Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In this dispute between a coal mining company and the owner of a natural gas pipeline over whether the pipeline owner may recover for damage caused to the pipeline as a result of mining the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court in favor of the mining company, holding that surface damage liability waivers in the relevant property deeds were valid and enforceable.The mining company held its interest in the coal underneath the lands through property deeds that severed the surface estate from the mineral interest. The deeds included provisions waiving liability for damage to the land's surface caused by mining activities. The trial court entered judgment for the mining company. On appeal, the pipeline owner asserted that the surface damage liability waivers were rendered invalid by an administrative agency's regulation requiring mining operators to pay for damage to surface structures from mining activities. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the administrative agency lacked authority to enact a regulation requiring mining operators to pay damages irrespective of common law property rights to the extent those rights have not been limited by federal law; and (2) the surface damage liability waivers at issue remained valid and enforceable. View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Ohio Valley Coal Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's decision granting summary judgment for John Chervenak, trustee of the Chervenak Family Trust, and declaring the trust the owner of the disputed mineral rights in this case, holding that the Chervenaks satisfied the notice requirements of the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act.Timothy Gerrity filed this action to quiet title and for a declaratory judgment, claiming that he was the rightful owner of severed mineral rights under the Chervenak property. At issue was whether the Chervenaks satisfied the notice requirements that the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act, Ohio Rev. Code 5301.56(E)(1), imposes as prerequisites to deeming a severed mineral interest abandoned and vested in the owner of the land subject to the mineral interest. The lower courts rendered judgment for Chervenak. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) application of the Dormant Mineral Act is not limited to circumstances in which every holder of a severed mineral interest has been identified; and (2) a surface owner must use reasonable diligence to identify and locate holders of a severed mineral interest, but what constitutes reasonable diligence will vary based on the facts of each case. View "Gerrity v. Chervenak" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus sought by Omni Energy Group, LLC as to the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management chief Eric Vendel ordering him to rule upon the validity of objections that were submitted concerning Omni's two saltwater injection well permit applications, holding that Omni was entitled to the writ.When the division chief did not render a decision on Omni's applications Omni filed a complaint against the division, Vendel, and department director Mary Mertz, sought a writ of mandamus compelling them to either issue or deny the permits. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, but instead of ordering Vendel immediately to render a decision on the applications, the Court ordered him to rule upon the validity of objections as required under Ohio Adm.Code 1501:9-3-06(H)(2)(c), holding (1) Omni had a clear legal right to, and Vendel had a clear legal duty to provide, a ruling on the validity of objections submitted against the applications; and (2) Omni did not suggest a basis for granting a writ of mandamus as to the division or to Mertz. View "State ex rel. Omni Energy Group, LLC v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil & Gas Resources Management" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the City of Cincinnati to repair and maintain two streets located within the City's boundaries, holding that the court of appeals' analysis eschewed a comprehensive mandamus discussion.Appellant sought a writ of mandamus to compel the City to repair and maintain the streets at issue, alleging that the City's neglect of the streets had resulted in unsafe conditions caused by inadequate water drainage. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the streets had never become public through either a statutory or a common-law dedication. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Platting Commission Act furnishes a means of achieving a statutory dedication; (2) the two streets at issue were the subject of a statutory dedication as of 1876; and (3) because the parties did not adequately brief the clear-legal-right and clear-legal-duty requirements of the mandamus standard, the cause is remanded for full application of the mandamus standard. View "State ex rel. Delta Lookout, LLC v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment for the State and denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the State to initiate property-appropriation proceedings in this regulatory-takings case, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether Appellant had suffered a total or partial taking.Appellant alleged that it had suffered a taking of its property when the Ohio Department of Natural Resources' Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management suspended Appellant's operation of one of its two saltwater-injection wells. The Division suspended the well's operation due to concerns that the well had induced two earthquakes in its vicinity. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for the State, determining that Appellant had suffered neither a total nor a partial governmental taking. