Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Texas
TENARIS BAY CITY INC. v. ELLISOR
Hurricane Harvey caused significant flooding in Texas in 2017. Homeowners in Matagorda County sued Tenaris Bay City Inc., a nearby pipeline manufacturing company, alleging that design defects at its facility caused flood damage to their homes. The plaintiffs claimed negligence, gross negligence, negligence per se, and negligent nuisance. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the court of appeals affirmed the decision.The district court directed a verdict on gross negligence in favor of Tenaris but submitted the other negligence theories to the jury. The jury found Tenaris liable on all three negligence theories, and the district court rendered judgment for $2.8 million plus interest. Tenaris appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case, focusing on whether the plaintiffs proved that Tenaris's negligence was the cause of the flooding. The court concluded that there was legally insufficient evidence to show that the plaintiffs' homes would not have flooded but for Tenaris's actions. The plaintiffs' expert witness admitted he had not conducted the necessary scientific analysis to determine the cause of the flooding at the specific properties. The court emphasized that in cases of catastrophic rainfall, proving causation requires reliable evidence that the defendant's actions were the but-for cause of the damage.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgments of the lower courts and rendered judgment for Tenaris, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that their flood damage would not have occurred without Tenaris's alleged negligence. View "TENARIS BAY CITY INC. v. ELLISOR" on Justia Law
MYERS-WOODWARD, LLC v. UNDERGROUND SERVICES MARKHAM, LLC
Myers-Woodward, LLC (Myers) owns 160 acres in Matagorda County, Texas. In 1947, Myers’s predecessors retained the surface estate but transferred the mineral estate to the predecessor of Underground Services Markham, LLC and United Brine Pipeline Company, LLC (collectively, USM). The mineral deed granted USM’s predecessor an interest in all oil, gas, and other minerals on the land, along with rights necessary for mining and transporting these minerals. In 2008, USM acquired all of Texas Brine Company’s interest in the salt on the property. Disputes arose over the ownership of caverns created by salt mining and the calculation of royalties owed to Myers.The district court ruled that USM owned the subsurface caverns created by its salt mining activities but denied USM’s request to use the caverns for storing hydrocarbons produced off-site. The court agreed with Myers that USM could only use the land for purposes specified in the 1947 deed. Regarding royalties, the district court ruled that Myers was entitled to a one-eighth royalty based on the market value of the salt at the point of production, which amounted to $258,850.41. Myers appealed, challenging the royalty calculation and the ownership of the caverns. USM cross-appealed, contesting the limitation on its use of the caverns.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision that Myers, as the surface estate owner, retains ownership of the empty spaces within the salt formations. The court held that the mineral estate does not include ownership of the empty spaces created by salt mining. However, the court reversed the lower courts’ calculation of Myers’s royalty payments, ruling that Myers is entitled to an in-kind royalty of one-eighth of the net proceeds from the sale of the salt. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "MYERS-WOODWARD, LLC v. UNDERGROUND SERVICES MARKHAM, LLC" on Justia Law
THOMPSON v. LANDRY
Cindy Thompson, individually and as heir of Charles Thompson, and CC & T Investments, LLC, sought to void a default judgment and a subsequent purchaser’s deed, claiming the taxing authorities failed to properly serve her with suit papers, leading to foreclosure of tax liens. The subsequent purchaser, Mae Landry, argued that Thompson had notice of the property’s sale years before the collateral attack.The trial court sustained the collateral attack, setting aside the default judgment and tax sale. The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed, holding that fact issues exist regarding the adequacy of service in the underlying tax suit. The subsequent purchaser petitioned for review, asserting that the owner’s notice of the property’s sale years earlier defeats her claim as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Texas held that a property owner may not set aside a subsequent property purchase on due process grounds if the owner obtained notice of the default judgment or the property’s sale during the statutory limitations and redemption period. Such an owner has notice of any due process violation in time to assert a legal remedy. Additionally, a subsequent purchaser may advance equitable defenses against a collateral attack if a prior owner unreasonably delays, to the current owner’s detriment, in suing to quiet title after obtaining notice of the judgment or the property’s sale. However, the evidence in this case fails to conclusively demonstrate the date of such notice.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "THOMPSON v. LANDRY" on Justia Law
ELLIOTT v. CITY OF COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS
