Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In this premises-defect case, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of mandamus brought by Eagleridge Operating, LLC seeking relief from a trial court order striking its responsible-third-party designation under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, holding that Eagleridge failed to establish that it was entitled to the writ.In this action, Eagleridge argued that a former well site owner-operator bore continuing responsibility for injuries caused by a burst gas pipeline because the former owner acted as an independent contractor in constructing, installing, and maintaining the pipeline. The lower courts concluded that Occidental Chemical Corp. v. Jenkins, 478 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2016), was controlling and that the former owners' responsibility for premises defects did not survive the conveyance of its ownership interest. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that an agreement between tenants in common to allocate expenses, assign responsibilities, and compensate for disparate efforts in a joint endeavor does not create an exception to Occidental as to improvements each party would otherwise have been free to construct without the consent of the other. View "In re Eagleridge Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a negligence claim can arise from the condition or use of an improvement even when negligence elsewhere is alleged to have contributed to a plaintiffs' injuries so long as the other statutory requirements are satisfied.Plaintiffs brought claims for negligence, gross negligence, and trespass to chattels against Defendant, the owner of property upon which Plaintiffs were working to drill a water well. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that there was negligence regarding a condition of the water well Plaintiffs were drilling, and this negligence caused damages. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Chapter 95 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code applied to Plaintiffs' claims. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Chapter 95 applied; and (2) the trial court properly granted summary judgment because Defendant proved conclusively that it could not be held liable under Chapter 95 given its lack of control over the work. View "Energen Resources Corp. v. Wallace" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that no contract to settle a debt was formed in this case, that the implied-revocation doctrine is not constrained to real-property transactions, and that the settlement offer was impliedly revoked when the offeror assigned the underlying judgment.At issue in this contract dispute was whether a purported offer to settle a debt for a reduced sum was accepted before it was revoked. The issue's resolution turned on the parameters of the doctrine of implied revocation adopted by the Supreme Court in Antwine v. Reed, 199 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1947). The trial court granted summary judgment against the offeree. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the implied-revocation doctrine is not limited to offers involving the sale of land; and (2) the settlement offer in this case was impliedly revoked when the offeror assigned the underlying judgment to a third party for collection and the assignee gave the offeree a copy of the assignment agreement before the offeree accepted the settlement offer. View "Angel v. Tauch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the Pemberton Park Community Association (Association) on its complaint against Li for violations of several restrictive covenants found in the "Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions and Easements for Pemberton Park" (the Covenants) holding that the court of appeals erred.On appeal, Appellant argued that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Appellant failed to preserve for appeal her argument that the Association's enforcement of the Covenants was "arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory," in violation of Tex. Prop. Code 202.004(a). The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that Appellant preserved her argument for appeal. View "Li v. Pemberton Park Community Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants in this trespass-to-try-title suit between the lessees of adjacent mineral estates, holding that the court of appeals erred.In its complaint, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants drilled wells either on Plaintiff's leasehold or closer to the lease line than allowed by Railroad Commission rules. Defendants argued in response that Plaintiff ratified an agreed boundary line, foreclosing Plaintiff's trespass claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a boundary stipulation between the fee owners of the two mineral estates, which Plaintiff accepted, was void and could not be ratified. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the boundary stipulation was valid and that Defendants conclusively established their ratification defense. View "Concho Resources, Inc. v. Ellison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of mandamus sought by Texas-New Mexico Power Co. (TNM) in this negligence action, holding that Plaintiffs' claim was not one within the Public Utility Commission's (PUC) exclusive original jurisdiction because it was not about TNM's operations and services as a utility.Plaintiffs, a larger number of homeowners near the Junemann Bayou and Las Marque, sued TNM, their electric utility, for damages due to flooding during Hurricane Harvey, alleging that TNM was negligent in not requiring its contractor to secure wooden mats to the ground during a construction project. The trial court denied TNM's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and TNM petitioned for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the PUC's exclusive original jurisdiction did not extend to the issues underlying this tort claim. View "In re Texas-New Mexico Power Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court concluding that service on WWLC Investment, LP by Sorab Miraki was not defective, holding that WWLC met its burden to prove lack of proper service.After WWLC had Miraki evicted, Miraki sued for breach of lease, fraud, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code ch. 17. Miraki accomplished substituted service by attaching a copy of the petition and citation to the front door of the home of an WWLC employee. When WWLC did not answer, Miraki took a default judgment against it. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that service on WWLC was not defective. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that WWLC demonstrated that it was not properly served. View "WWLC Investment, LP v. Miraki" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that "a governmental unit's copyright infringement is not a taking" and that, therefore, the trial court erred in denying a plea to the jurisdiction, holding that the violation of a copyright, without more, is not a taking of the copyright.Plaintiff, a professional photographer, sued the University of Houston, alleging that the University's publication of his photograph was an unlawful taking. The University filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting immunity under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. After the trial court denied the plea, the University brought this interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order denying the plea and dismissed the cause for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that a governmental unit's copyright infringement is not a taking. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) factual allegations of an infringement do not alone allege a taking; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in sustaining the jurisdictional plea and dismissing the case because the State retained its immunity in the absence of a properly pled takings claim. View "Jim Olive Photography v. University of Houston System" on Justia Law

In this quiet title action, the Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Defendant, holding that Defendant did not conclusively negate unsound-mind tolling pleaded as an exception to limitations.Plaintiff, a person who alleged a mental incapacity, sought to prevent Defendant, his aunt, from evicting him from property he had inherited, arguing that a deed to Defendant that he had signed years earlier was void due to his lack of capacity. Defendant moved for traditional summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. In response, Plaintiff invoked the unsound-mind tolling statute. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Defendant moved for traditional summary judgment on limitations and Plaintiff raised the unsound-mind tolling statute, Defendant had the burden to conclusively negate Plaintiff's assertion of mental capacity; (2) because Defendant offered no evidence regarding Plaintiff's soundness of mind, she failed to carry her burden; and (3) therefore, the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order granting Defendant summary judgment. View "Draughon v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In this tax exemption case concerning privately owned real property in Galveston County the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Galveston Central Appraisal District, holding that Odyssey 2020 Academy was not entitled to an exemption from the ad valorem tax.The property at issue was subleased by Odyssey, which used the property to operate a public charter school. Odyssey contractually agreed to pay the property owners' ad valorem taxes and requested that the Galveston Central Appraisal District exempt the property from taxation as "property owned by this state" under section 11.11(a) of the Tax Code. The District denied the exemption request. On review, the district court granted summary judgment for the District. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, on these facts, the Constitution does not merit an exemption for Odyssey. View "Odyssey 2020 Academy, Inc. v. Galveston Central Appraisal District" on Justia Law