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. View "State ex rel. AWMS Water Solutions, LLC v. Mertz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relator's application for an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs in this mandamus action, holding that attorney fees were not available.The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Department of Transportation and its director (ODOT) to conduct appropriation proceedings to determine the appropriate amount of compensation it should pay to New Wen, Inc., whose Wendy's restaurant was located at an intersection that ODOT closed. Thereafter, New Wen filed an application for attorney fees and other costs. ODOT opposed the application. The Supreme Court denied the application, holding that attorney fees were not available in this type of action. View "State ex rel. New Wen, Inc. v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment to the State and denying AWMS Water Solutions, LLC's petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Department of Natural Resources and others (collectively, the State) to initiate property-appropriation proceedings, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether AWMS had suffered a total or partial taking.AWMS, a disposer of waste from oil and gas production and drilling sites, obtained permits to drill and inject saltwater in wells on its property. After an earthquake occurred, AWMS was ordered to suspend its operations at one of its wells. In its petition for a writ of mandamus, AWMS alleged that a suspension order effected a governmental taking of its property requiring the State to pay just compensation. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for the State and denied the mandamus petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) AWMS was justified in pursuing compensation through a takings action and that its claim was ripe at the time it instituted its action; and (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the State's suspension of operations at the well deprived AWMS of all economically beneficial use of its leasehold. View "State ex rel. AWMS Water Solutions, LLC v. Mertz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting the city of Xenia's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Greene County Board of Commissioners (the county) to approve the city's annexation petition, holding that the city's petition satisfied the conditions of Ohio Rev. Code 709.23(E).The proposed annexation in this case concerned approximately forty-five acres of land located between Central State University and Xenia. The county denied the petition, determining that the petition did not satisfy section 709.023(E)(1), (4), (5), or (7). Thereafter, the city filed an original action in the court of appeals requesting a writ of mandamus compelling the county to approve the petition. The court of appeals issued the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a writ of mandamus is a proper vehicle to compel the county to grant the petition; and (2) the city's petition satisfied the conditions specified in section 709.023(E). View "State ex rel. Xenia v. Greene County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that B.E.B. Properties reserved the right to receive future rental payments for leased land underneath a cell tower when it conveyed the property, holding that the deed did not contain such a reservation.B.E.B. Properties leased a portion of commercial property it owned to a cellular telephone company, and a cellular tower was erected on the site. B.E.B. subsequently sold the property to Keith Baker and Joseph Cyvas. Thereafter, two of the general partners in B.E.B. sold their interests in the partnership to Bruce and Sheila Bird, who believed this transaction included the assignment of the right to receive rental payments for the tower. When LRC Realty, Inc. acquired the property it sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to the annual rental payments. The trial court granted summary judgment for LRC Realty. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Birds were entitled to rental payments based on the language contained in the deed transferring the property from B.E.B. to Baker and Cyvas. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) absent a reservation in the deed conveying the property, the right to receive rents runs with the land; and (2) the deed here did not create such a reservation. View "LRC Realty, Inc. v. B.E.B. Properties" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition sought by a property owner who was the subject of a board of revision foreclosure seeking to invalidate the foreclosure adjudication, holding that the board of revision did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction when it proceeded in the foreclosure action.The Cuyahoga Board of Revision (BOR) entered a judgment of foreclosure concerning real property owned by Elliott Feltner. More than a year later, Feltner filed this original action asserting multiple prohibition and mandamus claims against the BOR and others. The Supreme Court granted an alternative writ of prohibition as to two of the claims against the BOR and its members concerning whether the statutes under which the BOR proceeded violated the separation of powers doctrine or the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court then made a final determination denying the writ, holding (1) at the time of its judgment, the BOR acted with presumptively valid statutory authority and therefore did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed; and (2) this Court therefore has no authority to undo the BOR's final judgment and need not consider the merit of Feltner's constitutional challenge. View "State ex rel. Feltner v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision" on Justia Law