Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus in this original proceeding involving more than 2,000 cases brought by more than 7,000 plaintiffs represented by more than fifty law firms consolidated in an multidistrict litigation (MDL) court, holding that Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead their claims.This proceeding arose from explosions occurring in the TPC petrochemical processing plant in Port Neches, resulting in the release of toxic chemicals, extensive personal injury, and property damages. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded claims that investors in the plant owner were directly liable for damages. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding that Plaintiffs' petition made no factual allegations to show a cause of action with a basis in law against the investors for TPC's conduct. View "In re First Reserve Management, L.P." on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases involving claims brought against the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) the Supreme Court answered, among other questions, that ERCOT is a governmental unit as defined in the Texas Tort Claims Act and is thereby entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.CPS Energy sued ERCOT and several of its officers for, inter alia, breach of contract. The trial court denied ERCOT'S plea to the jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court of appeals held that ERCOT was a governmental unit entitled to take an interlocutory appeal. In the second case, Panda sued ERCOT for, inter alia, fraud. The trial court denied ERCOT's pleas to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals ultimately held that ERCOT was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in the first case and reversed in the other, holding (1) ERCOT was entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction; (2) the Public Utility Commission of Texas has exclusive jurisdiction over the parties' claims against ERCOT; and (3) ERCOT was entitled to sovereign immunity. View "CPS Energy v. Electric Reliability Council of Texas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's holding that, as a matter of law, a statutory "safe-harbor" provision applied and relieved an operator of oil-and-gas wells from any obligation to pay interest in the amounts withheld, holding that the safe-harbor provision applied as a matter of law.At issue was the "safe harbor" provision that permits operators to withhold payments without interest under certain circumstances. In reliance with the safe harbor provision the operator in this case withheld production payments it was contractually obligated to make to one of the wells' owners. The owner brought suit seeking to recover the payments with interest. The operator made the payments but without interest. The trial court concluded that the safe-harbor provision allowed the operator to withhold the funds. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the operator established as a matter of law that it was entitled to withhold distribution of production payments without interest under the statutory safe-harbor provision of Tex. Nat. Res. Code 91.402(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B)(ii). View "Freeport McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC v. 1776 Energy Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that no statute expressly authorizes a school district to retain a lawyer on a contingent-fee basis to prosecute litigation designed to increase the appraised value of property so as to generate more tax receipts for the school district and that authority for such an arrangement cannot be implied from a school district's express authority to bring litigation regarding appraisals.Iraan-Sheffield Independent School District employed attorney D. Brent Lemon on a contingent-fee basis to pursue claims designed to increase the appraised value of property so as to generate more tax receipts. After the Appraisal Review Board denied the challenge the school district appealed. The district court granted Defendants' Rule 12 motion challenging Lemon's authority to represent the school district and then dismissed the case with prejudice. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Tex. Tax Code 6.30(c) authorized the contingent-fee arrangement. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds and remanded the case, holding that the district court (1) correctly granted Defendants' Rule 12 motion; but (2) erred in dismissing the case with prejudice. View "Pecos County Appraisal District v. Iraan-Sheffield Independent School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a Hidalgo County court at law had jurisdiction over a civil case within the $750,000 limit involving the foreclosure of a lien on land.The McMasters executed a deed of trust to Ditech Servicing, LLC to secure a loan to purchase property. Thereafter, Jerry Perez acquired the property at a sheriff's sale to enforce a judgment. When the McMasters defaulted on their note Ditech initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Perez subsequently sued Ditech in County Court seeking a declaration that Ditech had waived its right to foreclose. Ditech counterclaimed for judicial foreclosure. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment for Ditech. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgment and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, concluding that the trial court had no jurisdiction under Tex. Gov't Code 26.043. The Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment for Ditech, holding (1) suits for the enforcement of a lien on land or for the recovery of land are "civil cases" over which a district court has jurisdiction; and (2) where the amount in controversy was less than $750,000, the Hidalgo County court at law had jurisdiction over Ditech's counterclaim. View "Ditech Servicing, LLC v. Perez" on Justia Law