Two property owners in the extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) of College Station, Texas, challenged city ordinances regulating off-premise signage and driveway construction. They argued that these regulations, imposed without granting them the right to vote in city elections, violated the Texas Constitution's requirement for a "republican form of government." The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the ordinances were void and unenforceable.The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, agreeing with the City that the form of local government is a political question for the legislature, not the courts. The plaintiffs appealed, but while the appeal was pending, the legislature amended the law to allow ETJ residents to unilaterally opt out of a city's ETJ. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District of Texas affirmed the trial court's dismissal, not addressing the new statutory opt-out provision.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the legislative change provided a nonjudicial remedy that could moot the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The court vacated the lower court judgments and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to abate the proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to complete the opt-out process. The court emphasized the importance of judicial restraint and constitutional avoidance, noting that the new law offered a means of relief that should be pursued before addressing broader constitutional questions. View "ELLIOTT v. CITY OF COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS" on Justia Law
PDT HOLDINGS, INC. v. CITY OF DALLAS
A builder, PDT Holdings, Inc. and Phillip Thompson Homes, Inc., sought to construct a duplex townhome in Dallas. They met with city officials multiple times to verify applicable restrictions and were informed of a 36-foot maximum building height limit. The builder submitted a construction plan for a 36-foot-high duplex, which the city approved. During construction, the city issued a stop-work order due to a parapet wall exceeding the height limit, which the builder corrected. Later, the city issued another stop-work order, citing a violation of the residential-proximity-slope (RPS) ordinance, which limited the height to 26 feet. Despite this, the city lifted the stop-work order, allowing the builder to complete the duplex.The builder applied for a variance from the Board of Adjustment (BOA) but was denied. They then sued the city, seeking to estop it from enforcing the RPS ordinance. The trial court ruled in favor of the builder, finding that the city was estopped from enforcing the ordinance. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the city’s mistake in issuing the permit did not warrant estoppel.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court's judgment was supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court found that city officials had affirmatively misled the builder about the height limit and that the builder had relied on these misrepresentations to their detriment. The court also determined that this was an exceptional case where estoppel was necessary to prevent manifest injustice and that estopping the city would not interfere with its governmental functions. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, estopping the city from enforcing the RPS ordinance against the builder. View "PDT HOLDINGS, INC. v. CITY OF DALLAS" on Justia Law
FIRST SABREPOINT CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. v. FARMLAND PARTNERS INC.
A Colorado real estate investment trust sued a Texas hedge fund and its employees for damages caused by an allegedly defamatory article published under a pseudonym. The claims were dismissed in Colorado federal court for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trust then sued in Texas state court. The defendants moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) and for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. The trial court granted both motions.The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the trial court lacked authority to grant the TCPA motion after it was overruled by operation of law and that the defendants failed to conclusively establish that collateral estoppel barred the claims. The appellate court determined that the Colorado court's findings on personal jurisdiction did not preclude the Texas claims and that the addition of new defendants in Texas further demonstrated that the issues were not identical.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It agreed with the appellate court that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on their collateral estoppel defense. However, it found that the appellate court erred in holding that the order granting the TCPA motion was void. The Supreme Court of Texas concluded that the trial court's error in granting the TCPA motion outside the statutory deadline was harmless because it occurred within the time frame in which the defendants could have appealed the denial by operation of law. The case was remanded to the appellate court to address the TCPA motion on its merits. View "FIRST SABREPOINT CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. v. FARMLAND PARTNERS INC." on Justia Law
KENSINGTON TITLE-NEVADA, LLC v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Kensington Title-Nevada, LLC, a Nevada-based real estate company, acquired property in Denton, Texas, which contained radioactive materials owned by US Radiopharmaceuticals, Inc. (USR). The Texas Department of State Health Services had denied USR’s application for a radioactive material license and ordered decommissioning of the materials. Kensington proposed a decommissioning plan, which the Department approved, and a licensed contractor began the cleanup. However, Kensington faced conflicting demands from the Department and local taxing entities, leading to a halt in decommissioning.The Department issued a notice of violation to Kensington for possessing radioactive material without a license and sought an $8,000 penalty. Kensington amended its pleading in an ongoing tax dispute to seek a declaratory judgment under Section 2001.038(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the licensing rule did not apply to it as it did not own or possess the radioactive material. The trial court denied the Department’s plea to the jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Kensington failed to allege a proper rule-applicability challenge.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Kensington had standing to seek a declaratory judgment under Section 2001.038(a). The Court found that Kensington’s allegations of interference with its legal rights due to the Department’s notice of violation were sufficient to establish standing. The Court also concluded that Kensington’s challenge to the applicability of the licensing rule was within the scope of the statute’s waiver of immunity. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "KENSINGTON TITLE-NEVADA, LLC v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES" on Justia Law
