Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Mable Hrynchuk named Bryan Kenton as the sole beneficiary of her estate, which included her residential property. After her death, the homeowner’s association foreclosed on the property and sold it to Saticoy Bay LLC Series 3580 Lost Hills. Kenton, through his attorney-in-fact, Foreclosure Recovery Services, sought to redeem the property as a successor in interest. Saticoy Bay refused, asserting that Kenton was not the successor in interest and had no rights of redemption under Nevada law.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County granted summary judgment in favor of Foreclosure Recovery Services, holding that Kenton was the successor in interest and had the right to redeem the property. Saticoy Bay appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that a will beneficiary is immediately vested with a beneficial interest in devised property upon the testator’s death and is therefore the testator’s successor in interest for the purposes of NRS 116.31166. The court concluded that Kenton, as the sole beneficiary of Hrynchuk’s will, was her successor in interest and had the right to redeem the property. The court also determined that Foreclosure Recovery Services provided all necessary documentation to Saticoy Bay to establish its right to act on behalf of Kenton in redeeming the property. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 3580 Lost Hills v. Foreclosure Recovery Services, LLC" on Justia Law

A Nevada limited liability company, Mass Land Acquisition, LLC, challenged the use of eminent domain by Sierra Pacific Power Company, d/b/a NV Energy, to take an easement across its property for a natural gas pipeline. NV Energy sought immediate occupancy of the property, while Mass Land argued that such a taking by a private entity violated the Nevada Constitution and requested a jury determination on whether the taking was for a public use.The First Judicial District Court of Nevada denied Mass Land's motion to dismiss and granted NV Energy's motion for immediate occupancy. The court concluded that NV Energy, as a regulated public utility, was exercising delegated eminent domain powers and acting as the government, not as a private party. The court also found that the taking was for a natural gas pipeline, a statutorily recognized public use, and thus did not require a jury determination on public use before granting occupancy.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and denied Mass Land's petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The court held that the Nevada Constitution's prohibition on transferring property taken by eminent domain to another private party did not apply to NV Energy's taking for a natural gas pipeline, as it was a public use. The court also determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact requiring a jury determination on whether the taking was actually for a public use. The court concluded that NV Energy's actions were lawful and consistent with the statutory and constitutional provisions governing eminent domain in Nevada. View "MASS LAND ACQUISITION, LLC VS. DISTRICT COURT" on Justia Law

Retailers House of CB USA, LLC, and Chinese Laundry Lifestyle, LLC, leased commercial space at the Miracle Mile Shops, operated by PHWLV, LLC, which also runs the Planet Hollywood Resort and Casino. On July 8, 2017, a fire-suppression pipe burst, causing significant water damage to the retailers' stores and inventory. The retailers sued PHWLV for negligence in maintaining the fire-suppression system.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County granted partial summary judgment in favor of the retailers on the elements of duty and breach, concluding that PHWLV had a duty to prevent items on its property from damaging others' property and had breached this duty. The case proceeded to a jury trial on causation and damages, resulting in a verdict awarding House of CB $3,133,755.56 and Chinese Laundry $411,581.41. The district court denied PHWLV's motion for a new trial and entered judgment on the jury verdict, also awarding attorney fees and prejudgment interest to House of CB.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its formulation of PHWLV's duty. The appropriate standard of care was the duty to use reasonable care in servicing and inspecting the fire-suppression system and responding to issues arising from failures within the system. The court reversed the district court's judgment on the jury verdict, vacated the post-judgment orders awarding attorney fees and prejudgment interest, and remanded the case for a new trial. The court also denied PHWLV's request to reassign the case to a different judicial department. View "PHWLV, LLC VS. HOUSE OF CB USA, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas as Trustee Rali 2006QA5 (Deutsche Bank), the holder of the first deed of trust, and SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC (SFR), the purchaser of a property at a homeowners’ association (HOA) lien foreclosure sale. The dispute centers around whether the homeowner's partial payments to the HOA satisfied the superpriority lien, which would mean that the HOA foreclosure did not extinguish the first deed of trust.The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank, finding that the homeowner's pre-foreclosure payments satisfied the superpriority lien. