Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding that there was no default of the loan in this case and issuing a wide-ranging preliminary injunction reaching matters that were not argued or briefed, holding that the district court erred in disregarding the loan agreements' provisions setting forth what constituted a default.At issue before the Supreme Court was the conditions under which a lender or its assignee is entitled to the appointment of a receiver after a borrower defaults on a real property loan agreement. Once Borrower in this case assumed ownership of properties housing multi-family apartment complexes the lender observed a significant decrease in occupancy. Observing that significant repairs were needed and relying on specific provisions in the loan agreements Lender demanded deposits into repair and replacement escrow accounts. Lender deemed a default when Borrower did not make the deposits. Lender sued and sought a receiver. Borrower countersued alleging breach of contract and seeking injunctive relief. The district court granted judgment for Borrower. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion in refusing to appoint a receiver on Borrower's default; and (2) abused its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction. View "Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Westland Liberty Village, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court did not err in denying Appellant's petition because Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.610 was not satisfied by the timely filing of Appellant's other claims.Appellant purchased seventeen lots that it owned as tenants in common with Nye County and two other owners. After the owners failed to pay property taxes the County sold the lots at public action, resulting in excess process. Two of the owners filed timely claims for the excess proceeds, which Nye County granted. The County, however, denied Appellant's petition for the excess proceeds on the grounds that it was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if a former property owner wants its share of the excess proceeds from a tax sale, the former property owner must file a claim for those excess proceeds within the one-year deadline set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.610; and (2) because Appellant filed timely to file a claim, the money was no longer accessible to Appellant under section 361.610. View "Artmor Investments, LLC v. Nye County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Respondents' consolidated petitions for judicial review and reinstating the decision of the State Engineer approving the Diamond Valley Groundwater Management Plan (GMP), holding that the State Engineer's decision to approve the GMP was not erroneous.Once an over-appropriated basin is designated a critical management area (CMA) water permit and certificate holders may petition the State Engineer to approve a GMP that sets forth the necessary steps for removal of the basin's designation as a CMA. After Diamond Valley was designated a CMA the State Engineer approved the Diamond Valley GMP, which deviated somewhat from the doctrine of appropriation. The district court invalidated the order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the GMP complied with Nev. Rev. Stat. 534.037 and 534.110(7); and (2) therefore, the GMP was valid. View "Diamond Natural Resources Protection & Conservation Ass'n v. Diamond Valley Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this action involving a foreclosed property located in a homeowner's association (HOA) community and sold by the HOA to a subsequent purchaser at a foreclosure sale, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.In the alternative to seeking to quiet title, Plaintiff, the subsequent purchaser of the property at issue, asserting a misrepresentation claim against the HOA and its agent based upon their failure to disclose and publicly record for failing to disclose a superpriority tender. The court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. View "Saticoy Bay, LLC v. Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-3" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of forfeiture entered by the district court after determining that Nevada's homestead exemption may, as a general matter, protect against civil forfeiture, holding (1) there is no forfeiture exception to the homestead exemption, and (2) incarcerated individuals may still be deemed residents for purposes of the homestead exemption under Nev. Rev. Stat. 115.020.After Appellant had been arrested Elko County Sheriff's Office filed a complaint for forfeiture of the property. While in jail, Appellant recorded his initiated declaration of homestead. Appellant was subsequently convicted of a drug-related crime. While incarcerated, Appellant leased the property to a third party. After a trial, the district court awarded the sheriff a judgment of forfeiture. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a valid homestead is exempt from civil forfeiture; and (2) the property was a constitutionally-protected homestead because Appellant satisfied Nev. Rev. Stat. 115.020. View "Aguirre v. Elko County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing of an order affirming the judgment of the district court in the underlying quiet title action, holding that this Court did not overlook or misapprehend any material fact in the record.Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.240 provides that ten years after a debt secured by a lien on real property has become "wholly due" and has remained unpaid, "it shall be conclusively presumed that the debt has been regularly satisfied and the lien discharged." At issue was what effect a notice of rescission has on the statute's ten-year time frame when it is recorded after a notice of default. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in this case consistent with its unpublished decision in Glass v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 78325, 2020 WL 3604042 at *1 (Nev. July 1, 2020). Appellant sought rehearing. The Supreme Court denied rehearing, holding that the Court did not overlook or misapprehend any material facts. View "SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to Appellant's claim for declaratory relief and as to Appellant's accompanying violation of property rights claim, holding that public policy favors the adoption of sections 6.7 and 6.9 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes.At issue was the scope of a common-interest-community homeowners association's power to adopt rules restricting the design and use of individually-owned properties. In the instant case, Appellant argued that Respondent did not have any express power to adopt the architectural guidelines in question and argued that the district court should interpret an association's implied to adopt rules under Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 116 as being limited, consistent with sections 6.7 and 6.9. The district court ruled in favor of Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that this Court expressly adopts sections 6.7 and 6.9 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, the subject association possess the authority to adopt design-control restrictions for individually-owned property, but it must exercise that power reasonably. The Court remanded the case for the parties to address this issue. View "Moretto v. Elk Point Country Club Homeowners Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that declaratory relief actions are not categorically exempt from statutes of limitations, that the four-year statute of limitations applies to an action like this one to determine the validity of a lien under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.010, and that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the titleholder affirmatively repudiates the lien.In this declaratory relief and quiet title matter arising out of a homeowners association (HOA) foreclosure sale, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as the questions leading to this opinion. The Supreme Court held (1) City of Fernley does not hold that declaratory relief actions are categorically exempt from statutes of limitations; (2) this is a quiet title action under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.010; (3) the four-year catch-all statute of limitations applies; and (4) the four-year limitations period is not triggered until the titleholder repudiates the lien. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Thunder Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court quieting title in favor of Respondent, the first deed-of-trust beneficiary in this case, holding that the district court properly quieted title in Respondent's favor.A homeowners' association foreclosed its lien on the subject property. The property was eventually transferred to Appellant by deed expressly providing that Appellant's interest was subject to any claims, encumbrances, or liens. U.S. Bank Trust, the assignee of the first deed of trust, sought to quiet title. The district court concluded that Appellant took title to the property subject to U.S. Bank Trust's first deed of trust and that the foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that U.S. Bank Trust may enforce its deed-of-trust lien in accordance with Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.210. View "Lakes v. U.S. Bank Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment and dismissing Appellant's complaint for declaratory relief challenging attorney fees imposed under a deed of trust, holding that the district court did not err.Appellant purchased certain real property at a homeowners association foreclosure sale, taking the property subject to Respondent's deed of trust, which allowed Respondent to add any reasonable expenses incurred protecting its interest in the property, including attorney fees, to the secured debt. The deed of trust entitled Respondent to add the attorney fees accrued in protecting its interest in the property to the secured debt without filing a motion seeking those fees in court. The district court concluded that Respondent may add those attorney fees to the amount of indebtedness owed under the note secured by the deed of trust because Appellant's property was subject to the deed of trust and because Appellant sought to pay off the note secured by the deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) and its timing requirements were inapplicable in this case; and (2) the district court did not err in finding that Respondent may add those attorney fees to the amount of indebtedness owed under the note. View "Oella Ridge Trust v. Silver State Schools Credit Union" on Justia Law