Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Texas Optometry Act prohibits commercial retailers of ophthalmic goods from attempting to control the practice of optometry; authorizes the Optometry Board and the Attorney General to sue a violator for a civil penalty; and provides that “[a] person injured as a result of a violation . . . is entitled to the remedies. In 1992, Wal-Mart opened “Vision Centers” in its Texas retail stores, selling ophthalmic goods. Wal-Mart leased office space to optometrists. A typical lease required the optometrist to keep the office open at least 45 hours per week or pay liquidated damages. In 1995, the Board advised Wal-Mart that the requirement violated the Act. Wal-Mart dropped the requirement and changed its lease form, allowing the optometrist to insert hours of operation. In 1998, the Board opined that any commercial lease referencing an optometrist’s hours violated the Act; in 2003, the Board notified Wal-Mart that it violated the Act by informing optometrists that customers were requesting longer hours. Optometrists sued, alleging that during lease negotiations, Wal-Mart indicated what hours they should include in the lease and that they were pressured to work longer hours. They did not claim actual harm. A jury awarded civil penalties and attorney fees. The Fifth Circuit certified the question of whether such civil penalties, when sought by a private person, are exemplary damages limited by the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 41. The Texas Supreme Court responded in the affirmative, noting that “the certified questions assume, perhaps incorrectly, that the Act authorizes recovery of civil penalties by a private person, rather than only by the Board or the Attorney General.” View "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Forte" on Justia Law

Garofolo took out a $159,700 home-equity loan. She made timely payments and paid off the loan in, 2014. Ocwen had become the note’s holder. A release of lien was promptly recorded in Travis County, but Garofolo did not receive a release of lien in recordable form as required by her loan’s terms. Garofolo notified Ocwen she had not received the document. Upon passage of 60 days following that notification, and still without the release, Garofolo sued, alleging violation of the home-equity lending provisions of the Texas Constitution and breach of contract. She sought forfeiture of all principal and interest paid on the loan. The federal district court dismissed. The Fifth Circuit certified questions of law to the Texas Supreme Court, which responded that the constitution lays out the terms and conditions a home equity loan must include if the lender wishes to foreclose on a homestead following borrower default, but does not create a constitutional cause of action or remedy for a lender’s breach of those conditions. A post-origination breach of terms and conditions may give rise to a breach-of-contract claim for which forfeiture can sometimes be an appropriate remedy. When forfeiture is unavailable, the borrower must show actual damages or seek some other remedy such as specific performance. View "Garofolo v. Ocwen Loan Serv., L.L.C." on Justia Law

Shortly after the City of Houston enacted a drainage-free ordinance, Houston Belt & Terminal Railway, BNSF Railway, and Union Pacific Railway (collectively, the Railroads) received notices of proposed charges for their properties in Houston. Daniel Krueger, the City’s Director of Public Works and Engineering, determined that the properties were “benefitted” and thus subject to drainage charges and determined that the Railroads should pay roughly $3 million based on their benefitted properties’ “impervious surface” area. The Railroads filed suit against the City and Krueger in his official capacity, alleging ultra vires claims against Krueger and seeking prospective injunctive relief. The trial court sustained the City’s plea to the jurisdiction as to the Railroads’ ultra vires claims based on governmental immunity. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the Railroads pleaded a viable ultra vires claim challenging Krueger’s determination that their properties were benefitted but that the railroads’ challenge to Krueger’s “impervious surface” determination did not fall within the ultra vires exception. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the Railroads’ pleadings affirmatively alleged that Krueger acted “without legal authority” in both his “benefitted property” and “impervious surface” determinations, and thus the pleadings alleged viable ultra claims as to each. View "Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Caffe Ribs, Inc. (Caffe) purchased condemned property that was contaminated. After the property was placed into the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality’s (TCEQ) Voluntary Cleanup Program, two of the property’s previous owners (Previous Owners) began remediation. The TCEQ requested four additional groundwater monitoring wells, but the Previous Owners were not able to comply with the request due in part to the State’s impending condemnation. The State then initiated statutory condemnation proceedings against Caffe. For reasons not relevant to this appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a new trial. At retrial, the State presented testimony that it would take eight years of cleanup to render the property marketable and that the property’s value should be substantially discounted on that basis. Caffe sought to offer testimony that the State’s condemnation project delayed the property’s cleanup, but the trial court excluded the testimony. The jury determined the value of the property to be just under $5 million. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the exclusion of Caffe’s proffered testimony was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence concerning the State’s role in delaying the condemned property’s environmental cleanup. Remanded for a new trial. View "Caffe Ribs, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

This case involved two Collin County properties - the Staley Tract, which was landlocked, and the Stiles Tract, the property adjacent to the Staley Tract. Both properties were once part of an 1853 land grant from the State. In 1886, the land grant was partitioned into separate tracts and severed. The eventual owner of the Staley Tract (“Staley”) sought to establish a roadway easement across the Stiles Tract. The trial court rendered judgment finding that Staley was not entitled to an easement across the Stiles Tract. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that there was no evidence that, at the time the two tracts were severed, the easement would have resulted in access to a public road from the landlocked property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Staley failed to establish entitlement to a necessity easement across the Stiles Tract. View "Staley Family P’ship, Ltd. v. Stiles" on Justia Law