Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The pro-forma provision in the tariff in this case, which set the rates and terms for a utility’s relationship with its retail customers, did not conflict with a prior franchise agreement, which reflected the common law rule requiring utilities to pay public right-of-way relocation costs, or the common law, and the franchise agreement controlled as to the relocation costs at issue.At issue was whether the City of Richardson or Oncor Electric Delivery Company must pay relocation costs to accommodate changes to public rights-of-way. The City negotiated a franchise agreement with Oncor requiring Oncor to bear the costs of relocating its equipment and facilities to accommodate changes to public rights-of-way, but Oncor refused to pay such costs. While the relocation dispute was pending, Oncor filed a case with the Public Utility Commission (PUC) seeking to alter its rates. The case was settled, and the resulting rate change was filed as a tariff with the PUC. The City enacted an ordinance consistent with the tariff, which included the pro-forma provision at issue. The Supreme Court held that the provision in the tariff did not conflict with the franchise contract’s requirement that Oncor pay the right-of-way relocation costs at issue. View "City of Richardson v. Oncor Electric Delivery Co." on Justia Law

The pro-forma provision in the tariff in this case, which set the rates and terms for a utility’s relationship with its retail customers, did not conflict with a prior franchise agreement, which reflected the common law rule requiring utilities to pay public right-of-way relocation costs, or the common law, and the franchise agreement controlled as to the relocation costs at issue.At issue was whether the City of Richardson or Oncor Electric Delivery Company must pay relocation costs to accommodate changes to public rights-of-way. The City negotiated a franchise agreement with Oncor requiring Oncor to bear the costs of relocating its equipment and facilities to accommodate changes to public rights-of-way, but Oncor refused to pay such costs. While the relocation dispute was pending, Oncor filed a case with the Public Utility Commission (PUC) seeking to alter its rates. The case was settled, and the resulting rate change was filed as a tariff with the PUC. The City enacted an ordinance consistent with the tariff, which included the pro-forma provision at issue. The Supreme Court held that the provision in the tariff did not conflict with the franchise contract’s requirement that Oncor pay the right-of-way relocation costs at issue. View "City of Richardson v. Oncor Electric Delivery Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal from a slander-of-title judgment was how the special or economic damages should be measured.When Marc Pieroni and Bonnie Allen-Pieroni divorced, Bonnie was awarded $500,000, which Marc paid in monthly installments. Thereafter, Marc purchased a new home, and Bonnie recorded in the county property record an abstract of judgment reflecting Marc’s $500,000 debt from the divorce decree, thus creating an ostensible lien on Marc’s property. When Marc was preparing to close on the sale of his property years later, the sale fell through because Bonnie refused to release her lien. Marc sued Bonnie to quiet title and for damages, asserting an equitable action to remove her lien and a tort action for slander of title. The trial court rendered judgment for Marc and awarded damages of $98,438. The court awarded damages based in part on the difference between the disparaged property’s contract price and the owner’s mortgage balance - the amount the property owner would have received from the property’s sale but for the defendant’s disparagement of his title. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the damages awarded for slander of title were based in part on an erroneous measure and unsupported by the evidence. Remanded. View "Allen-Pieroni v. Pieroni" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court’s judgment awarding a constructive trust to Longview Energy Company on certain mineral leases and related property and requiring the disgorgement of money derived from past lease production revenues.Longview sued two of its directors and entities associated with them after discovering that one of the entities had purchased mineral leases in an area where Longview had been investigating the possibility of buying leases. The jury found (1) the directors breached their fiduciary duties to Longview by usurping a corporate opportunity and by competing with the corporation without disclosing the competition, and (2) the entity as issue acquired leases as a result of the breaches. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no evidence tracing the entity’s acquisition of any specific leases to any assumed breaches, and therefore, the trial court erred by imposing the constructive trust on and requiring the transfer of leases and properties to Longview; and (2) there was no evidence to support the trial court’s damages award. View "Longview Energy Co. v. Huff Energy Fund LP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals, which dismissed Petitioners’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Petitioners timely filed their interlocutory appeal.Respondent filed suit against several parties, including Petitioners - municipal development corporations (MDCs) - alleging that negligent construction of a municipal hiking and walking path caused damming, resulting in damage to his property. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Respondent’s claims lacked a jurisdictional basis. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss as to some claims but denied relief as to all other claims. The MDCs subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims for injunctive relief, arguing that Respondent’s claims lacked a jurisdictional basis and evidentiary merit. The trial court denied the motion, and the MDCs appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the MDCs’ appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the MDCs’ hybrid motion for summary judgment was not a mere motion for reconsideration but, rather, a distinct motion that merited an independent twenty-day interlocutory appeal period. View "City of Magnolia 4A Economic Development Corp. v. Smedley" on Justia Law