In this proceeding brought by one political subdivision against another the Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity did not apply in this context, thus reversing the conclusion of the court of appeals that the condemnee entity was immune from suit and that the trial court's order granting the condemnee entity's plea to the jurisdiction was without error.Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No. 3 (the Improvement District) offered to purchase subsurface easement from Hidalgo County Irrigation District No. 1 (the Irrigation District) in order to extend an irrigation pipeline. After the Irrigation District rejected the offer the Improvement District filed this condemnation action. The commissioners awarded the Irrigation District $1,900 in damages, and before the trial court ruled on its objection, the Irrigation District filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court granted the plea, concluding that the Irrigation District had governmental immunity from the condemnation suit. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that sovereign immunity does not apply in eminent domain proceedings and that the Irrigation District was not immune from the Improvement District's condemnation suit. View "Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No. 3 v. Hidalgo County irrigation District No. 1" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief in this mandamus proceeding arising out of a dispute between Property Owners and a Homeowners Association (HOA) regarding enforcement of amended restrictive covenants, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in compelling joinder of the other owners.Property Owners sued the HOA in this case requesting a declaratory judgment that the amended restrictions could not be enforced against them because the required percentage of owners did not approve the amended restrictions. The trial court granted the HOA's motion to abate the claims until Property Owners joined all 700 other owners in the subdivision as parties or face dismissal of their suit. The court of appeals denied Property Owners' ensuing petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in granting the motion to abate and ordering Property Owners to join the other property owners and that Property Owners lacked an adequate remedy by appeal. View "In re Kappmeyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the court of appeals on remand that PNC Mortgage's foreclosure claim was time-barred, holding that there was no error.PNC, whose predecessor refinanced John and Amy Howards' original mortgage loans, did not initiate foreclosure proceedings until its claim to enforce its own lien was time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the common-law doctrine of equitable subrogation did not provide PNC with an alternative means of disclosure. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to address the Howards' claim that PNC's equitable subrogation claim was time-barred. On remand, the court of appeals concluded that the equitable subrogation claim was time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that PNC's claim was time-barred. View "PNC Mortgage v. Howard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals in this interlocutory appeal concerning whether a subsequent purchaser (Purchaser) of a home is required to arbitrate her claims against the builder (Builder) for alleged construction defects, holding that the trial court erred in granting Purchaser's motion to vacate and denying Builder's motion to confirm.The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration filed by Builder, which joined two subcontractors in the arbitration, asserting that they owed defense and indemnity obligations. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of Builder. The trial court vacated the award against Purchaser but made no ruling whether to vacate the award against the subcontractors. The Supreme Court rendered judgment confirming the award against Purchaser and remanded the case, holding (1) Purchaser was bound by the arbitration clause in the purchase-and-sale agreement under the doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel; and (2) because the record contained no ruling on whether to vacate the award against the subcontractors, remand was required. View "Lennar Homes of Tex. Land & Construction, Ltd. v. Whiteley" on Justia Law

In this mineral lease dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that a lease deadline and untimely scheduled drilling date were irrelevant for invoking a force majeure clause and thus reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding the case, holding that the court of appeals erred.In reversing the trial court's judgment, the court of appeals determined that fact issues existed both as to whether the force majeure clause applied and as to each element of the lessee's tortious-interference claims. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) construed in context, the phrase "Lessee's operations are delayed by an event of force majeure" does not refer to the delay of a necessary drilling operation already scheduled to occur after the deadline for perpetuating the lease; (2) the force majeure clause in this case did not save the lease; and (3) to the extent the lessee's tortious-interference claims were predicated on the force majeure clause's saving the lease, a take-nothing judgment is rendered in part. View "Point Energy Partners Permian, LLC v. MRC Permian Co." on Justia Law