Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that a Hidalgo County court at law had jurisdiction over a civil case within the $750,000 limit involving the foreclosure of a lien on land.The McMasters executed a deed of trust to Ditech Servicing, LLC to secure a loan to purchase property. Thereafter, Jerry Perez acquired the property at a sheriff's sale to enforce a judgment. When the McMasters defaulted on their note Ditech initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Perez subsequently sued Ditech in County Court seeking a declaration that Ditech had waived its right to foreclose. Ditech counterclaimed for judicial foreclosure. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment for Ditech. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgment and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, concluding that the trial court had no jurisdiction under Tex. Gov't Code 26.043. The Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment for Ditech, holding (1) suits for the enforcement of a lien on land or for the recovery of land are "civil cases" over which a district court has jurisdiction; and (2) where the amount in controversy was less than $750,000, the Hidalgo County court at law had jurisdiction over Ditech's counterclaim. View "Ditech Servicing, LLC v. Perez" on Justia Law

In this proceeding brought by one political subdivision against another the Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity did not apply in this context, thus reversing the conclusion of the court of appeals that the condemnee entity was immune from suit and that the trial court's order granting the condemnee entity's plea to the jurisdiction was without error.Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No. 3 (the Improvement District) offered to purchase subsurface easement from Hidalgo County Irrigation District No. 1 (the Irrigation District) in order to extend an irrigation pipeline. After the Irrigation District rejected the offer the Improvement District filed this condemnation action. The commissioners awarded the Irrigation District $1,900 in damages, and before the trial court ruled on its objection, the Irrigation District filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court granted the plea, concluding that the Irrigation District had governmental immunity from the condemnation suit. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that sovereign immunity does not apply in eminent domain proceedings and that the Irrigation District was not immune from the Improvement District's condemnation suit. View "Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No. 3 v. Hidalgo County irrigation District No. 1" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief in this mandamus proceeding arising out of a dispute between Property Owners and a Homeowners Association (HOA) regarding enforcement of amended restrictive covenants, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in compelling joinder of the other owners.Property Owners sued the HOA in this case requesting a declaratory judgment that the amended restrictions could not be enforced against them because the required percentage of owners did not approve the amended restrictions. The trial court granted the HOA's motion to abate the claims until Property Owners joined all 700 other owners in the subdivision as parties or face dismissal of their suit. The court of appeals denied Property Owners' ensuing petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in granting the motion to abate and ordering Property Owners to join the other property owners and that Property Owners lacked an adequate remedy by appeal. View "In re Kappmeyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the court of appeals on remand that PNC Mortgage's foreclosure claim was time-barred, holding that there was no error.PNC, whose predecessor refinanced John and Amy Howards' original mortgage loans, did not initiate foreclosure proceedings until its claim to enforce its own lien was time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the common-law doctrine of equitable subrogation did not provide PNC with an alternative means of disclosure. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to address the Howards' claim that PNC's equitable subrogation claim was time-barred. On remand, the court of appeals concluded that the equitable subrogation claim was time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that PNC's claim was time-barred. View "PNC Mortgage v. Howard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals in this interlocutory appeal concerning whether a subsequent purchaser (Purchaser) of a home is required to arbitrate her claims against the builder (Builder) for alleged construction defects, holding that the trial court erred in granting Purchaser's motion to vacate and denying Builder's motion to confirm.The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration filed by Builder, which joined two subcontractors in the arbitration, asserting that they owed defense and indemnity obligations. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of Builder. The trial court vacated the award against Purchaser but made no ruling whether to vacate the award against the subcontractors. The Supreme Court rendered judgment confirming the award against Purchaser and remanded the case, holding (1) Purchaser was bound by the arbitration clause in the purchase-and-sale agreement under the doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel; and (2) because the record contained no ruling on whether to vacate the award against the subcontractors, remand was required. View "Lennar Homes of Tex. Land & Construction, Ltd. v. Whiteley" on Justia Law

In this mineral lease dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that a lease deadline and untimely scheduled drilling date were irrelevant for invoking a force majeure clause and thus reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding the case, holding that the court of appeals erred.In reversing the trial court's judgment, the court of appeals determined that fact issues existed both as to whether the force majeure clause applied and as to each element of the lessee's tortious-interference claims. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) construed in context, the phrase "Lessee's operations are delayed by an event of force majeure" does not refer to the delay of a necessary drilling operation already scheduled to occur after the deadline for perpetuating the lease; (2) the force majeure clause in this case did not save the lease; and (3) to the extent the lessee's tortious-interference claims were predicated on the force majeure clause's saving the lease, a take-nothing judgment is rendered in part. View "Point Energy Partners Permian, LLC v. MRC Permian Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals directing the trial court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Homeowners' suit against the City of Brownville for negligence brought under the Texas Tort Claims Act, holding that Homeowners successfully invoked the statutory waiver of governmental immunity set forth in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.021(1)(A).Homeowners filed this action against the City to recover for property damage they received after about two feet of water from a resaca that served as part of the City's water-draining system spilled over its banks and into their homes. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed and directed the trial court to grant the City's plea to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Homeowners, at least at this stage, met their burden to create a fact issue precluding dismissal. View "Rattray v. City of Brownsville" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Landowners in this oil-and-gas dispute over how to calculate Landowners' royalty under the terms of a mineral lease with Producers, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.At issue in a declaratory judgment action was whether, based on language in the subject leases, Landowners' royalty was payable not only on gross proceeds but also on an unaffiliated buyer's post-sale postproduction costs if the producers' sales contracts stated that the sales price had been derived by deducting such costs from published index prices downstream from the point of sale. The trial court granted summary judgment for Landowners as to these types of marketing arrangements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the broad language of the lease unambiguously contemplated such a royalty base. View "Devon Energy Production Co., L.P. v. Sheppard" on Justia Law

In this "double-fraction" dilemma arising from antique mineral conveyances in which the parties used two fractions, the Supreme Court held that the meaning of a 1924 deed's mineral reservation of "one-half of one-eighth" equalled one-half of the mineral estate.The parties in this case were the parties who derived from the grantees (White parties) and the parties whose interests derived from the grantors (Mulkey parties). The ownership of certain royalties turned on which side correctly interpreted the 1924 deed's mineral reservation of "one-half of one-eighth." The trial court entered an order granting the White parties' motion for partial summary judgment on the construction of the deed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower courts erred in holding that the Mulkey parties did not have a one-half interest in the minerals because (1) the presumption that "1/8" was used as a term of art to refer to the "mineral estate" was not rebutted in this case; and (2) alternatively, the presumed-grant doctrine would confirm that the Mulkey parties had title to one-half of the mineral estate. View "Van Dyke v. Navigator Group" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relators' petition for a writ of mandamus and their accompanying motion for temporary relief against the Comptroller, holding that Relators failed to establish that they were entitled to relief.At issue were Relators timely applications for participation in the Texas Economic Development Act, which allows allows school districts to offer ten years of considerable property-tax incentives. Under Tex. Tax Code 313.007, access to the statutory program expires on December 31, 2022. The Comptroller asserted that the a lack of available resources meant that December 31 would pass before he could complete the necessary evaluation for Relators' applications. Relators sought temporary and mandamus relief. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Relators did not have a judicially-enforceable right to compel the Comptroller to act on their applications or to extend the statutory deadline to account for the processing delays. View "In re Stetson Renewable Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law