Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent, who owned a ranch, sued Petitioner, which produced natural gas on the ranch, for underpayment of royalties and underproduction of its lease. The parties resolved their dispute with two agreements that contained an arbitration provision. Respondent later sued Petitioner for environmental contamination and improper disposal of hazardous materials on the ranch. Before arbitration commenced, Respondent asked the Railroad Commission (RRC) to investigate contamination of the ranch by Petitioner. Meanwhile, an arbitration panel awarded Respondent $15 million for actual damages and $500,000 for exemplary damages. At issue on appeal was whether the RRC had exclusive or primary jurisdiction over Respondent’s claims, precluding the arbitration, and whether the arbitration award should be vacated for the evident partiality of a neutral arbitrator or because the arbitrators exceeded their powers. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding (1) because Respondent’s claims were inherently judicial, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not apply, and vacatur was not warranted for failure to abate the arbitration hearing; and (2) the arbitrators did not exceed their authority. View "Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio Land & Cattle Co." on Justia Law

T-4 permit to Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC to obtain common-carrier status, which would give it eminent domain authority pursuant to the Natural Resources Code. Denbury Green, which was formed to build and operate a carbon dioxide pipeline known as “the Green Line” as a common carrier in Texas, filed suit against Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. for an injunction allowing access to certain tracts of land so that it could complete a pipeline survey. While the suit was pending, Denbury Green took possession of Texas Rice’s property pursuant to Tex. Prop. Code 21-021(a). The trial court concluded that Denbury Green was a common carrier with eminent domain authority. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with the common-carrier test the Court established. The trial court granted summary judgment for Denbury Green. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that reasonable mind could differ regarding whether, at the time Denbury Green intended to build the Green Line, a reasonable probability existed that Green Line would serve the public. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Denbury Green is a common carrier as a matter of law. View "Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC v. Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd." on Justia Law

In this case the trial court entered judgment terminating a bottom lease based on jury findings that the lease failed to produce in paying quantities over a specified period of time. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding (1) the rule against perpetuities did not invalidate the top lease, and (2) the trial court erred in charging the jury on the production-in-paying-quantities question. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly remanded for a new trial where (1) the top lease did not violate the rule against perpetuities; and (2) the trial court erred in charging the jury on cessation of production in paying quantities. View "BP America Production Co. v. Laddex, Ltd." on Justia Law

In appraising real property, an appraisal district may choose to divide a single tract into multiple accounts for various reasons. Valero Refining-Texas L.P. (Valero), the property owner in this case, protested some, but not all, of those accounts and not the valuation of the whole tract, claiming unequal taxation. Galveston Central Appraisal District moved for want of jurisdiction, arguing that an equal-and-uniform challenge can be determined only if made to the appraised value of the entire tract, not just to some of the component tax accounts. The trial court denied the motion. After a trial, the jury found that the property had been appraised unequally. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict. The District appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine an unequal appraisal challenge to anything but an entire tract. The court of appeals rejected the jurisdiction argument, concluding that the issue was one of fact, but ruling that there was no evidence to support the verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction of Valero’s appeal; (2) there was some evidence to support the jury’s findings; and (3) as a matter of law, appraisals of individual accounts may be challenged as unequal. View "Valero Refining - Texas, L.P. v. Galveston Central Appraisal District" on Justia Law

An oil-and-gas lessor sued the lessee for failure to pay royalties. The trial court concluded that the lessor’s neighboring landowners were necessary parties to the suit and dismissed the case without prejudice because the lessor failed to join them. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring joinder. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abuse its discretion in requiring joinder under Tex. R. Civ. P. 39 and dismissing the case because the adjacent landowners did not claim an interest relating to the subject of the lessor’s suit against the lessee. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Crawford v. XTO Energy, Inc" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the interpretation a land description in an option contract between Landowners and an oil and gas company (Company). Landowners argued that the description excluded a 400-acre tract. Company argued that the description included the 400-acre tract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Company. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the option contract was ambiguous and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that Landowners’ interpretation of the contract was the only reasonable interpretation, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in holding that the contract was ambiguous. Remanded. View "North Shore Energy, L.L.C. v. Harkins" on Justia Law

