Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that Ruby Lake Estates Homeowner's Association's (RLEHOA) authority to impose assessments on Appellants, property owners in Ruby Lake Estates (RLE), holding that RLE is a common-interest community within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.021 and that RLEHOA did not need to be organized before the first lot in RLE was conveyed. RLE was create in 1989. Appellants filed a declaratory relief action challenging RLEHOA's authority to impose assessments on them. Specifically, Appellants argued (1) RLE was not a validly created "common-interest community" as defined by section 116.021; and (2) alternatively, RLEHOA was not a validly created "unit-owners' association." The district court granted summary judgment for RLEHOA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) RLE is a common-interest community because RLE's declaration contained an implied payment obligation for the common elements and other real estate of which Appellants had notice; and (2) Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3101(1) does not apply to common-interest communities formed before 1992, and therefore, RLEHOA did not need to be organized before the first lot in RLE was conveyed. View "Artemis Exploration Co. v. Ruby Lake Estates Homeowner's Ass'n" on Justia Law

In this homeowners' association (HOA) foreclosure case, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to U.S. Bank, N.A. and remanded for entry of summary judgment for SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, holding that the mere fact that a foreclosure sale was held in violation of a bankruptcy stay is not by itself evidence of unfairness. The homeowner filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, which imposed an automatic stay on actions against her real property. In violation of the stay, the HOA sold the property at a foreclosure sale. SFR, the purchaser, sought to quiet title. The bankruptcy court issued a limited order retroactively annulling the bankruptcy stay of the stay, which has the legal effect of validating the sale. The district court, however, set aside the sale and granted summary judgment for U.S. Bank finding that the HOA's foreclosure sale being conducted in violation of the bankruptcy stay was evidence of unfairness and that the sale price was inadequate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that U.S. Bank failed to produce any evidence showing how the sale's violation of the automatic stay constituted unfairness and that SFR met its burden of showing that the HOA foreclosure sale complied with the procedures in Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 116. View "SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to reinstate Happy Creek, Inc.'s original water rights' priority dates in equity, holding that, under the extraordinary circumstances of this case, the district court properly granted equitable relief for Happy Creek. As mandated by Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.410 the State Engineer canceled Happy Creek's ground water permits after Happy Creek's agent missed a filing deadline by a few weeks. Accordingly, Happy Creek lost more than fifty years of priority in water rights despite having invested $1 million in improving water-use efficiency and having met the other substantive criteria for maintaining priority of its water rights. Happy Creek's groundwater rights were in an over-appropriated basin, and therefore, Happy Creek was threatened with complete loss of use of water. The district court granted equitable relief by restoring Happy Creek's original senior priority dates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pursuant to State Engineer v. American National Insurance Co., 498 P.2d 1329 (Nev. 1972), and its progeny, the district court properly granted Happy Creek equitable relief. View "State Engineer v. Happy Creek, Inc." on Justia Law

In this action to quiet title the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) owned the subject loan at the time of a homeowner association's (HOA) foreclosure sale such that the HOA sale purchaser took title to the property subject to the first deed of trust by operation of the 12 U.S.C. 4617(j)(3), commonly known as the Federal Foreclosure Bar, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. Before the Court in this appeal were two issues related to the Federal Foreclosure Bar. The Supreme Court held (1) Nevada's recording statutes impose no requirement that Freddie Mac must be identified as the beneficiary on the publicly recorded deed of trust to establish its ownership interest in the subject loan; and (2) Freddie Mac's loan servicer did need not produce either the actual loan servicing agreement with Freddie Mac or the original promissory note to establish Freddie Mac's ownership interest in the loan because the loan provider introduced properly authenticated business records establishing that ownership interest. View "Daisy Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In this action to quiet title to real property the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowner, holding that the homeowner complied with the redemption statute allowing homeowners, holders of a recorded security interest, and successors in interest to redeem property within a sixty-day time frame after a homeowners' association (HOA) foreclosure sale. Appellant purchased property owned by Homeowner at an HOA foreclosure sale. Within sixty days of the foreclosure sale, Homeowner notified Nevada Association Services (NAS), the entity that conducted the sale, that he intended to redeem the property pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.31166(3). Homeowner provided the redemption amount, and Appellant received a check for the full redemption amount. Appellant, however, rejected the check. Appellant brought this action seeking quiet title to the property. The district court granted summary judgment to Homeowner, terminated the foreclosure sale, and quieted title in favor of Homeowner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) NAS complied with the plain language of section 116.31166(3), whether or not it explicitly invoked the statute; and (2) Homeowner substantially complied with the HOA foreclosure sale notice of redemption provision. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9050 W Warm Springs 2079 v. Nevada Ass'n Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents, a real estate appraisal company and a professional real estate appraiser, as to Appellants' allegations that Respondents' negligence prevented them from refinancing their home loan, holding that Appellants' claims lacked evidentiary support and were based on little more than conclusory allegations and accusations. After purchasing a home, Appellants brought this action against Respondents asserting claims for professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of the statutory duty to disclose a material fact, and breach of contract as third-party beneficiaries. Specifically, Appellants alleged that Respondents negligently relied on inaccurate information in calculating the home's size and market value, which resulted in a misleading appraisal report and inflated purchase price. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed and took the opportunity of this case to emphasize the important role of summary judgment in promoting sound judicial economy. View "Boesiger v. Desert Appraisals, LLC" on Justia Law

