Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Roy and Shirley Senholtz took out a loan from Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, a division of Walls Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo). The loan was secured by a deed of trust on property governed by an a homeowners’ associations’ (HOA) CC&Rs. When the Senholtzes failed to pay their HOA dues and mortgage, the HOA conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The property was sold to Saticoy Bay LLC. Satico Bay filed a complaint seeking an injunction preventing Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the property and a declaration that it was the rightful owner of the property free and clear of any encumbrances or liens. The district court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116-.31168 violated Wells Fargo’s due process rights. The statutes grant an HOA a superpriority lien for certain unpaid assessments and allow an HOA to nonjudicially foreclose on such a lien if specific requirements are met. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutes do not implicate due process because neither the HOA’s nonjudicial foreclosure nor the Legislature’s enactment of the statutes constitute state action; and (2) the extinguishment of a subordinate deed of trust through an HOA’s nonjudicial foreclosure does not violate the Takings Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 350 Durango 104 v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage" on Justia Law

When Respondent defaulted on a commercial guaranty agreement with Bank, Bank sued Respondent. Bank’s complaint sought from Respondent the deficiency allowed by Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.495(4). On June 18, 2013 Bank proceeded to foreclosure sale. Bank acquired the property at foreclosure. On January 16, 2014, Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a deficiency judgment against Respondent. Respondent filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that because Bank let more than six months elapse between the date of the foreclosure sale and the date it filed its motion for summary judgment, Bank forfeited its right to obtain a deficiency judgment by operation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455. Bank responded that its pre-foreclosure complaint satisfied all applicable requirements in Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 40. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent and against Bank. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bank’s complaint against Respondent for the deficiency allowed by section 40.495(4) satisfied the requirements of Chapter 40. View "Bank of Nevada v. Petersen" on Justia Law

Appellants filed an inverse condemnation complaint against Washoe County alleging that the County approved subdivision maps, directed the flow of water, and accepted street dedications during the building process of two upstream developments that increased the flow of water to Whites Creek and caused flooding to Appellants’ property. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Washoe County, concluding that the County’s approval of subdivision maps and acceptance of dedications did not constitute substantial involvement sufficient to support a claim for inverse condemnation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the County’s action constituted substantial involvement in the drainage system sufficient to support a claim for inverse condemnation. View "Fritz v. Washoe County" on Justia Law

Catherine Rodriguez defaulted on her loan and elected for foreclosure mediation. At a third, unsuccessful mediation between Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, as the agent of the Bank of New York Mellon (BONY), and Rodriguez, Nationstar presented an uncertified, inaccurate copy of the promissory note. Thereafter, BONY filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure. Upon learning that the note presented at the third mediation was inaccurate, Rodriguez filed a petition for judicial review of the mediation against Nationstar and BONY (collectively, Nationstar). The district court excused the untimeliness of the petition based on good cause and found that the note’s certification was false and that Nationstar knew of the falsity. The court sanctioned Nationstar $100,000. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition for judicial review because the filing of such a petition is not permitted beyond the thirty-day time period provided in Nevada’s Foreclosure Mediation Rule 21(2), even when a party discovers fraud months after the mediation. View "Nationstar Mortgage v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Hawley McIntosh purchased a home located within a common-interest community. McIntosh’s first mortgage lender subsequently foreclosed on McIntosh’s home. Scott Ludwig purchased the property and subsequently transferred the property by quitclaim deed to Ikon Holdings, LLC. Ikon acknowledged that it acquired the property subject to the homeowner association’s (Horizons) superpriority lien but disagreed that the lien included nine months, rather than six months, of unpaid assessments or the collection fees and foreclosure costs Horizon was seeking to recoup. Thereafter, Ikon filed the underlying declaratory relief action. The district court granted partial declaratory relief, concluding that Horizons’ covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) limited its superpriority lien to an amount equal to six months of assessments, which did not offend Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2)’s superpriority provision providing for nine months of assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a superpriority lien for common expense assessments pursuant to section 116.3116(2) does not include collection fees and foreclosure costs incurred by an HOA; and (2) an HOA’s CC&Rs that purport to create a superpriority lien covering certain fees and costs over six months preceding foreclosure are superseded by the terms of the superpriority lien created by section 116.3116(2). View "Horizons at Seven Hills Homeowners Ass’n v. Ikon Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

On December 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint asserting claims to quiet title and for adverse possession. On August 11, 2011, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s action with prejudice for want of prosecution. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that dismissal was premature because the two-year time period in Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) had not passed. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted Defendant’s motion for attorney fees and costs in full. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal and the award of attorney fees. The two appeals were subsequently consolidated. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the subsequent order awarding attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court’s findings of fact, on which it based its conclusions of law and decision to dismiss the action with prejudice, were unsupported by the evidence in the record and that there was no evidence presented that supported a finding that dismissal with prejudice was warranted. View "Hunter v. Gang" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were a homeowners’ association (HOA) and a foreclosure sale buyer. On summary judgment, the district court set aside a trustee’s deed following the HOA’s assessment lien foreclosure sale, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2) limited the HOA lien to nine months of common expense assessments, and the HOA acted unfairly and oppressively in insisting on more than that amount to cancel the sale; (2) the bid price was grossly inadequate as a matter of law; and (3) the buyer did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.31166’s enactment, in an appropriate case, did not eliminate a court’s authority to grant equitable relief from a defective HOA lien foreclosure sale; but (2) the district court in this case erred in limiting the HOA lien amount to nine months of common expense assessments and in resolving on summary judgment the issues of fact regarding the parties’ conduct, the foreclosure sale buyer’s status, the HOA lien amount, and the competing equities. Remanded. View "Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc." on Justia Law

Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(4), if two or more homeowners’ associations (HOAs) have liens for assessments created at any time on the same property, those liens have “equal priority.” The property at issue in this dispute was part of two HOAs - Appellant and a nonparty. The nonparty foreclosed on the property, and Respondent purchased it. Appellant subsequently recorded a lien against the property for unpaid association dues pre-dating the foreclosure sale. When the lien went unpaid, Appellant set a foreclosure sale date. Respondent sought to preliminarily enjoin the foreclosure sale, arguing that section 116.3116(4) gives equal priority to multiple HOA liens, and therefore, the nonparty’s foreclosure sale extinguished Appellant’s lien. The district court granted the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under section 116.3116(4), the nonparty’s foreclosure sale extinguished Appellant’s lien, but Appellant remained entitled to its proper share of the sale proceeds. View "Southern Highlands Cmty. Ass’n v. San Florentine Ave. Trust" on Justia Law