Tex. Prop. Code 12.0071, the lis pendens expunction statute, does not legally eradicate coextensive information that may be obtained independently of the information contained in the notice of underlying litigation.Two companies (collectively, Defendants) each bought real property involved in a title dispute. Notices of lis pendens were filed on the pieces of property involved in the suit. The trial court subsequently expunged the notices of lis penden. Claiming bona-fide-purchaser status, Defendants each filed summary judgment motions, claiming that they lawfully relied on the trial court’s expungement order, which voided any notice derived from the lis pendens. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that section 12.0071 extinguished actual and constructive notice of the title dispute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the unresolved fact issue of whether Defendants had actual, independent knowledge of the issues covered by the lis pendens notice precluded summary judgment; and (2) Defendants have not established bona fide purchaser status simply by relying on the expungement order. View "Sommers v. Sandcastle Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

In dispute in this case were 1991 deeds purporting to pass title of all the grantors’ mineral interests in Harrison County to Petitioners. In 2011, the grantors deed to Respondent the same interests they had conveyed to Petitioners. Respondent then sued Petitioners to quiet title to mineral interests, asserting that the property descriptions and general granting clause in the 1991 deeds were insufficient to satisfy the Statue of Frauds because the property conveyed was not identified with reasonable certainty. The trial court granted summary judgment for Petitioners on the title issue and rendered a take-nothing judgment against Respondent. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the general granting clause was ambiguous. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment that Respondent take nothing, holding that the general grants in the 1991 deeds were valid and unambiguous, conveying title of the grantors’ Harrison County mineral interests to Petitioners. View "Davis v. Mueller" on Justia Law

While the Supreme Court was asked in this case to recognize tortious interference with an inheritance as a viable cause of action in Texas, the court was not persuaded to consider it because Petitioners and cross-respondents, the Kinsels, had an adequate remedy in this case.In this case involving the sale of a ranch, the Kinsels sought damages for tortious interference with their inheritances, statutory and common-law fraud, and conspiracy. The jury found for the Kinsels on every claim. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s award of damages for tortious interference with an inheritance on the basis that neither the Texas legislature nor the Supreme Court has recognized that cause of action. On appeal, the Kinsels urged the Supreme Court to recognize tortious interference with an inheritance as a cause of action and uphold their recovery. The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the facts of this case did not warrant an enlargement of this state’s body of tort law, as the law provided an adequate remedy in this case - a constructive trust imposed on the disputed inheritance. View "Kinsel v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

Respondent, who owned a ranch, sued Petitioner, which produced natural gas on the ranch, for underpayment of royalties and underproduction of its lease. The parties resolved their dispute with two agreements that contained an arbitration provision. Respondent later sued Petitioner for environmental contamination and improper disposal of hazardous materials on the ranch. Before arbitration commenced, Respondent asked the Railroad Commission (RRC) to investigate contamination of the ranch by Petitioner. Meanwhile, an arbitration panel awarded Respondent $15 million for actual damages and $500,000 for exemplary damages. At issue on appeal was whether the RRC had exclusive or primary jurisdiction over Respondent’s claims, precluding the arbitration, and whether the arbitration award should be vacated for the evident partiality of a neutral arbitrator or because the arbitrators exceeded their powers. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding (1) because Respondent’s claims were inherently judicial, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not apply, and vacatur was not warranted for failure to abate the arbitration hearing; and (2) the arbitrators did not exceed their authority. View "Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio Land & Cattle Co." on Justia Law

T-4 permit to Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC to obtain common-carrier status, which would give it eminent domain authority pursuant to the Natural Resources Code. Denbury Green, which was formed to build and operate a carbon dioxide pipeline known as “the Green Line” as a common carrier in Texas, filed suit against Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. for an injunction allowing access to certain tracts of land so that it could complete a pipeline survey. While the suit was pending, Denbury Green took possession of Texas Rice’s property pursuant to Tex. Prop. Code 21-021(a). The trial court concluded that Denbury Green was a common carrier with eminent domain authority. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with the common-carrier test the Court established. The trial court granted summary judgment for Denbury Green. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that reasonable mind could differ regarding whether, at the time Denbury Green intended to build the Green Line, a reasonable probability existed that Green Line would serve the public. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Denbury Green is a common carrier as a matter of law. View "Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC v. Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd." on Justia Law