Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the district court granting summary judgment and dismissal in favor of a loan servicer and trustee in this case involving a home equity line of credit agreement (HELOC) with a defined maturity date and closed draw period, holding that there was no error.At issue before the Court was whether a loan servicer and trustee were entitled to foreclose upon Borrowers' residence due to Borrowers' failure to repay the funds provided to them under the terms of their HELOC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that Borrowers' HELOC was both a negotiable instrument under Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.3104(1) and a promissory note under Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.3104(5), entitling the loan servicer and trustee to enforce the document under Nev. Rev. Code chapter 104 due to Borrowers' default; and (2) erred in finding that Borrowers' property was not owner-occupied and thus not subject to statutory requirements pertaining to foreclosures affecting owner-occupied housing, but the error was harmless. View "Wishengrad v. Carrington Mortgage Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Tahican LLC's petition seeking a writ of mandamus affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Tahican LLC's second motion seeking to expunge a lis pendens, holding that the district court did not err in denying Tahican's motion to expunge the lis pendens.Max Joly and Bydoo, LLC formed a partnership. Joly later transferred his shares in the partnership to Bydoo but Bydoo did not make the payments required under the parties' agreement. Joly sued Bydoo and Jean Francois Rigollet, alleging breach of contract. Bydoo later transferred real property to Tahican by quitclaim deed. When Joly recorded a notice of lis pendens against the property Rigollet sought to expunge the lis pendens. Joly amended his complaint to add Tahican as a defendant and allege fraudulent transfer. The district court denied the motion to expunge and granted summary judgment in favor of Joly on the majority of his claims. Tahican brought this petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that there was no error in the denial of Tahican's motion to expunge the lis pendens because a fraudulent transfer claim seeking avoidance of the transfer of real property is an "action...affecting the title or possession of real property" within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 14.010(1). View "Tahican, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court holding that a revocable living trust agreement signed by the decedent and the named trustee sufficiently established the decedent's house as trust property, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.At issue was whether the revocable living trust agreement was effective to establish the decedent's house, his only real property, as an asset of the trust under Nevada law and to the satisfaction of the relevant statute of frauds. The district court confirmed the trustee and the house as trust property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trust agreement effectively funded the decedent's house to the trust; (2) the agreement satisfied the common law statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.205(1); and (3) the decedent's living trust agreement funded the trust with his house. View "In re Trust Agreement of Davies" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a third-party entity in a post-judgment collection action has party standing to appeal from an order of the district court resolving its petition to return property levied pursuant to a writ of execution.Jennifer Goldstein obtained a judgment against NuVeda, LLC for over $2.5 million. In post-judgment collection proceedings, Goldstein had a writ of execution serviced on Clark NMSD, LLC, and cash was seized. Clark NMSD filed a third-party claimant petition, which NuVeda joined, seeking return of the seized cash and requesting that Goldstein be prohibited from further collection activity. The district court denied the petition. Goldstein then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because Clark NMSD was not a party to the proceedings below it had not standing to appeal. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that Clark NMSD had party standing to challenge the district court's order, and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal. View "Clark NMSD, LLC v. Goldstein" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the grants of dismissal and summary judgment as to claims of improper actions taken by the Regional Transportation Commission of Washoe County (RTC) during the completion of a construction project on Appellants' party following condemnation proceedings, holding that the district court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Appellants' claim for waste; (2) did not err in dismissing Appellants' separate cause of action for injunctive relief; (3) did not err in granting the RTC's motion for summary judgment as to Appellants' contract-based claims; and (4) erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the RTC as to Appellants' trespass claim and their request for declaratory relief. The Court vacated the order awarding RTC attorney fees and costs because, after remand, the RTC might not be the prevailing party. View "Iliescu v. Regional Transportation Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding that there was no default of the loan in this case and issuing a wide-ranging preliminary injunction reaching matters that were not argued or briefed, holding that the district court erred in disregarding the loan agreements' provisions setting forth what constituted a default.At issue before the Supreme Court was the conditions under which a lender or its assignee is entitled to the appointment of a receiver after a borrower defaults on a real property loan agreement. Once Borrower in this case assumed ownership of properties housing multi-family apartment complexes the lender observed a significant decrease in occupancy. Observing that significant repairs were needed and relying on specific provisions in the loan agreements Lender demanded deposits into repair and replacement escrow accounts. Lender deemed a default when Borrower did not make the deposits. Lender sued and sought a receiver. Borrower countersued alleging breach of contract and seeking injunctive relief. The district court granted judgment for Borrower. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion in refusing to appoint a receiver on Borrower's default; and (2) abused its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction. View "Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Westland Liberty Village, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court did not err in denying Appellant's petition because Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.610 was not satisfied by the timely filing of Appellant's other claims.Appellant purchased seventeen lots that it owned as tenants in common with Nye County and two other owners. After the owners failed to pay property taxes the County sold the lots at public action, resulting in excess process. Two of the owners filed timely claims for the excess proceeds, which Nye County granted. The County, however, denied Appellant's petition for the excess proceeds on the grounds that it was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if a former property owner wants its share of the excess proceeds from a tax sale, the former property owner must file a claim for those excess proceeds within the one-year deadline set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.610; and (2) because Appellant filed timely to file a claim, the money was no longer accessible to Appellant under section 361.610. View "Artmor Investments, LLC v. Nye County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Respondents' consolidated petitions for judicial review and reinstating the decision of the State Engineer approving the Diamond Valley Groundwater Management Plan (GMP), holding that the State Engineer's decision to approve the GMP was not erroneous.Once an over-appropriated basin is designated a critical management area (CMA) water permit and certificate holders may petition the State Engineer to approve a GMP that sets forth the necessary steps for removal of the basin's designation as a CMA. After Diamond Valley was designated a CMA the State Engineer approved the Diamond Valley GMP, which deviated somewhat from the doctrine of appropriation. The district court invalidated the order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the GMP complied with Nev. Rev. Stat. 534.037 and 534.110(7); and (2) therefore, the GMP was valid. View "Diamond Natural Resources Protection & Conservation Ass'n v. Diamond Valley Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this action involving a foreclosed property located in a homeowner's association (HOA) community and sold by the HOA to a subsequent purchaser at a foreclosure sale, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.In the alternative to seeking to quiet title, Plaintiff, the subsequent purchaser of the property at issue, asserting a misrepresentation claim against the HOA and its agent based upon their failure to disclose and publicly record for failing to disclose a superpriority tender. The court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. View "Saticoy Bay, LLC v. Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-3" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of forfeiture entered by the district court after determining that Nevada's homestead exemption may, as a general matter, protect against civil forfeiture, holding (1) there is no forfeiture exception to the homestead exemption, and (2) incarcerated individuals may still be deemed residents for purposes of the homestead exemption under Nev. Rev. Stat. 115.020.After Appellant had been arrested Elko County Sheriff's Office filed a complaint for forfeiture of the property. While in jail, Appellant recorded his initiated declaration of homestead. Appellant was subsequently convicted of a drug-related crime. While incarcerated, Appellant leased the property to a third party. After a trial, the district court awarded the sheriff a judgment of forfeiture. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a valid homestead is exempt from civil forfeiture; and (2) the property was a constitutionally-protected homestead because Appellant satisfied Nev. Rev. Stat. 115.020. View "Aguirre v. Elko County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law