In this homeowner's association (HOA) lien foreclosure dispute the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court holding that a lien foreclosure sale extinguished the first deed of trust and quieting title in favor of the foreclosure sale buyer's successor, holding that a remand was required to determine whether, given a notice defect, the first deed of trust holder deserved relief from the sale. The HOA in this case did not give the first deed of trust holder the notice of default required by Nevada law to foreclose a superpriority lien. The district court quieted title in favor of the foreclosure sale buyer's successor despite the HOA's failure, finding that the first deed of trust holder was not entitled to notice at the address specified in the deed of trust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred when it ruled that the first deed of trust holder was not entitled to notice of default because it had not requested it; (2) the failure to mail the first deed of trust holder the notice of default at the address given for it in the recorded deed of trust violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.31168 and Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.090(3); and (3) the district court erred in finding that the foreclosure sale buyer was a bona fide purchaser for value. View "U.S. Bank, National Ass'n ND v. Resources Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the State Engineer granting Intermountain Water Supply Ltd., which held water rights permits to transmit water to Lemmon Valley for municipal use, an extension of time in which to apply the water to beneficial use, holding that the anti-speculation doctrine applies to requests for extensions of time and that Intermountain failed to show reasonable diligence to apply the water to beneficial use. In its extension request, Intermountain submitted an affidavit claiming that it had an option agreement with two unidentified "worldwide engineering and construction firms." The Supreme Court held (1) a generic option contract does not save an applicant from the anti-speculation doctrine, and the State Engineer abused his discretion in determining that Intermountain's averred option agreements satisfied the anti-speculation doctrine; and (2) there was insufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate reasonable diligence under Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.380(3)-(4) and Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State, 944 P.2d 835, 841 (Nev. 1997). View "Sierra Pacific Industries v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court setting aside a nonjudicial foreclosure sale by a unit-owners’ association (UOA), holding that title vested in the purchaser’s name and that there were no equitable grounds to set aside the sale. At issue in this appeal was whether a person conducting a sale under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116, governing nonjudicial foreclosure sales by a UOA, has the discretion to refuse to issue a foreclosure deed to the highest bidder at the sale after payment has been made when it is later determined that the delinquency amount may have been paid by the property owner before the sale. The Supreme Court held (1) each party in a quiet title action has the burden of demonstrating superior title in himself; (2) once a bid is accepted and payment is made, the foreclosure sale is complete and title vests in the purchaser; and (3) the standard for determining whether to set aside a sale on equitable grounds is whether there has been a showing of fraud, unfairness, or oppression affecting the sale. In the instant case, the purchaser in this case demonstrated superior title, and there were no equitable grounds to set aside the sale. View "Resources Group, LLC v. Nevada Ass’n Services, Inc" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment determining that a foreclosure sale extinguished a bank's deed of trust when an homeowner's association (HOA) agent told a deed of trust beneficiary's agent that it would reject a superpriority tender if made, holding that such a representation excludes the formal requirement of making a formal tender sufficient to preserve the first deed of trust under Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 427 P.3d 113 (2018). Here, the HOA told the deed of trust beneficiary that it would reject a superpriority tender if made. The district court ruled that the foreclosure sale extinguished Bank’s deed of trust and that the HOA's offer was insufficient to constitute a tender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an offer to make a payment at some point in the future cannot constitute a valid tender; (2) a formal tender is excused when the party entitled to payment represents that if a tender is made, it will be rejected; and (3) the deed of trust beneficiary’s agent was excused from making a formal tender in this case, and therefore, the foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Thomas Jessup, LLC Series VII" on Justia Law