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada vacated and remanded the case, instructing the district court to consider the analysis in the then recently decided case 9352 Cranesbill Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. On remand, the district court ruled in favor of SFR, concluding that a portion of the superpriority lien remained unsatisfied, so the HOA foreclosure extinguished Deutsche Bank’s deed of trust.The Supreme Court of Nevada disagreed with the district court's conclusion. The court held that, unless expressly authorized by the homeowner, the HOA may not allocate a payment in a way that results in a forfeiture of the first deed of trust holder’s interest and deprives the homeowner of the security on the homeowner’s mortgage. Applying this principle to the case at hand, the court found that the homeowner's partial payments to the HOA satisfied the HOA’s superpriority lien, so the foreclosure did not extinguish Deutsche Bank’s first deed of trust. Therefore, SFR took possession of the property subject to the deed of trust. The court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for entry of judgment for Deutsche Bank consistent with this opinion. View "Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a transaction between the Redevelopment Agency of the City of Sparks (RDA) and a developer. The RDA transferred property to the developer for the construction of an apartment project. In exchange, the developer agreed to maintain free public parking on the property for the next 50 years. The Labor Commissioner considered this transaction as the RDA providing a "financial incentive" worth more than $100,000 to the developer, thus requiring the developer to pay prevailing wages on the project. The Labor Commissioner assessed a penalty against the RDA for not requiring the developer to pay prevailing wages.The Labor Commissioner's decision was upheld by the district court, which led to the RDA's appeal. The RDA argued that the Labor Commissioner had neither the expertise nor the statutory authority to address a dispute arising under Nevada’s Community Redevelopment Law over the valuation of interests in real property. The RDA also contended that the Labor Commissioner's interpretation of the law was incorrect.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Labor Commissioner's interpretation of the law was incorrect and expanded its reach. The court held that the statute does not reference "future compensation," nor does it equate its receipt with a redevelopment agency giving a developer "financial incentives [worth] more than $100,000." The court concluded that the Labor Commissioner's decision that the RDA provided a financial incentive exceeding $100,000 to the developer lacked substantial evidence and must be reversed. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to grant the RDA’s petition for judicial review. View "The Redevelopment Agency of the City of Sparks v. Nevada Labor Commissioner" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the City of Las Vegas and 180 Land Co., LLC over a 35-acre parcel of land. 180 Land Co. purchased the land, which was part of a larger 250-acre golf course, with the intention of developing it for residential use. The land was zoned for residential development, but was also designated as "Parks/Schools/Recreation/Open Space" in the city's General Plan. The City of Las Vegas denied 180 Land Co.'s applications to develop the property, citing public opposition and concerns about piecemeal development.In response, 180 Land Co. sued the City for inverse condemnation, arguing that the City's actions had deprived it of all economically beneficial use of the property. The district court agreed, finding that the City's handling of 180 Land Co.'s development efforts rendered any future attempts to develop the property futile. The court also ruled that the residential zoning of the property took precedence over the open space designation in the General Plan. The court awarded 180 Land Co. $48 million in compensation, including the value of the property, property taxes, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees.The City appealed the decision, arguing that the lower court erred in determining that a regulatory taking had occurred and in its calculation of the compensation award. 180 Land Co. also appealed, challenging the amount of prejudgment interest awarded by the district court.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision in its entirety. The court agreed that the City's actions constituted a per se regulatory taking and that 180 Land Co. was entitled to just compensation. The court also upheld the district court's calculation of the compensation award, including the amount of prejudgment interest. View "City of Las Vegas v. 180 Land Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a personal injury claim filed by Laura Graham against International Property Holdings, LLC (IPH) and its sole member, Ovidiu Ene. Graham sustained injuries when she tripped and fell over a sprinkler box on IPH's property. During the trial, Graham moved to assert that Ene was the alter ego of IPH, meaning he should be held personally liable for the injuries she sustained on the company's property.The district court found that Ene, as the sole member and manager of IPH, was indeed the alter ego of the company. The court based its decision on several factors: Ene had his own personal gate code to the property and used it for personal reasons without paying IPH or the property management company; Ene's father maintained a garden and a chicken coop on the property; the property's insurance was in Ene's name; and Ene remained the guarantor on the mortgage loan for the property.The Supreme Court of Nevada, however, disagreed with the district court's findings. The court clarified that the alter ego analysis for a limited liability company is the same as the analysis applied to a corporation. The court found that substantial evidence did not support the district court's determination that Ene was the alter ego of IPH. The court concluded that while Ene did influence and govern IPH, there was not a unity of interest and ownership such that Ene and IPH were inseparable. Furthermore, the court found no evidence that recognizing IPH as a separate entity from Ene would sanction fraud or promote injustice. