Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute over an unrecorded parking agreement related to an office building, hotel, and parking garage in downtown San Antonio. The agreement, executed in 2005, reserved parking spaces in the garage for the office building's occupants and was intended to run with the land. However, it was not recorded in the county's real property records. In 2006, HEI San Antonio Hotel, LP purchased the garage and hotel, financing the purchase through a loan from Merrill Lynch, which was aware of the parking agreement. In 2008, Cypress Real Estate Advisors, through its entity CRVI Crowne Plaza, purchased a note from Merrill Lynch but did not inquire about the parking agreement despite having access to relevant documents.The trial court ruled that the parking agreement was an enforceable easement and rejected the lender's and its affiliate's bona fide purchaser defenses. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas agreed that the agreement was an easement but concluded that the lender took the loan without notice of the easement, thus sheltering its affiliate from enforcement.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with both lower courts that the parking agreement is an easement. However, it disagreed with the Court of Appeals regarding the notice issue. The Supreme Court concluded that both the lender and its affiliated owner had sufficient notice to remove any bona fide purchaser protection. Therefore, the easement was enforceable against the affiliated owner.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "425 SOLEDAD, LTD. v. CRVI RIVERWALK HOSPITALITY, LLC" on Justia Law

Kenneth Hahn, who owns a non-participating royalty interest (NPRI) in a mineral estate leased by ConocoPhillips, disputed the amount of royalty owed to him. Hahn's NPRI was initially set at a fixed 1/8 share of production. The case centered on whether this share was reduced when Hahn ratified a subsequent lease by the mineral estate owner, which included its own royalty term, or when he signed a stipulation and cross-conveyance agreeing to accept a different royalty.The trial court denied Hahn's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the Gipses' motion, declaring that Hahn's NPRI was a floating fraction of the landowner's royalty. Hahn appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Hahn's NPRI was a fixed 1/8 share and that the stipulation could not alter this interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court again ruled in favor of ConocoPhillips, declaring that Hahn's ratification of the lease subjected his NPRI to the lease's royalty provision. Hahn appealed again.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that Hahn's ratification of the lease did not reduce his NPRI from a fixed to a floating fraction. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals regarding the stipulation and cross-conveyance. The Court held that the stipulation did effectively reduce Hahn's NPRI by conveying part of it to the mineral fee owner. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and rendered judgment that ConocoPhillips correctly calculated Hahn's share of proceeds from the production on the pooled unit. View "CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY v. HAHN" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a tax appraisal dispute involving Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc. (the Landfill) and Travis Central Appraisal District (the District). The Landfill owns 344 acres of land in Travis County, which it operates as a landfill. In 2019, the District appraised the market value of the landfill at $21,714,939. The Landfill protested this amount under the Tax Code provision requiring equal and uniform taxation but did not claim that the District’s appraised value was higher than the market value of the property. The appraisal review board reduced the appraised value of the subject property by nearly ninety percent. The District appealed to the trial court, claiming that the board erred in concluding that the District’s appraised value was not equal and uniform when compared with similarly situated properties. The District also claimed that the board’s appraised value was lower than the subject property’s true market value.The trial court granted the Landfill’s plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the challenge it made before the appraisal review board was an equal-and-uniform challenge, not one based on market value. Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider market value. However, the court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that a trial court’s review of an appraisal review board’s decision is not confined to the grounds the taxpayer asserted before the board.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. The court concluded that the Tax Code limits judicial review to conducting a de novo trial of the taxpayer’s protest. In deciding the taxpayer’s protest in this case, the trial court is to determine the equal and uniform appraised value for the property subject to taxation. This limit, though mandatory, is not jurisdictional. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "TEXAS DISPOSAL SYSTEMS LANDFILL, INC. v. TRAVIS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the use of a property in the River Plantation subdivision, which has been operated as a golf course since the subdivision's establishment. The River Plantation Community Improvement Association (the Association) sought a declaratory judgment that the golf course property is encumbered by an implied reciprocal negative easement restricting it to use solely as a golf course. The owners of the golf course property, River Plantation Properties, LLC and Preisler Golf Properties, LLC, counterclaimed for a declaration that the property is not so encumbered.The trial court granted summary judgment for the golf course property’s owners, holding it is not burdened by an implied reciprocal negative easement as a matter of law. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, noting that when the subdivision was developed, the developers retained the Reserves without placing any restrictions on their use, and the recitals in the property records put prospective lot owners on notice that the Reserves were excluded from the subdivision’s uniform plan.The Supreme Court of Texas agreed with the lower courts and affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment. The court held that the doctrine of implied reciprocal negative easements does not apply in this case. The Association's complaint was not that a substantial number of lots in the River Plantation subdivision were burdened by express restrictions when originally conveyed by the developer while others were not. Instead, the Association argued that the property should be burdened by an entirely different restriction: golf course use only. The court concluded that there are no substantially uniform express restrictions on the River Plantation lots that the Association claims give rise to similar restrictions on the golf course property. Therefore, the golf course property is not burdened by an implied reciprocal negative easement. View "River Plantation Community Improvement Assn. v. River Plantation Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