THE COMMONS OF LAKE HOUSTON, LTD. v. CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS
After Hurricane Harvey in 2017, the City of Houston amended its ordinances to increase elevation requirements for construction in floodplains. A developer, The Commons of Lake Houston, Ltd., sued the City, claiming the amendments caused a regulatory taking of its property under the Texas Constitution. The developer argued that the new requirements rendered a significant portion of its property undevelopable, leading to financial losses.The trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed and dismissed the case. The appellate court held that the developer could not establish a valid takings claim because the City amended the ordinance as a valid exercise of its police power and to comply with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) criteria.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the appellate court's reasoning. The Court held that a regulation could cause a compensable taking even if it results from a valid exercise of the government’s police power or is designed to comply with the NFIP. The Court also found that the developer’s claim was ripe for adjudication, as the City had effectively made it clear that the developer could not obtain the necessary permits under the new ordinance. Additionally, the Court determined that the developer had standing to assert its claim, as it possessed a vested interest in the property affected by the ordinance.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether the amended ordinance caused a compensable taking under the Texas Constitution. View "THE COMMONS OF LAKE HOUSTON, LTD. v. CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS" on Justia Law
425 SOLEDAD, LTD. v. CRVI RIVERWALK HOSPITALITY, LLC
This case involves a dispute over an unrecorded parking agreement related to an office building, hotel, and parking garage in downtown San Antonio. The agreement, executed in 2005, reserved parking spaces in the garage for the office building's occupants and was intended to run with the land. However, it was not recorded in the county's real property records. In 2006, HEI San Antonio Hotel, LP purchased the garage and hotel, financing the purchase through a loan from Merrill Lynch, which was aware of the parking agreement. In 2008, Cypress Real Estate Advisors, through its entity CRVI Crowne Plaza, purchased a note from Merrill Lynch but did not inquire about the parking agreement despite having access to relevant documents.The trial court ruled that the parking agreement was an enforceable easement and rejected the lender's and its affiliate's bona fide purchaser defenses. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas agreed that the agreement was an easement but concluded that the lender took the loan without notice of the easement, thus sheltering its affiliate from enforcement.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with both lower courts that the parking agreement is an easement. However, it disagreed with the Court of Appeals regarding the notice issue. The Supreme Court concluded that both the lender and its affiliated owner had sufficient notice to remove any bona fide purchaser protection. Therefore, the easement was enforceable against the affiliated owner.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "425 SOLEDAD, LTD. v. CRVI RIVERWALK HOSPITALITY, LLC" on Justia Law
CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY v. HAHN
Kenneth Hahn, who owns a non-participating royalty interest (NPRI) in a mineral estate leased by ConocoPhillips, disputed the amount of royalty owed to him. Hahn's NPRI was initially set at a fixed 1/8 share of production. The case centered on whether this share was reduced when Hahn ratified a subsequent lease by the mineral estate owner, which included its own royalty term, or when he signed a stipulation and cross-conveyance agreeing to accept a different royalty.The trial court denied Hahn's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the Gipses' motion, declaring that Hahn's NPRI was a floating fraction of the landowner's royalty. Hahn appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Hahn's NPRI was a fixed 1/8 share and that the stipulation could not alter this interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court again ruled in favor of ConocoPhillips, declaring that Hahn's ratification of the lease subjected his NPRI to the lease's royalty provision. Hahn appealed again.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that Hahn's ratification of the lease did not reduce his NPRI from a fixed to a floating fraction. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals regarding the stipulation and cross-conveyance. The Court held that the stipulation did effectively reduce Hahn's NPRI by conveying part of it to the mineral fee owner. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and rendered judgment that ConocoPhillips correctly calculated Hahn's share of proceeds from the production on the pooled unit. View "CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY v. HAHN" on Justia Law