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ene v. Graham" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a property dispute between two neighboring parties, Bo and Dan Jones (appellants), and Hamed Ghadiri (respondent). A block wall, erected before either party owned their respective properties, did not follow the property line, resulting in Ghadiri being denied use of a portion of his property. When Ghadiri sought to remove the wall and build a new one on the property line, the Joneses filed a complaint in the district court for a prescriptive easement or adverse possession.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ghadiri. It found that the Joneses could not claim adverse possession as they had not paid property taxes on the disputed property. It also ruled that a prescriptive easement was unavailable as it would result in Ghadiri's complete exclusion from the subject property. The Joneses appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court clarified the distinction between adverse possession and prescriptive easements, noting that the former results in the acquisition of title and the right to exclusively control the subject property, while the latter results in the right to a limited use of the subject property. The court acknowledged that comprehensive prescriptive easements, which result in the owner of the servient estate being completely excluded from the subject property, may be warranted in exceptional circumstances. However, it found that the Joneses had not demonstrated such exceptional circumstances. Therefore, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Ghadiri. View "Jones v. Ghadiri" on Justia Law

In 2005, Lance and Eva Posner purchased a property with an outstanding loan secured by a deed of trust, which they assumed responsibility for. The deed of trust was later assigned to U.S. Bank. In 2012, U.S. Bank filed a judicial foreclosure action against the Posners, alleging that the amount owing under the note had become accelerated. However, U.S. Bank did not pursue the judicial foreclosure and voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit without prejudice in 2013. The Posners remained in default on the loan through 2019.U.S. Bank's dismissal of its judicial foreclosure action led to a dispute in 2022. The Posners filed a state-court action asserting a claim for quiet title, alleging that the 10-year period in NRS 106.240 was triggered in 2012 when U.S. Bank filed its judicial foreclosure action, such that by 2022, the deed of trust had been extinguished as a matter of law. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent U.S. Bank's scheduled nonjudicial foreclosure sale.The district court denied the request for an injunction, finding the Posners' claims had no likelihood of success. The Posners appealed, arguing that the district court erred in relying on NRS 107.550, which only applies to judicial foreclosure actions commenced on or after October 1, 2013.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court clarified that instituting judicial foreclosure proceedings does not trigger the 10-year time frame in NRS 106.240. The court concluded that the Posners' quiet title claim had no likelihood of success on the merits because the judicial foreclosure action did not trigger the 10-year time frame in NRS 106.240. Therefore, the lien on the subject property was not discharged as a matter of law in 2022. View "Posner v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Nevada was tasked with determining whether a government entity, in this case Clark County, qualifies as a "person" under Nevada's anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. This arose from a dispute where a property owner, 6635 W Oquendo LLC, claimed Clark County lacked the authority to impose civil penalties and to record liens against its property. Clark County, in response, filed an anti-SLAPP motion arguing that the actions forming the basis of Oquendo's claims were protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute. The district court ruled in favor of Oquendo, stating that Clark County was not a "person" for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed this decision, concluding that a government entity is not a "person" under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court rejected Clark County's arguments, stating that the statutory definition of "person" in Nevada law does not include a government, governmental agency or political subdivision of a government. The court also clarified that an earlier decision, John v. Douglas County School District, did not establish that a governmental entity is a "person" for the purpose of anti-SLAPP protections. The court concluded that Clark County was not entitled to file an anti-SLAPP motion, affirming the lower court's decision. View "Clark County v. 6635 W Oquenda LLC" on Justia Law