Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Nevada

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The servicer of a loan owned by a regulated entity has standing to assert the Federal Foreclosure Bar in a quiet title action. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC was assigned a deed of trust. When Respondent purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, Respondent filed a third-party complaint against Nationstar, arguing that Nationstar’s security interest was extinguished by the foreclosure sale. Nationstar argued that its security interest survived the sale pursuant to the Federal Foreclosure Bar because Freddie Mac had purchased the loan, and the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) had placed Freddie Mac under conservatorship. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that, although there was a factual dispute as to whether Freddie Mac or the FHFA had an interest in the deed of trust, Nationstar lacked standing to assert the Federal Foreclosure Bar on behalf of Freddie Mac or the FHFA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the servicer of a loan owned by a regulated entity has standing to argue that the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116. View "Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

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This appeal concerned a dispute between taxpayers from the Incline Village and Crystal Bay areas of Washoe County and Nevada State Board of Equalization concerning the State Board’s failure to equalize property values as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.395 for tax years 2003 through 2005. The district court dismissed the taxpayers’ petition for judicial review of the State Board’s interlocutory administrative order requiring reappraisals of properties around Incline Village and Crystal Bay for the tax years in question. The Supreme Court reversed and instructed the district court to grant, in part, the petition for judicial review and vacated the State Board’s interlocutory administrative order directing reappraisals of the properties, holding (1) this Court has jurisdiction to consider the district court’s dismissal of the petition for judicial review; and (2) the district court erred when it dismissed the petition for judicial review because the State Board exceeded its statutory authority to order reappraisals pursuant to section 361.395. View "Village League To Save Incline Assets, Inc. v. State, Board of Equalization" on Justia Law

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This appeal concerned the contested ownership of real property consisting of three lots. In 2012, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. was assigned the beneficial interest of a deed of trust recorded against the property. In 2007, the Canyon Gate Master Association (CGMA) recorded a notice of default against the property. In 2009, Susan Hannaford filed a complaint against CGMA challenging an arbitration award relating to the property. In 2013, CGMA recorded a notice of foreclosure sale against Lots 21 and 26. Saticoy Bay LLC purchased the two lots and successfully moved to intervene in the action initiated by Hannaford’s complaint. In 2013, Saticoy filed its complaint in intervention. That same year, CGMA recorded a notice of foreclosure sale of Lot 22. CGMA purchased the lot, and Saticoy purchased the lot from CGMA by way of a quitclaim deed. In 2014, JPMorgan filed an answer to Saticoy’s complaint in intervention. The district court dismissed Hannaford’s complaint and Saticoy’s complaint in intervention with prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) dismissal of the complaint in intervention was mandatory under Rule 41(e); but (2) the district court erred in dismissing the complaint in intervention with prejudice rather than without prejudice. Remanded. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2021 Gray Eagle Way v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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Roy and Shirley Senholtz took out a loan from Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, a division of Walls Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo). The loan was secured by a deed of trust on property governed by an a homeowners’ associations’ (HOA) CC&Rs. When the Senholtzes failed to pay their HOA dues and mortgage, the HOA conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The property was sold to Saticoy Bay LLC. Satico Bay filed a complaint seeking an injunction preventing Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the property and a declaration that it was the rightful owner of the property free and clear of any encumbrances or liens. The district court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116-.31168 violated Wells Fargo’s due process rights. The statutes grant an HOA a superpriority lien for certain unpaid assessments and allow an HOA to nonjudicially foreclose on such a lien if specific requirements are met. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutes do not implicate due process because neither the HOA’s nonjudicial foreclosure nor the Legislature’s enactment of the statutes constitute state action; and (2) the extinguishment of a subordinate deed of trust through an HOA’s nonjudicial foreclosure does not violate the Takings Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 350 Durango 104 v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage" on Justia Law

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When Respondent defaulted on a commercial guaranty agreement with Bank, Bank sued Respondent. Bank’s complaint sought from Respondent the deficiency allowed by Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.495(4). On June 18, 2013 Bank proceeded to foreclosure sale. Bank acquired the property at foreclosure. On January 16, 2014, Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a deficiency judgment against Respondent. Respondent filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that because Bank let more than six months elapse between the date of the foreclosure sale and the date it filed its motion for summary judgment, Bank forfeited its right to obtain a deficiency judgment by operation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455. Bank responded that its pre-foreclosure complaint satisfied all applicable requirements in Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 40. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent and against Bank. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bank’s complaint against Respondent for the deficiency allowed by section 40.495(4) satisfied the requirements of Chapter 40. View "Bank of Nevada v. Petersen" on Justia Law

