Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Kenney Company, LLC, contested the auditor’s valuation of fourteen office condominium parcels for tax year 2009. The auditor valued the units at approximately $2,512,000. Before the Delaware County Board of Revision (BOR), The Kenney Company presented an appraisal that assigned an aggregate value of $1,430,000 to the unites. The BOR adopted the appraisal valuation. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed the BOR’s decision and reinstated the auditor’s valuation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably by rejecting The Kenney Company’s appraisal and reinstating the auditor’s valuation. View "Olentangy Local Schools Board of Education v. Delaware County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

Betty Lunn, the owner of a single-family residence, challenged the Lorain County auditor’s valuation of the property for tax year 2012. Lunn appealed, arguing that her 2011 purchase of the home was a recent arm’s-length sale that established a lower true value. The Board of Revision (BOR) retained the auditor’s valuation, concluding that the auditor had provided insufficient evidence of the sale. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed and valued the property according to the sale price. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully when it found that Lunn satisfied her initial burden to show a recent arm’s-length sale under former Ohio Rev. Code 4713.03; but (2) Lunn’s purchase was a “forced sale” under section 5713.04, and therefore, Lunn failed to overcome the presumption that the sale of the property post-foreclosure was not indicative of the property’s true value. View "Lunn v. Lorain County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

Dynamic Industries, Inc. (DI) owned real property on which stood a building that DI claimed was unsalvageable. After an application was filed to have the building designated a historic landmark, DI filed an application seeking a permit to demolish the building. The City of Cincinnati did not process DI’s application because the historic-designation application was still pending. DI filed in the court of appeals an original action in mandamus seeking a peremptory writ compelling the City to immediately issue its requested permit and related relief. The City subsequently passed an ordinance approving the historic-designation application. When the building became a historic landmark, DI was precluded from obtaining a demolition permit unless it first obtained a certificate of appropriateness, for which DI did not apply. The court of appeals dismissed DI’s complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over DI’s claims in declaratory and injunctive relief and for money damages; and (2) DI failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before asserting its takings and general mandamus claims, and therefore, those claims were unripe and unavailing. View "State ex rel. Dynamic Industries, Inc. v. Cincinnati" on Justia Law

This case arose after the City of Cleveland granted a production company a permit to close a portion of a street in downtown Cleveland for sixteen consecutive days so that the company could film scenes for a movie. The street’s closure cut off access to one of two entrances to a parking lot owned by Cuyahoga Lakefront Land, LLC (“Lakefront”) during the permit period. Lakefront brought this original action in the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which found that Cleveland had taken Lakefront’s property without just compensation and issued a writ of mandamus ordering Cleveland to commence appropriation proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no writ should issue because Lakefront failed to show that the temporary loss of access to one of the two entrances to the parking lot was a compensable taking of its property. View "State ex rel. Cuyahoga Lakefront, L.L.C. v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the proper valuation for the tax year 2010 of an undeveloped tract made up of three noncontiguous parcels that was purchased in 2007 for the development of ranch condominiums. The county auditor originally valued the entire tract using the 2007 sale price, with a portion of that price allocated to each of the individual parcels. The Delaware County Board of Revision ordered reductions based on a deputy auditor’s report that was not made part of the record until the case was appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) retained the reduced valuations. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding that the evidence in the record negates the validity of the 2007 sale price but does not clearly establish an alternative valuation for the property. Remanded with instructions that the BTA perform an independent valuation of the property based on the existing record and any additional evidence that may be heard or received. View "Olentangy Local Schools Board of Education v. Delaware County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a declaratory-judgment action against Defendant, seeking to quiet title to a mineral interest. At issue between the parties was whether the 1989 version of the Dormant Mineral Act or the 2006 version of the Act applied in this case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the 1989 version of the Act applied, and therefore, Defendant, the owner of the severed mineral estate, did not preserve his rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, the 2006 version of the Act applied in this case; and (2) based on Dodd v. Croskey, Defendant preserved his mineral rights. View "Walker v. Shondrick-Nau" on Justia Law

Nile and Katheryn Batman claimed to hold an interest in minerals underlying the properties owned by Wayne Lipperman and the estate of James Albanese (“Albanese”). Albanese and Lipperman filed separate actions seeking to quiet title to their respective properties, claiming that the severed mineral interests held by the Batmans had been abandoned. Albanese and Lipperman also sought to cancel any oil and gas leases executed in relation to the Batmans’ interests in their properties. The trial court granted summary judgment against Albanese and Lipperman. The court of appeals affirmed in both cases. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (ODMA) applies in these cases; and (2) because neither Albanese nor Lipperman complied with the notice and affidavit requirements in the ODMA, the mineral interests are preserved in favor of their holder, the Batmans. View "Albanese v. Batman" on Justia Law

Appellant, a property owner, applied to exempt real property used as a public community school for tax year 2010. The tax commissioner denied the exemption to the property that Appellant leased to the community school. Appellant appealed, arguing that because it was wholly owned by a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation whose members include the community school to whom the property is leased, the property should qualify for exemption under the public-schoolhouse exemption and an exemption for exclusive charitable use. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of an exemption, concluding that the record showed a “view to profit” on the part of the lessor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record contained sufficient support for the BTA’s view-to-profit finding. View "250 Shoup Mill, LLC v. Testa" on Justia Law

Bank filed this foreclosure action against Debtors. Debtors counterclaimed, alleging that Bank did not own the promissory note or the mortgage at the time it commenced the foreclosure action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Bank, finding that Bank was the holder of the note and the assignee of the mortgage prior to the commencement of the action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) only the current holder of both the note and the mortgage has standing to file a foreclosure action, and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Bank owned the note at the time it commenced the foreclosure action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when debt on a promissory note secured by a mortgage has been discharged by a bankruptcy court, the holder of the mortgage has standing to foreclose on the property and to collect the deficiency on the note from the foreclosure sale of the property; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding any of the elements of Bank’s foreclosure action. View "Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Holden" on Justia Law

The Franklin County auditor valued a two-story office building at $2,205,000. The property owner filed a complaint seeking a reduction. Before the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) the owner presented an appraisal valuing the property at $1,000,000. The BOR adopted the lower value. The Dublin City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the BOR’s valuation. BOE appealed, arguing that the appraisal did not constitute probative evidence of value, and therefore, the BTA should not have adopted that value for the real property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in light of the plain applicability of the Bedford rule, the BTA did not err in its decision. View "Dublin City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law