A nuisance lawsuit was brought by neighbors against two poultry farms located on a single tract of rural land in Henderson County, southeast of Dallas. The neighbors claimed that the odors from the farms were a nuisance, causing them discomfort and annoyance. A jury found that the odors were a temporary nuisance and the trial court granted permanent injunctive relief that effectively shut down the farms. The farm owners and operators appealed, challenging the injunction on three grounds: whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding imminent harm; whether equitable relief was unavailable because damages provide an adequate remedy; and whether the scope of the injunction is overly broad.The Supreme Court of Texas upheld the trial court’s authority to grant an injunction, rejecting the first two challenges. However, the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in crafting the scope of the injunction, which was broader than necessary to abate the nuisance. The court therefore reversed in part and remanded for the trial court to modify the scope of injunctive relief. View "HUYNH v. BLANCHARD" on Justia Law

Westwood Motorcars, LLC leased commercial property in Dallas to operate an automobile dealership. The lease was set to expire in 2013, but an addendum allowed Westwood to extend the lease for two additional 24-month terms. In 2015, ownership of the property changed hands and Virtuolotry, LLC became the new landlord. Westwood sought to exercise its option to extend the lease for the second additional term, but Virtuolotry’s lawyers refused, asserting that Westwood had breached the lease in numerous ways. Amidst this dispute, Westwood claimed that Virtuolotry and its manager, Richard Boyd, harassed Westwood at the premises, interfering with its business operations. Westwood sued Virtuolotry in district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had not breached the lease and that it had properly extended the lease for another two years. Virtuolotry sued in justice court to evict Westwood for unpaid rent, lease violations, and holding over unlawfully.The justice court ruled in favor of Virtuolotry, awarding it "possession only." Westwood appealed the judgment to the county court at law. However, a few weeks before the trial date, Westwood formally withdrew its appeal in county court, and the county court entered a “stipulate[d] and agree[d]” judgment ordering “that possession of the Premises is awarded” to Virtuolotry. Westwood fully vacated the property, but continued its pending suit in district court, adding claims for breach of contract (against Virtuolotry) and constructive eviction (against Virtuolotry and Boyd). The district court ruled in favor of Westwood, awarding damages and attorney’s fees.Virtuolotry and Boyd appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, ruling that by agreeing to the eviction-suit judgment in county court, Westwood “voluntarily abandoned the premises” and thus “extinguish[ed] any claim for damages.” Westwood then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' decision, ruling that the court of appeals erred by giving a judgment of possession from a court of limited jurisdiction preclusive effect over Westwood’s claim for damages in district court. The Supreme Court of Texas held that Westwood’s agreement to entry of the county-court judgment cannot reflect assent to anything more than what that judgment resolves—i.e., who receives immediate possession of the property. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "WESTWOOD MOTORCARS, LLC v. VIRTUOLOTRY, LLC" on Justia Law