Homeowners’ association River Oaks Property Owners, Inc. (ROPO) sued homeowner Carolyn Keenan seeking an injunction requiring Keenan to remove improvements that allegedly violated a limit on impervious cover. The limit was found in 2006 “Amended Restrictions” that purported to amend the neighborhood’s deed restrictions. Keenan counterclaimed, asserting that the Amendment Restrictions were unenforceable because an insufficient number of homeowners had voted for them. Keenan moved to compel production of the homeowner ballots on the Amended Restrictions after ROPO asserted that the ballots were confidential and privileged voting records. The trial court refused to order production of the ballots but stated that Keenan’s counsel could review the ballots without disclosing the contents "to anyone else." Keenan sought mandamus relief. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court disagreed and conditionally granted relief, holding that Keenan was entitled to copy the ballots and disclose them for purposes of discovery, expert analysis, trial preparation, and trial. View "In re Carolyn Frost Keenan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, about 400 homeowners whose homes were located in the upper White Oak Bayou watershed of Harris County, filed suit against the County, asserting a takings cause of action. Plaintiffs claim that the flooding of their homes was caused by the County’s approval of “unmitigated” upstream development, combined with a failure to fully implement the Pate Plan, a flood-control plan. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the County's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that, assuming all disputed facts in favor of the homeowners, the record is clear that the County never harbored a desire to cause flooding anywhere. In this case, assuming that a cause of the flooding was the affirmative act of approving private development, there indisputably were other causes: heavy rainfall, and, according to the homeowners themselves, the failure to fully implement the flood-control measures of the Pate Plan. The court concluded that the confluence of these circumstances does not give rise to a takings claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the case. View "Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr" on Justia Law

The Tarrant Regional Water District supplies water to two million Texans across 11 counties and is a governmental agency with the power of eminent domain. In 2010, the Water District and the City of Dallas approved a financing agreement to build a 150-mile pipeline to transport water owned by Dallas in Lake Palestine to the Dallas/Fort Worth area. Construction began in 2014. The proposed route crosses the 1,000-acre LazyW Ranch five miles northwest of Athens in Henderson County, with a 150-foot-wide underground easement, about 3,375 feet long, covering 11.623 acres. The owner, Bennett, opposed to the project, obtained legislation creating the LazyW District, a municipal utility district. Bennett sued the Water District for violating the Texas Open Meetings Act; the court of appeals concluded that the Water District was immune from suit. Bennett repeatedly tried, unsuccessfully, to replace incumbent board members who support the Project’s use of the Ranch and dedicated a small cemetery on the Ranch in the proposed pipeline's path. The Water District offered the Lazy W $169,218 for the easement, and when the offer was rejected, petitioned for condemnation. Bennett asserted governmental immunity. The court refused to proceed further without deciding whether the case should be dismissed. The court of appeals granted mandamus relief. The Supreme Court of Texas vacated, rejecting an argument that the trial court cannot rule on the Lazy W’s plea to the jurisdiction until the commissioners issue their award. It is important that the special commissioners convene and render an award expeditiously and without interference from the court. The trial court had the obligation to consider the Lazy W’s assertion of immunity when the plea to the jurisdiction was filed. View "In re Lazy W Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

The Town of Lakewood Village, a Type A general-law municipality in Denton County, has a population of 620; its extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) extends one half-mile beyond its boundaries. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code 42.021(a)(1). The ETJ encompasses part of the Sunrise Bay subdivision. Other parts of the Subdivision are within the city limits and ETJ of Little Elm, a home-rule city that has a larger population. When developers planned the subdivision in the mid-1990s, Little Elm and Denton County approved the final plat. The developers did not file a plat with the Town, which does not provide any services to the Subdivision. Little Elm provides water to the Subdivision. Little Elm and Denton County maintain its roads. In 2013, Bizios purchased a Subdivision lot, located entirely within the Town’s ETJ. Bizios obtained approvals and permits from Denton County, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Subdivision’s architectural review committee. The County inspected the construction. Bizios did not obtain building permits from the Town, although its ordinances adopt building codes and make them enforceable within its ETJ. The Town filed suit after Bizios ignored its orders to stop construction. The trial court granted the Town a temporary injunction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court of Texas agreed that a Type A general-law municipality does not have authority to enforce its building codes and building-permit requirements within its extraterritorial jurisdiction. View "Town of Lakewood Village v. Bizios" on Justia Law