Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals in this interlocutory appeal concerning whether a subsequent purchaser (Purchaser) of a home is required to arbitrate her claims against the builder (Builder) for alleged construction defects, holding that the trial court erred in granting Purchaser's motion to vacate and denying Builder's motion to confirm.The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration filed by Builder, which joined two subcontractors in the arbitration, asserting that they owed defense and indemnity obligations. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of Builder. The trial court vacated the award against Purchaser but made no ruling whether to vacate the award against the subcontractors. The Supreme Court rendered judgment confirming the award against Purchaser and remanded the case, holding (1) Purchaser was bound by the arbitration clause in the purchase-and-sale agreement under the doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel; and (2) because the record contained no ruling on whether to vacate the award against the subcontractors, remand was required. View "Lennar Homes of Tex. Land & Construction, Ltd. v. Whiteley" on Justia Law

In this mineral lease dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that a lease deadline and untimely scheduled drilling date were irrelevant for invoking a force majeure clause and thus reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding the case, holding that the court of appeals erred.In reversing the trial court's judgment, the court of appeals determined that fact issues existed both as to whether the force majeure clause applied and as to each element of the lessee's tortious-interference claims. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) construed in context, the phrase "Lessee's operations are delayed by an event of force majeure" does not refer to the delay of a necessary drilling operation already scheduled to occur after the deadline for perpetuating the lease; (2) the force majeure clause in this case did not save the lease; and (3) to the extent the lessee's tortious-interference claims were predicated on the force majeure clause's saving the lease, a take-nothing judgment is rendered in part. View "Point Energy Partners Permian, LLC v. MRC Permian Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals directing the trial court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Homeowners' suit against the City of Brownville for negligence brought under the Texas Tort Claims Act, holding that Homeowners successfully invoked the statutory waiver of governmental immunity set forth in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.021(1)(A).Homeowners filed this action against the City to recover for property damage they received after about two feet of water from a resaca that served as part of the City's water-draining system spilled over its banks and into their homes. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed and directed the trial court to grant the City's plea to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Homeowners, at least at this stage, met their burden to create a fact issue precluding dismissal. View "Rattray v. City of Brownsville" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Landowners in this oil-and-gas dispute over how to calculate Landowners' royalty under the terms of a mineral lease with Producers, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.At issue in a declaratory judgment action was whether, based on language in the subject leases, Landowners' royalty was payable not only on gross proceeds but also on an unaffiliated buyer's post-sale postproduction costs if the producers' sales contracts stated that the sales price had been derived by deducting such costs from published index prices downstream from the point of sale. The trial court granted summary judgment for Landowners as to these types of marketing arrangements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the broad language of the lease unambiguously contemplated such a royalty base. View "Devon Energy Production Co., L.P. v. Sheppard" on Justia Law

In this "double-fraction" dilemma arising from antique mineral conveyances in which the parties used two fractions, the Supreme Court held that the meaning of a 1924 deed's mineral reservation of "one-half of one-eighth" equalled one-half of the mineral estate.The parties in this case were the parties who derived from the grantees (White parties) and the parties whose interests derived from the grantors (Mulkey parties). The ownership of certain royalties turned on which side correctly interpreted the 1924 deed's mineral reservation of "one-half of one-eighth." The trial court entered an order granting the White parties' motion for partial summary judgment on the construction of the deed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower courts erred in holding that the Mulkey parties did not have a one-half interest in the minerals because (1) the presumption that "1/8" was used as a term of art to refer to the "mineral estate" was not rebutted in this case; and (2) alternatively, the presumed-grant doctrine would confirm that the Mulkey parties had title to one-half of the mineral estate. View "Van Dyke v. Navigator Group" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relators' petition for a writ of mandamus and their accompanying motion for temporary relief against the Comptroller, holding that Relators failed to establish that they were entitled to relief.At issue were Relators timely applications for participation in the Texas Economic Development Act, which allows allows school districts to offer ten years of considerable property-tax incentives. Under Tex. Tax Code 313.007, access to the statutory program expires on December 31, 2022. The Comptroller asserted that the a lack of available resources meant that December 31 would pass before he could complete the necessary evaluation for Relators' applications. Relators sought temporary and mandamus relief. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Relators did not have a judicially-enforceable right to compel the Comptroller to act on their applications or to extend the statutory deadline to account for the processing delays. View "In re Stetson Renewable Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

In this dispute over ownership of some ranchland the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that a grantor conveys an expectancy interest only through a clear manifestation of the grantor's intent to do so, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Father devised his estate, including Cottonwood Ranch, to Widow for life with the remainder upon her death to his children, including Son. Father granted Widow power to sell estate property and to redirect a child's remainder interest to others. Widow, a co-owner of the ranch, later conveyed her separate interest in the ranch to Son and daughter. Thereafter, while Widow was still living, Son conveyed his "right, title and interest in and to" the ranch to his daughters. At issue was whether Son gifted a remainder interest in Father's estate property when he conveyed his present interest in the same property without expressly reserving any remainder interest. Applying the rule set forth in Clark v. Gauntt, 161 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. [Comm'n Op.] 1942), the Supreme Court held that Son did not convey his remainder interest in the estate property. View "Jordan v. Parker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified as affirmed the decision of the court of appeals to vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case, holding that the judgment must be modified to vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss the case.In this real property dispute, the Mortgagee set a foreclosure sale and then filed this suit seeking temporary and permanent injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order one day before the scheduled foreclosure sale and then granted summary judgment for the Mortgagee. Before Appellant appealed, the Mortgagee posted the property for foreclosure sale and then purchased it at the sale. When Appellant appealed, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that Appellant's loss of ownership of the property rendered the appeal moot. The Supreme Court modified as affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that dismissal was required but should have vacated the trial court's judgment and dismissed the case. View "Alsobrook v. MTGLQ Investors, LP" on Justia Law

In this eminent domain case brought in a county court at law the Supreme Court held that the county court correctly concluded that counterclaims challenging the authority to condemn and seek damages in excess of the amount-in-controversy cap on the court's additional jurisdiction do not require a transfer to the district court.Plaintiff sued Defendant in the Walker County Court at Law to condemn a pipeline easement across Defendant's property. Defendant filed counterclaims and sought to transfer them to the district court, arguing that they exceeded the county court's jurisdictional limit. The county court at law denied Defendant's motion to transfer. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals granted. The Supreme Court conditionally granted Plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandamus and ordered the appeals court to vacate its conditional writ, holding that Defendant's counterclaims could be fully adjudicated by the county court at law, which retained jurisdiction over the entire case. View "In re Breviloba, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the ruling of the trial court that two private entities behind a high-speed rail between Houston and Dallas did not qualify as either railroad companies or interurban electric railway companies entitled to eminent-domain authority, holding that the entities had eminent-domain power as interurban electric railway companies.The owner of real property located along the proposed railway route sought a declaratory judgment that the two private entities lacked eminent-domain authority. The trial court granted summary judgment for the landowner. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the entities had eminent-domain power as both railroad companies and interurban electric railway companies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the private entities had eminent-domain authority under Chapter 131 of the Texas Transportation Code. View "Miles v. Texas Central Railroad & Infrastructure, Inc." on Justia Law