Mark and Birgit Self owned a tract of rural land that adjoined a portion of Farm-to-Market Road 677 in Montague County, Texas. The Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) had a right-of-way easement that reached fifty feet from the centerline of the road in each direction, which burdened part of the Selfs’ property. As part of a highway maintenance project, TxDOT contracted with T.F.R. Enterprises, Inc. (TFR) to remove brush and trees from the right-of-way. TFR subcontracted with Lyellco Inc. to remove the trees. Following TxDOT’s instruction to TFR to “clear everything between the fences,” Lyellco workers cut all trees up to the Selfs’ fence line, including trees that were outside the State’s right-of-way easement. The Selfs sued TxDOT for negligence and inverse condemnation.The trial court denied TxDOT’s plea to the jurisdiction, asserting immunity from both causes of action. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that there was a fact issue on whether the Texas Tort Claims Act waived immunity for the negligence cause of action, but reversed the trial court’s judgment on the cause of action for inverse condemnation, holding there was no evidence that TxDOT intentionally destroyed the Selfs’ property.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals. It held that the Selfs had not shown either that the subcontractor’s employees were in TxDOT’s paid service or that other TxDOT employees operated or used the motor-driven equipment that cut down the trees, as required to waive immunity under the Tort Claims Act. Therefore, the negligence cause of action was dismissed. However, regarding inverse condemnation, the court found that the Selfs had alleged and offered evidence that TxDOT intentionally directed the destruction of the trees as part of clearing the right-of-way for public use. Therefore, the cause of action for inverse condemnation was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. SELF" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Harley Channelview Properties, LLC (Channelview) and Harley Marine Gulf, LLC (Harley Marine) over a property lease agreement. The original lease, signed in 2011, included a provision granting Harley Marine an option to purchase the property. In 2012, Channelview bought the property, subject to the Harley Marine lease. Over time, Channelview concluded that Harley Marine's purchase option had expired, and it invested $15 million in property improvements. However, Harley Marine believed the purchase option was still valid and attempted to buy the property in 2020. When Channelview refused to transfer the property, Harley Marine sued for breach of contract and sought specific performance.The trial court granted Harley Marine's motion for partial summary judgment on its contract claim and ordered Channelview to transfer the property title to Harley Marine within 30 days, even though the court acknowledged that its ruling was "interlocutory" and other issues remained unresolved. Channelview appealed, arguing that the trial court's order was equivalent to a temporary injunction.The court of appeals dismissed Channelview's appeal, ruling that the trial court had granted "permanent" relief, and thus the order was not a "temporary" injunction from which an appeal could be taken. Channelview then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' decision. The court held that the trial court's order had the character and function of a temporary injunction because it required immediate action based on an interim ruling that a claim had merit and was effective during the pendency of the suit. The court noted that the order was "interlocutory," not final, and the trial court could modify it at any time until final judgment. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of the merits of the appeal. View "HARLEY CHANNELVIEW PROPERTIES, LLC v. HARLEY MARINE GULF, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a construction dispute where several homeowners in the San Marcial neighborhood sued Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc., for negligence and gross negligence. The homeowners alleged that the company's misuse of heavy equipment and faulty construction techniques caused damage to their homes during the construction of a drainage pipeline. They sought actual damages to restore their properties and exemplary damages based on gross negligence.The trial court found Renda Contracting negligent and grossly negligent. However, the jury was not unanimous in deciding the amount of exemplary damages, with ten out of twelve jurors agreeing. Consequently, the trial court omitted exemplary damages from the judgment. The homeowners appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the decision, arguing that unanimity as to exemplary damages could be implied despite a divided verdict.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment. The court held that under Section 41.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a court may not imply a unanimous jury finding in imposing exemplary damages. The burden to secure a unanimous verdict is on the plaintiff and "may not be shifted." The court concluded that the plaintiff bears the burden to obtain the findings necessary to impose exemplary damages, including that the jury is unanimous as to any amount of exemplary damages awarded. It is the plaintiff who must challenge a divided verdict as infirm or in need of clarification. View "OSCAR RENDA CONTRACTING, INC. v. BRUCE" on Justia Law

The case involves successors in interest of mineral-rights holders who sued in 2019 to declare a 1999 judgment foreclosing on their predecessors’ property for delinquent taxes as void. They argued that there was constitutionally inadequate notice of the foreclosure suit, rendering the foreclosure judgment and the tax sale that followed both void. The current owners sought traditional summary judgment based on the Tax Code’s command that an action relating to the title to property against the purchaser of the property at a tax sale may not be commenced later than one year after the date that the deed executed to the purchaser at the tax sale is filed of record.The trial court granted the current owners' motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The majority held that the sheriff’s deed conclusively established the accrual date for limitations, so the burden shifted to the successors to adduce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a due-process violation that could render the statute of limitations inoperable. Because the successors relied only on their arguments and presented no evidence of a due-process violation, the majority concluded, the current owners were entitled to summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas held that under Draughon v. Johnson, the nonmovant seeking to avoid the limitations bar by raising a due-process challenge bears the burden to adduce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact about whether the underlying judgment is actually void for lack of due process. Because the nonmovant here adduced no such evidence, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment based on Section 33.54(a)(1). However, the court also noted that the law governing this case has undergone meaningful refinement since the summary-judgment proceedings took place. Given these recent and substantial developments in the relevant law, the court remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings in the interest of justice. View "GILL v. HILL" on Justia Law