Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment and dismissing Appellant's complaint for declaratory relief challenging attorney fees imposed under a deed of trust, holding that the district court did not err.Appellant purchased certain real property at a homeowners association foreclosure sale, taking the property subject to Respondent's deed of trust, which allowed Respondent to add any reasonable expenses incurred protecting its interest in the property, including attorney fees, to the secured debt. The deed of trust entitled Respondent to add the attorney fees accrued in protecting its interest in the property to the secured debt without filing a motion seeking those fees in court. The district court concluded that Respondent may add those attorney fees to the amount of indebtedness owed under the note secured by the deed of trust because Appellant's property was subject to the deed of trust and because Appellant sought to pay off the note secured by the deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) and its timing requirements were inapplicable in this case; and (2) the district court did not err in finding that Respondent may add those attorney fees to the amount of indebtedness owed under the note. View "Oella Ridge Trust v. Silver State Schools Credit Union" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that a judgment debtor may claim the so-called "wildcard exemption" from execution under Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.090(1)(z) to protect up to $10,000 of the debtor's disposable earnings not already excepted by the earnings exemption under Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.090(1)(g), holding that the district court did not err.The district court permitted Appellant to execute on the attachable portion of the judgment debtor's disposable earnings to the extent that those earnings exceeded $10,000 during the 180-day garnishment period. Appellant appealed, challenging Respondent's use of the wildcard exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because earnings qualify as personal property, the plain language of the wildcard exemption permits a debtor to shield from execution up to $10,000 of earnings not otherwise exempted; and (2) the use of the wildcard exemption on nonexempt earnings does not produce absurd results. View "Platte River Insurance Co. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint under Nev. Rev. Stat. 38.310, holding that the district court erred.Appellant purchased property at a homeowners' association (HOA) foreclosure sale following the previous owner's default on HOA assessments imposed by covenants, conditions, or restrictions (CC&Rs). Because the first deed of trust on the property survived the foreclosure sale, Appellant sued the HOA and its agent, alleging breach of the duty of good faith, misrepresentation, conspiracy, and violation of Nev. REv. Stat. Chapter 113. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Appellant had not engaged in alternative dispute resolution before bringing this suit in violation of section 38.310. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 38.310 did not apply to Appellant's claims; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint. View "Saticoy Bay, LLC v. Peccole Ranch Community Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court exercising jurisdiction over the underlying fraudulent conveyance action and avoiding all of Paul Morabito's transfers to Superpumper, Inc., Sam Morabito, Snowshoe Petroleum, Inc., and Edward Bayer, individually and as trustee of the Bayuk Trust (collectively, Superpumper) and awarding Paul Morabito's bankruptcy trustee (Trustee) the subject property or the value thereof, holding that the district court did not err.Paul and Consolidated Nevada Corporation entered into a settlement agreement with JH Inc., Jerry Herbst, and Berry-Hinckley Industries (collectively, the Herbsts) for $85 million and later defaulted on the agreement. After a bankruptcy court adjudicated Paul as a Chapter 7 debtor the Herbsts filed a fraudulent transfer action against Paul and Superpumper, the transferees of Paul's assets. The state district court avoided all of Morabito's transfers to Superpumper and awarded the Trustee the subject property or the value thereof. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the fraudulent conveyance action; (2) Superpumper waived its in rem jurisdiction argument; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing attorney-client communications to be admitted into evidence at trial. View "Superpumper, Inc. v. Leonard" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the correct interpretation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2), Nevada's "superpriority lien" statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment for Respondents, holding that the district court's construction of the statute was correct.Section 116.3116(2) gives a homeowners association's lien priority over a first deed of trust with respect to the HOA's assessments for common expenses based on the periodic budget adopted by the HOA "which would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the [nine] months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien." Respondents' predecessor tendered a check equaling nine months' worth of assessments in an attempt to satisfy the HOA's superpriority lien, but the HOA had imposed a yearly assessment so that the entire assessment became due during the nine months immediately preceding when the HOA brought this action to enforce its liens. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly reasoned that the HOA's imposition of an annual assessment accelerated the assessments' due date such that Respondents were not required to tender more than nine months of assessments to satisfy the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien. View "Anthony S. Noonan IRA, LLC v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n EE" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court invalidating Order No. 1293A, which prohibited the driving of new domestic wells in the Pahrump Artesian Basin unless the applicant identified and relinquished 2.0 acre-feet annually from an alternate source (the 2.0 afa requirement), as unlawful, holding that Nevada law authorized the order's 2.0 afa requirement under the circumstances.In invalidating the order, the district court concluded (1) the State Engineer violated due process by issuing the order without first providing notice and a public hearing; (2) the State Engineer lacked authority to issue the 2.0 afa requirement; and (3) substantial evidence did not support the order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State Engineer was not required to hold a hearing or develop a more robust record; (2) the State Engineer was not required to provide notice and a hearing regarding the 2.0 afa requirement under the circumstances; and (3) the State Engineer's decision was supported by substantial record evidence. View "Wilson, P.E. v. Pahrump Fair Water, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court entering judgment for Green Tree Servicing, LLC in this action to quiet title brought after a homeowners' association (HOA) lien foreclosure sale upon finding that the first deed of trust had not been extinguished because there had been a valid tender, holding that Saticoy Bay LLC Series 133 McLaren took title subject to Green Tree's first deed of trust.Green Tree was assigned a deed of trust on certain property. The original homeowners because delinquent on their HOA assessments, and the HOA proceeded with a foreclosure sale. The property was sold to Saticoy Bay. Saticoy Bay brought an action to quiet title, and Green Tree counterclaimed for the same. The district court granted summary judgment for Green Tree. On appeal, Saticoy Bay argued that the district court erred in granting equitable relief because the recitals in the foreclosure deed proved that the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien was in default at the time of the sale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) conclusive recitals of default in a foreclosure deed do not prevent a valid pre-sale tender from preserving a deed of trust; and (2) the valid tender by Green Tree's predecessor preserved the original deed of trust. View "Saticoy Bay, LLC Series 133 McLaren v. Green Tree Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this foreclosure action, holding that the loan servicer timely commenced the action after the foreclosure sale and sufficiently demonstrated that a regulated entity under the Federal Housing Finance Agency's (FHFA) conservatorship owned the loan.Defendant purchased property at a foreclosure sale. Plaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the first deed of trust survived the sale and for quiet title. Plaintiff offered evidence that it was servicing the loan on behalf of Freddie Mac, which had previously been placed into an FHFA conservatorship and that the first deed of trust therefore survived under the Federal Foreclosure Bar. Applying a three-year limitations period, the district court entered summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that the foreclosure sale extinguished the deed of trust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the claims underlying the action are best described as sounding in contract for purposes of the House and Economic Recovery Act statute of limitations, which provides for a six-year statute of limitations; and (2) the Federal Foreclosure Bar prevented the foreclosure sale from extinguishing gate first deed of trust, and therefore, Defendant took the property subject to that deed of trust. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Ass'n v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered in the negative a question certified to it by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that the public trust doctrine does not permit the reallocation of rights already adjudicated and settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation.This litigation stemmed from Mineral County's intervention in longstanding litigation over water rights in the Walker River Basin to protect and restore Walker Lake. Here, the Supreme Court was asked for the first time to consider whether the public trust doctrine permits reallocating water rights previously settled under Nevada's prior appropriation doctrine. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine, as implemented through the state's water statutes, does not permit reallocating water rights already adjudicated and settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation. View "Mineral County v. Lyon County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's amended judgment in favor of the buyers of residential real property and against the sellers and the real estate agents of both the buyers and the sellers and offsetting the judgment by a portion of the settlement amounts paid by the agents pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.245(1)(a), holding that the district court did not err.After the buyers brought suit alleging that all parties violated their statutory disclosure obligations the buyers settled with the sellers and the buyers' agents. The case proceeded to a bench trial against the sellers' agents, after which the district court entered judgment in favor of the buyers. Pursuant to section 17.245(1)(a), the district court offset the judgment by a portion of the settlement proceeds paid by the sellers and the buyers' agents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when considering if section 17.245(1)(a)'s settlement offsets apply, district courts must determine whether both the settling and the non settling defendants were responsible for the same injury; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's determination that all the defendants caused the same injury; and (3) the district court properly calculated the offset amount. View "J.E. Johnson & Associates v. Lindberg" on Justia Law