Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Homeowners’ associations (HOAs) have representational standing to represent unit owners who purchase their units after litigation commences on claims alleging construction defects, but HOAs do not have standing under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3102(1)(d) to bring, or continue to pursue, claims for unit owners who sell their units after the litigation commences.In this case, an HOA filed a complaint against the real party in interest on its own behalf and on behalf of all of the HOA unit owners, alleging, inter alia, breach of implied warranties of workmanlike quality and habitability and breach of contract. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the real party in interest, concluding that the HOA could only maintain an action for those owners who had owned their units continuously since the HOA first filed its complaint. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus requested by the HOA, holding (1) the HOA had standing in the construction defect action to represent unit owners who purchased units after the initiation of the underlying litigation; but (2) the HOA did not have standing to represent unit owners who sold their units after the litigation commenced. View "High Noon at Arlington Ranch Homeowners Ass’n v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court properly granted Respondents’ petition for judicial review and properly vacated permits granted to Kobeh Valley Ranch, LLC (KVR) to appropriate water. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court determined that the State Engineer failed to rely upon substantial evidence in approving KVR’s applications to appropriate water. The court reversed the district court’s previous order denying judicial review and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. After the district court granted judicial review, KVR and the State Engineer appealed, arguing that the district court violated the Supreme Court’s mandate by not further remanding to the State Engineer for additional fact-finding. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s actions were proper because (1) the Supreme Court did not direct the district court to remand to the State Engineer; and (2) KVR was not entitled to a do-over after previously failing to provide sufficient evidence of mitigation. View "State Engineer v. Eureka County" on Justia Law

Here the Supreme Court declined to apply Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(1)(b)’s statute of limitations for contract actions to nonjudicial foreclosures because statutes of limitations only apply to judicial actions, and a nonjudicial foreclosure by its nature is not a judicial action.After HSBC Bank USA, which was the beneficiary of a promissory note and deed of trust on Appellant’s home, recorded a notice of default and election to sell Appellant’s property “without any court action,” Appellant commenced this action to quiet title and extinguish HSBC’s interest in the property. The district court dismissed Appellant’s claim, thus rejecting Appellant’s argument that HSBC was barred from foreclosing on the mortgage property because the six-year limitation period began running with the initial notice of default and had therefore expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations set forth in section 11.190(1)(b) did not extinguish HSBC’s right to pursue a nonjudicial foreclosure because statutes of limitations apply only to judicial actions. View "Facklam v. HSBC Bank USA" on Justia Law

A homeowners association (HOA) is not limited to only one superpriority lien under the HOA lien statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116, per parcel of property forever.In this case arising from conflicting claimed interests in real property located in Las Vegas, Appellant challenged the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter for further proceedings, holding (1) when an HOA rescinds a superpriority lien on property, the HOA may assert a separate superpriority lien on the same property based on monthly assessments, and any maintenance and nuisance abatement charges, accruing after the rescission of the previous superpriority lien; and (2) an HOA lien survives bankruptcy even though the homeowner’s personal obligation is extinguished upon a Chapter 7 discharge. View "Property Plus Investments, LLC v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Certain real property was sold in violation of an automatic stay from the homeowners’ bankruptcy proceedings. Because the property was situated in Nevada, and the bankruptcy proceedings commenced in Texas, the Supreme Court was presented with a purported conflict of laws issue. Appellant sought to quiet title in the district court. Respondent disputed the validity of the sale by filing a complaint in intervention. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied, Respondent had standing as a creditor enforce the automatic stay in the homeowners’ bankruptcy, and the foreclosure sale was void due to the violation of the automatic stay. On appeal, Appellant argued that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit law applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper because, under both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, a sale conducted during an automatic stay in bankruptcy proceedings is invalid. View "LN Management LLC Series 5105 Portraits Place v. Green Tree Loan Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

The provisions of Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116, which provides homeowners’ associations (HOAs) a superpriority lien on up to nine months of unpaid HOA dues, are not preempted by federal law when the first deed of trust on the property is insured through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).Homeowners bought a home using a mortgage insured through the FHA insurance program, and the promissory note and deed of trust were eventually assigned to Respondent. Homeowners’ HOA eventually initiated foreclosure proceedings pursuant to section 116.3116. Appellant purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and then filed suit to quiet title to the property. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the chapter 116 foreclosure sale of federal insured property was void under the federal constitution’s Supremacy Clause. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the provisions of section 116.3116 were preempted when a homeowner’s first mortgage was insured through the FHA insurance program. View "Renfroe v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court’s holding in SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014) that foreclosures under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116 extinguish first security interests applies to all foreclosures conducted since section 116.3116’s inception.Respondent in this case employed the three-factor test established by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) and argued that SFR could not apply retroactively because this court established a new principle of law, a retroactive application would not further the purposes of section 116.3116, and a retroactive application would product inequitable results. The Supreme Court held (1) the Chevron Oil factors do not apply, but rather, that the court’s analysis in Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 383 P.3d 246 (Nev. 2016), governs the present matter; and (2) SFR did not create new law or overrule existing precent, and therefore, that decision applies retroactively. View "K&P Homes v. Christiana Trust" on Justia Law

The one-action rule, which generally requires a creditor seeking to recover debt secured by real property to proceed against the security prior to seeking recovery from the debtor personally, must be timely interposed as an affirmative defense in a party’s responsive pleadings or it is waived.Plaintiff contributed more than $2 million toward funding a loan that was secured by the personal residence of Defendant. When the borrower defaulted on the loan and Defendant refused to repay the loan under a personal guaranty agreement, Plaintiff filed a complaint to recover damages against Defendant. The jury entered a verdict in favor of Defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court granted based on Defendant’s failure to oppose the motion on the merits. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, raising the one-action rule defense for the first time. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the one-action rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant failed to raise the one-action rule defense until prior to the commencement of the second trial in this case, Defendant failed timely to interpose the one-action rule defense. View "Hefetz v. Beavor" on Justia Law

The servicer of a loan owned by a regulated entity has standing to assert the Federal Foreclosure Bar in a quiet title action.Nationstar Mortgage, LLC was assigned a deed of trust. When Respondent purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, Respondent filed a third-party complaint against Nationstar, arguing that Nationstar’s security interest was extinguished by the foreclosure sale. Nationstar argued that its security interest survived the sale pursuant to the Federal Foreclosure Bar because Freddie Mac had purchased the loan, and the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) had placed Freddie Mac under conservatorship. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that, although there was a factual dispute as to whether Freddie Mac or the FHFA had an interest in the deed of trust, Nationstar lacked standing to assert the Federal Foreclosure Bar on behalf of Freddie Mac or the FHFA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the servicer of a loan owned by a regulated entity has standing to argue that the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116. View "Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a dispute between taxpayers from the Incline Village and Crystal Bay areas of Washoe County and Nevada State Board of Equalization concerning the State Board’s failure to equalize property values as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.395 for tax years 2003 through 2005. The district court dismissed the taxpayers’ petition for judicial review of the State Board’s interlocutory administrative order requiring reappraisals of properties around Incline Village and Crystal Bay for the tax years in question. The Supreme Court reversed and instructed the district court to grant, in part, the petition for judicial review and vacated the State Board’s interlocutory administrative order directing reappraisals of the properties, holding (1) this Court has jurisdiction to consider the district court’s dismissal of the petition for judicial review; and (2) the district court erred when it dismissed the petition for judicial review because the State Board exceeded its statutory authority to order reappraisals pursuant to section 361.395. View "Village League To Save Incline Assets, Inc. v. State, Board of Equalization" on Justia Law