Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the criminal case against him based on an alleged violation of his statutory speedy-trial right, holding that the State did not violate Defendant's speedy-trial rights.The day before trial was set to begin, Defendant moved to dismiss the case base on an alleged violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, Defendant entered a plea of no contest to a single felony count. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no violation of Defendant's statutory speedy-trial rights in this case. View "State v. Belville" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition seeking a writ of prohibition to halt an ongoing appropriation case in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, holding that Petitioner failed to establish that he was entitled to a writ of prohibition.In the appropriation case, the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District sought to take Petitioner's property so it could build a biking trail. During the pendency of the case, the General Assembly passed a law stating that a park district in Mahoning County may not use its power of eminent domain to build a recreational trail. Arguing that the new law divested the Mahoning County court of jurisdiction, Petitioner brought suit asking for a writ of prohibition halting the appropriation proceeding. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the anti-appropriation provision did not patently and unambiguously eliminate the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court's subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) because Petitioner had an adequate remedy by way of an appeal and the trial court did not patently lack jurisdiction, Petitioner was not entitled to a writ of prohibition. View "Schlegel v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in this matter involving the 1882 transfer of property known today as Wade Park located in the city of Cleveland, holding that the Marketable Title Act (MTA), Ohio Rev. Code 5301.47 et seq., did not extinguish the reverter rights of Appellants and cross-Appellees (collectively, the Heirs).At issue was the interpretation and application of park-use restrictions in the deed donating the subject property to the city. The trial court interpreted the deed to both restrict the park's use and to promote its development, thus finding that Cleveland Botanical Garden (CBG), the City, and University Circle, Inc. did not violate the park-use restrictions. The court further found that the MTA extinguished the Heirs' reverter rights. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that CBG's operation in the park did not violate the deed's park-use restrictions but reversed the judgment regarding application of the MTA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no violation of the deed's park-use restrictions; and (2) the MTA may not be used to extinguish the Heirs' interests. View "Cleveland Botanical Garden v. Worthington Drewien" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ sought by Relators, five electors of the city of Canal Winchester, to have a referendum on a zoning ordinance placed on the general election ballot, holding that that the ordinance was properly enacted as emergency legislation and was not subject to referendum.Canal Winchester, NorthPoint Development, LLC, and the owners of the property at issue entered into an agreement whereby the owners agreed to petition for annexation to the city and the city and developer agreed to take steps for the land to be rezoned for the proposed development. However, the owners reserved the right to undo the annexation if the city's zoning approval became subject to referendum. After the city passed a resolution accepting annexation of the land, the city passed a second ordinance as emergency legislation repealing the previous ordinance and rezoning the property to "planned industrial district." Relators then sought to have the ordnance placed on the November ballot for referendum. When their request was refused, Relators filed their complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the petition to be transmitted to the Board. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding holding that the referendum was not subject to referendum and that the ordinance satisfied Ohio Rev. Code 731.30. View "State ex rel. Halstead v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In this appeal from a judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that Ohio's Marketable Title Act (MTA), Ohio Rev. Code 5301.47 et seq., applied to an oil and gas interest that had been severed from its surface property.Senterra, Ltd., the owner of the surface property at issue in this case, sought to quiet title to the disputed one-quarter oil and gas interest in its favor, urging the Court to apply the deed-interpretation rule of equity set forth in Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940) (the Duhig rule). The heirs to the oil and gas interest argued, in response, that the Duhig rule was inapplicable and that the MTA applied and gave them marketable record title to the interest. The trial court granted summary judgment to Senterra. The Seventh District reversed, ruling that the Duhig rule was inapplicable and that the MTA applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the oil and gas interest retained by the heirs was not subject to the Duhig rule; and (2) the heirs' interest was preserved under the MTA. View "Senterra, Ltd. v. Winland" on Justia Law

In this challenge to a foreclosure judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals did not err in denying Appellant's motion for relief from the judgment.In 2018, Appellant filed a prohibition action seeking to prevent a foreclosure sale. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. In 2019, Appellant filed a second prohibition action seeking to prevent the foreclosure sale. The court of appeals dismissed the action. Appellant both filed a motion for relief from judgment in the court of appeals and a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court denied the appeal, and the court of appeals denied the motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion. View "Lundeen v. Turner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's decisions in these two cases consolidated for appeal, holding that owners of the surface rights to land did not comply with the requirements of the Dormant Mineral Act, Ohio Rev. Code 5301.56, in seeking to have mineral interests in that land deemed abandoned.Plaintiffs filed complaints for declaratory judgment and seeking to quiet title, alleging that the surface owners had failed to exercise reasonable due diligence in attempting to locate holders of the mineral interests before commencing the abandonment process. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants in both cases. The court of appeals reversed in both cases, ruling that Defendants' searches were unreasonable and that they had failed to comply with the relevant notice requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendants failed to exercise reasonable diligence in these cases. View "Fonzi v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court dismissing this complaint brought by the Attorney General alleging that Defendants, including Rover Pipeline, LLC, had illegally discharged millions of gallons of drilling fluids into Ohio's waters, causing pollution and degrading water quality, holding that the lower courts erred.Rover sought a license to construct an interstate pipeline that cross several counts in Ohio. As required by 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1) - section 401 of the Clean Water Act - Rover applied for certification for the state that any discharge into the state's navigable waters would comply with federal law. The state later brought this action against Rover and other companies involved in building the pipeline. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of this lawsuit, holding (1) the state waived its ability to participate in the certification process when it did not respond to Rover's application within one year; but (2) the waiver applies only to issues that are related to the section 401 certification, and therefore, remand was required for a determination of whether any of the state's allegations address issues outside the contours of the section 401 certification. View "State ex rel. Yost v. Rover Pipeline, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing a decision of the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas and holding that amicus curiae Guernsey County Community Development Corporation (CDC) had violated land transfer restrictions that were included in a deed under the CDC's grant agreement with the Ohio Public Works Commission (OPWC), holding that there was no error.OPWC appealed the trial court's judgment that the deed restrictions did not apply to the subsurface of the property and the trial court's earlier holding denying OPWC's motion for an injunction. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the transfer restriction in the deed applied to both the surface and subsurface rights of the property and that OPWC had the authority to seek equitable remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the CDC violated enforceable land transfer restrictions included in the deed and thus violated the terms of CDC's grant agreement with the OPWC; and (2) OPWC was entitled to seek remedies at law and in equity to conserve the land for its intended purpose. View "Siltstone Resources, LLC v. Ohio Public Works Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that a recorded will that does not affect title to an interest in land is not a recorded title transaction under Ohio Rev. Code 5301.47(F) and cannot be an exception to the Marketable Title Act under Ohio Rev. Code 5301.49, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court and the appellate court incorrectly concluded that the interest H.J. Jones retained in the oil and gas was a life estate that expired upon Jones's death in 1932; but (2) the lower courts did not err in determining that a recorded will that does not distribute the decedent's oil and gas rights does not affect title and is not a recorded title transaction preventing those rights from being extinguished. View "Peppertree Farms, L.L.C. v. Thonen" on Justia Law