Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In this "double-fraction" dilemma arising from antique mineral conveyances in which the parties used two fractions, the Supreme Court held that the meaning of a 1924 deed's mineral reservation of "one-half of one-eighth" equalled one-half of the mineral estate.The parties in this case were the parties who derived from the grantees (White parties) and the parties whose interests derived from the grantors (Mulkey parties). The ownership of certain royalties turned on which side correctly interpreted the 1924 deed's mineral reservation of "one-half of one-eighth." The trial court entered an order granting the White parties' motion for partial summary judgment on the construction of the deed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower courts erred in holding that the Mulkey parties did not have a one-half interest in the minerals because (1) the presumption that "1/8" was used as a term of art to refer to the "mineral estate" was not rebutted in this case; and (2) alternatively, the presumed-grant doctrine would confirm that the Mulkey parties had title to one-half of the mineral estate. View "Van Dyke v. Navigator Group" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relators' petition for a writ of mandamus and their accompanying motion for temporary relief against the Comptroller, holding that Relators failed to establish that they were entitled to relief.At issue were Relators timely applications for participation in the Texas Economic Development Act, which allows allows school districts to offer ten years of considerable property-tax incentives. Under Tex. Tax Code 313.007, access to the statutory program expires on December 31, 2022. The Comptroller asserted that the a lack of available resources meant that December 31 would pass before he could complete the necessary evaluation for Relators' applications. Relators sought temporary and mandamus relief. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Relators did not have a judicially-enforceable right to compel the Comptroller to act on their applications or to extend the statutory deadline to account for the processing delays. View "In re Stetson Renewable Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

In this dispute over ownership of some ranchland the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that a grantor conveys an expectancy interest only through a clear manifestation of the grantor's intent to do so, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Father devised his estate, including Cottonwood Ranch, to Widow for life with the remainder upon her death to his children, including Son. Father granted Widow power to sell estate property and to redirect a child's remainder interest to others. Widow, a co-owner of the ranch, later conveyed her separate interest in the ranch to Son and daughter. Thereafter, while Widow was still living, Son conveyed his "right, title and interest in and to" the ranch to his daughters. At issue was whether Son gifted a remainder interest in Father's estate property when he conveyed his present interest in the same property without expressly reserving any remainder interest. Applying the rule set forth in Clark v. Gauntt, 161 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. [Comm'n Op.] 1942), the Supreme Court held that Son did not convey his remainder interest in the estate property. View "Jordan v. Parker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified as affirmed the decision of the court of appeals to vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case, holding that the judgment must be modified to vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss the case.In this real property dispute, the Mortgagee set a foreclosure sale and then filed this suit seeking temporary and permanent injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order one day before the scheduled foreclosure sale and then granted summary judgment for the Mortgagee. Before Appellant appealed, the Mortgagee posted the property for foreclosure sale and then purchased it at the sale. When Appellant appealed, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that Appellant's loss of ownership of the property rendered the appeal moot. The Supreme Court modified as affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that dismissal was required but should have vacated the trial court's judgment and dismissed the case. View "Alsobrook v. MTGLQ Investors, LP" on Justia Law

In this eminent domain case brought in a county court at law the Supreme Court held that the county court correctly concluded that counterclaims challenging the authority to condemn and seek damages in excess of the amount-in-controversy cap on the court's additional jurisdiction do not require a transfer to the district court.Plaintiff sued Defendant in the Walker County Court at Law to condemn a pipeline easement across Defendant's property. Defendant filed counterclaims and sought to transfer them to the district court, arguing that they exceeded the county court's jurisdictional limit. The county court at law denied Defendant's motion to transfer. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals granted. The Supreme Court conditionally granted Plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandamus and ordered the appeals court to vacate its conditional writ, holding that Defendant's counterclaims could be fully adjudicated by the county court at law, which retained jurisdiction over the entire case. View "In re Breviloba, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the ruling of the trial court that two private entities behind a high-speed rail between Houston and Dallas did not qualify as either railroad companies or interurban electric railway companies entitled to eminent-domain authority, holding that the entities had eminent-domain power as interurban electric railway companies.The owner of real property located along the proposed railway route sought a declaratory judgment that the two private entities lacked eminent-domain authority. The trial court granted summary judgment for the landowner. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the entities had eminent-domain power as both railroad companies and interurban electric railway companies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the private entities had eminent-domain authority under Chapter 131 of the Texas Transportation Code. View "Miles v. Texas Central Railroad & Infrastructure, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that, absent a clear abuse of discretion, governmental immunity protects a zoning commission's determination that a proposed subdivision conforms with applicable law.After the City of Georgetown's Planning and Zoning Commission approved a preliminary plat for a new 89-home subdivision neighboring Escalera Ranch, a subdivision to the north the Escalera Ranch Owners' Association sued the Commission members, asserting that their approval of the plat was a clear abuse of discretion. The trial court granted the Commissioners' plea to the jurisdiction, concluding that the Association lacked standing to sue. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commissioners adhered to their duty in determining that the preliminary plat conformed to the applicable standards. View "Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners' Ass'n" on Justia Law

In this eminent domain dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court's judgment in favor of a pipeline company, holding that remand was required for a new trial to determine the market value of the property taken.A landowner challenged the pipeline company's right to condemn, arguing that the transport of polymer-grade propylene did not the pipeline company common-carrier status. After excluding the landowner's evidence of sales of other pipeline easements the trial court found in favor of the pipeline company. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that whether the pipeline served a public use presented a fact question for a jury to resolve and that the trial court erred in excluding the landowner's testimony about easement sales. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Tex. Bus. Org. Code 2.105 grants common-carrier eminent domain authority for the construction and use of a polymer-grade propylene pipeline; (2) the company demonstrated that its pipeline served a public use, and that determination is a legal one; and (3) a property owner may testify to sales of pipeline easements across the property made to other pipeline carriers. View "Hlavinka v. HSC Pipeline Partnership, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality's (TCEQ) general jurisdiction over water and water rights, including the issuance of water rights permits and water rights adjudication, does not include the authority to adjudicate conflicting claims to ownership of surface-water rights.Plaintiff brought this complaint seeking declarations that it was the sole owner of certain surface-water rights. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that TCEQ has exclusive original jurisdiction to determine water-ownership rights. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that TCEQ lacks jurisdiction to decide conflicting claims of ownership to surface-water rights and that the adjudication of such claims is for the courts. View "Pape Partners, Ltd. v. DRR Family Properties LP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the current owners of certain property, holding that Elizabeth Mitchell's due process rights were violated in a 1999 suit in which the court entered a default judgment foreclosing a tax lien on Elizabeth's interest.After Elizabeth died in 2009, her heirs (Petitioners) brought suit to declare void the 1999 default judgment, alleging the judgment violated Elizabeth's constitutional right to procedural due process because Elizabeth was not properly served with notice of the underlying foreclosure suit. Respondents, the current owners of the property who purchased it at a tax sale or later acquired an interest in it, argued that the publicly recorded warranty deeds and county tax records could not be considered in this collateral attack. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment for Respondents. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) information available in relevant public records can be considered in a collateral attack on a judgment that alleges constitutional due process violations; and (2) Petitioners established that Elizabeth was not properly served in the 1999 suit, and therefore, the court in the tax foreclosure suit did not acquire personal jurisdiction over Elizabeth. View "Mitchell v. MAP Resources, Inc." on Justia Law