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Appellants filed an inverse condemnation complaint against Washoe County alleging that the County approved subdivision maps, directed the flow of water, and accepted street dedications during the building process of two upstream developments that increased the flow of water to Whites Creek and caused flooding to Appellants’ property. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Washoe County, concluding that the County’s approval of subdivision maps and acceptance of dedications did not constitute substantial involvement sufficient to support a claim for inverse condemnation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the County’s action constituted substantial involvement in the drainage system sufficient to support a claim for inverse condemnation. View "Fritz v. Washoe County" on Justia Law

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Catherine Rodriguez defaulted on her loan and elected for foreclosure mediation. At a third, unsuccessful mediation between Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, as the agent of the Bank of New York Mellon (BONY), and Rodriguez, Nationstar presented an uncertified, inaccurate copy of the promissory note. Thereafter, BONY filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure. Upon learning that the note presented at the third mediation was inaccurate, Rodriguez filed a petition for judicial review of the mediation against Nationstar and BONY (collectively, Nationstar). The district court excused the untimeliness of the petition based on good cause and found that the note’s certification was false and that Nationstar knew of the falsity. The court sanctioned Nationstar $100,000. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition for judicial review because the filing of such a petition is not permitted beyond the thirty-day time period provided in Nevada’s Foreclosure Mediation Rule 21(2), even when a party discovers fraud months after the mediation. View "Nationstar Mortgage v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

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Hawley McIntosh purchased a home located within a common-interest community. McIntosh’s first mortgage lender subsequently foreclosed on McIntosh’s home. Scott Ludwig purchased the property and subsequently transferred the property by quitclaim deed to Ikon Holdings, LLC. Ikon acknowledged that it acquired the property subject to the homeowner association’s (Horizons) superpriority lien but disagreed that the lien included nine months, rather than six months, of unpaid assessments or the collection fees and foreclosure costs Horizon was seeking to recoup. Thereafter, Ikon filed the underlying declaratory relief action. The district court granted partial declaratory relief, concluding that Horizons’ covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) limited its superpriority lien to an amount equal to six months of assessments, which did not offend Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2)’s superpriority provision providing for nine months of assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a superpriority lien for common expense assessments pursuant to section 116.3116(2) does not include collection fees and foreclosure costs incurred by an HOA; and (2) an HOA’s CC&Rs that purport to create a superpriority lien covering certain fees and costs over six months preceding foreclosure are superseded by the terms of the superpriority lien created by section 116.3116(2). View "Horizons at Seven Hills Homeowners Ass’n v. Ikon Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

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On December 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint asserting claims to quiet title and for adverse possession. On August 11, 2011, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s action with prejudice for want of prosecution. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that dismissal was premature because the two-year time period in Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) had not passed. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted Defendant’s motion for attorney fees and costs in full. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal and the award of attorney fees. The two appeals were subsequently consolidated. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the subsequent order awarding attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court’s findings of fact, on which it based its conclusions of law and decision to dismiss the action with prejudice, were unsupported by the evidence in the record and that there was no evidence presented that supported a finding that dismissal with prejudice was warranted. View "Hunter v. Gang" on Justia Law

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Appellants in this case were a homeowners’ association (HOA) and a foreclosure sale buyer. On summary judgment, the district court set aside a trustee’s deed following the HOA’s assessment lien foreclosure sale, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2) limited the HOA lien to nine months of common expense assessments, and the HOA acted unfairly and oppressively in insisting on more than that amount to cancel the sale; (2) the bid price was grossly inadequate as a matter of law; and (3) the buyer did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.31166’s enactment, in an appropriate case, did not eliminate a court’s authority to grant equitable relief from a defective HOA lien foreclosure sale; but (2) the district court in this case erred in limiting the HOA lien amount to nine months of common expense assessments and in resolving on summary judgment the issues of fact regarding the parties’ conduct, the foreclosure sale buyer’s status, the HOA lien amount, and the competing equities. Remanded. View "Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc." on Justia Law