence of any relevant findings or clear evidence that LVMPD brought or maintained its defense without reasonable ground. View "In re Execution of Search Warrants" on Justia Law