Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied the writs of prohibition and mandamus sought by Relators to order Respondent, the Union County Board of Elections, to remove a zoning referendum from the November 2, 2021 general-election ballot, holding that Relators' arguments were unavailing.This case concerned the proposed rezoning of approximately 139 acres of property in Plain City, Union County, and Relators in this action owned the property, which was zoned rural residential. When the board of trustees voted to rezone the property to a planned-development district, a group of petitioners filed a referendum petition containing a summary of the zoning amendment. The board of elections certified the petition to be placed on the November 2 election ballot. Relators then filed a protest to the referendum petition, contending that it failed to satisfy the "brief summary" requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 519.12(H). The board voted to deny the protest and allow the referendum to appear on the ballot. The Supreme Court denied Relators' writs, holding that Relators did not show that the board abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law in denying their protest. View "State ex rel. T-Bill Development Co. v. Union County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied as moot the writ of mandamus sought by Malcolm and Mary Wood seeking to compel Rocky River Board of Zoning and Building Appeals and its members (collectively, the zoning board) to stay their approval of a development plan and hear their appeals, holding that subsequent events had rendered the case moot.After the planning commission approved a proposed real estate development in Rocky River the Woods, who lived next to the site, filed an appeal. The zoning board declared the notice of appeal void on the grounds that the appeal was not completed or perfected within a timely fashion. The Woods subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus as moot because the construction of the project was substantially underway. View "State ex rel. Wood v. Rocky River" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the common pleas court adopting the Kings Local School District Board of Education's appraisal as the basis for determining the value of property owned by Appellant that was leased for use as a Lowe's Home Centers store, holding that there was no error.On appeal, Appellant argued that the appraisal introduced by the school board was not competent evidence of the property's value because it did not value the "fee simple, as if unencumbered," as required by Ohio Rev. Code 5713.03. Specifically, Appellant asserted that a property must be appraised under the theory that a hypothetical sale of the property on the tax-lien date would involve the current tenant vacating the property at transfer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the market-lease rule reflects the meaning of the phrase "fee simple estate, as if unencumbered"; and (2) the case law requiring adjustments of leased-fee comparable did not support Appellant's vacant-at-transfer rule. View "Rancho Cincinnati Rivers, LLC v. Warren County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming the decision of the tax commissioner denying Appellant's complaint challenging the continuing property tax exemption for a real estate parcel owned by the state and operated as the Ohio State University Airport (OSU Airport), the BTA's decision was reasonable and lawful.On appeal, Appellant argued that, given its use as of the tax lien date, the airport parcel did not qualify for exemption. Specifically, Appellant argued that either the entire airport should be taxed or that certain areas of the parcel should be split-listed as taxable. The Supreme Court affirmed BTA's decision continuing the exemption for the entire airport parcel, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 5715.271 placed the burden of proving entitled to continued exemption on OSU, and therefore, the BTA properly required OSU to bear that burden; (2) this Court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief to OSU on its evidentiary arguments; and (3) OSU proved that the airport was entitled to exemption under Ohio Rev. Code 3345.17. View "O'Keefe v. McClain" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) upholding the tax commissioner's denial of a municipality's request for an exemption for tax years 2015, 2016, and 2017, holding that the BTA reasonably and lawfully upheld the denial of an exemption.The village of Obetz enacted an ordinance in 2017 in an effort to reinstate the tax-exempt status of real property under a tax-increment-financing (TIF) arrangement after it expired in 2014. The commissioner explained that the 2017 could not retroactively reinstate the exemption for tax years 2015, 2016, and 2017 because Ohio Rev. Code 5709.40(G) provides that an exemption may begin no earlier than a tax year that "commences after the effective date of the ordinance." The BTA affirmed, agreeing that the 2017 ordinance created a new exemption rather than extending the earlier one so that section 5708.40(G) barred the exemption from applying during the relevant tax years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA's decision was reasonable and lawful. View "Obetz v. McClain" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming the journal entry issued by Ohio Tax Commissioner Jeffrey McClain adopting a per-acre valuation table for use by county auditors in assessing land that qualifies for "current agricultural use valuation" (CAUV), holding that substantial evidence supported the BTA's decision.For three reasons, the BTA found no abuse of discretion on the part of the tax commissioner in adopting the CAUV unit-value table. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-34(E) furnished no basis for challenging the CAUV journal entry; and (2) the BTA correctly determined that the tax commissioner did not abuse his discretion in adopting the valuation table. View "Johnson v. McClain" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's action seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a foreclosure judgment against her, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Appellant filed this prohibition action asserting that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., which filed the foreclosure action against Appellant, had failed to obtain service within one year of filing the complaint. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the cause, concluding that this action was moot and that Appellant's appeal in the foreclosure action constituted an adequate remedy precluding extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's cause of action was not moot; but (2) Appellant's opportunity to assert service and personal jurisdiction defenses in the foreclosure case and on appeal was an adequate remedy at law. View "Lundeen v. Turner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) that upheld three use-tax assessments based on Appellant's purchase of three trucks, holding that the BTA erred by failing to correlate its findings with the distinct primary uses of the trucks.The trucks at issue were two Peterbilt trucks and one Lodal truck. Appellant argued that because it purchased the three trucks for use in its business as a for-hire motor carrier, the purchase were exempt from sales and use tax under Ohio Rev. Code 5739.02(B)(32)'s "highway transportation for hire" exemption. The tax commissioner and the BTA determined that the exemption did not apply to the purchases because Appellant's use of the trucks to transport waste material to landfills did not qualify as the transportation of "personal property belonging to others." The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) for purposes of section 5739.02(B)(32), waste is "personal property belonging to" the person or entity that generated it when the person or entity has an agreement with the hauler that specifies where the waste is to be taken for disposal; and (2) because the generators of the waste hauled by the Peterbilt trucks designated the destination of the waste, the Peterbilt trucks were entitled to the exemption. View "N.A.T. Transportation, Inc. v. McClain" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus and a writ of prohibition against Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Judge Daniel R. Hawkins, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the cause for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.CitiMortgage Inc. brought a foreclosure action against Appellant, and the trial court granted summary judgment to CitiMortgage. After a trial on damages, the trial court entered a judgment on directed verdict in the full amount owed as claimed by CitiMortgage. Appellant later brought this action alleging, among other things, that alleged defects in the foreclosure case stripped the trial court of jurisdiction. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy by defending the foreclosure action and appealing the trial court's adverse judgment. View "State ex rel. Nyamusevya v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Relators, who owned property over which Ohio Power Company sought to take easements by eminent domain, holding that Relators were entitled to a writ of prohibition to prevent Washington County Court of Common Pleas Judge John Halliday from proceeding with a compensation trial during the pendency of Relators' appeal.After Judge Halliday ruled that Ohio Power's takings were necessary for a public use Relators appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding the appeal, Judge Halliday scheduled a trial on the issue of compensation. Relators commenced this action seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Halliday from holding the compensation trial while their appeal was pending. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the appropriations in this case did not fall under any of the exceptions to the owner's right to immediate appeal under Ohio Rev. Code 163.09(B)(3); and (2) a compensation trial during the pendency of a section 163.09(B)(3) appeal is inconsistent with the court of appeals' jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Bohlen v. Halliday" on Justia Law