Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court against Landlord and in favor of the City of Baytown in this dispute over unpaid utility bills, holding that Landlord's challenge to the City's enforcement action failed to show the intentional taking or damage for public use necessary to establish a constitutional right to compensation.In this action, Landlord alleging that the City's withholding of utility service to collect payment resulted in the loss of a tenant and the disrepair of his property and was a taking in violation of the state or federal constitution. The trial court concluded that Landlord did not establish an intentional taking of private property for public use. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City's utility enforcement actions did not establish a regulatory taking of private property as a matter of law. View "City of Baytown v. Schrock" on Justia Law

In this oil and gas case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's summary judgment, holding that a fact issue remained on Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the lease and that Plaintiffs' argument was not barred by res judicata but that the court of appeals erred by reversing a take-nothing summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' tort and statutory claims.At issue was the meaning and application of an express covenant to protect against drainage that appeared in a lease addendum that expressly limited the location of wells that may trigger Defendant-Lessee's obligation to protect against drainage but did not directly address the location of wells that may cause drainage. Plaintiffs-Lessors argued that the covenant allowed for separate triggering and draining wells and that Defendant breached the covenant by failing to protect against drainage from a non-triggering well. In response, Defendant argued that it had a duty to protect only against drainage from the limited class of triggering wells. The Supreme Court held (1) the addendum was ambiguous because both interpretations of the covenant were reasonable; (2) the court of appeals improperly reversed the trial court's take-nothing summary judgment on Plaintiffs' tort and statutory claims; and (3) remand was required for further proceedings on Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the lease. View "Rosetta Resources Operating, LP v. Martin" on Justia Law

In this dispute between a homeowners' association and a townhome owner the Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court enjoining the owner from renting its townhomes for terms of fewer than seven days, holding that the association had no authority to impose a short-term rental restriction.After the association demanded that the owner stop leasing its townhomes for short-term rentals the owner sued to enforce a covenant in the neighborhood's deed restrictions granting it the right to lease without restriction. The trial court ruled that the short-term rentals breached a provision in the neighborhood's deed restrictions. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the association possessed independent authority under Tex. Prop. Code 204.010(a)(6) to restrict short-term rentals. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the deed covenants nor the Property Code authorized the association to impose a short-term rental restriction. View "JBrice Holdings, LLC v. Wilcrest Walk Townhomes Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court, rendered pursuant to a jury verdict, that Stephen Stelly owned real property free of any encumbrance, holding that Stelly adequately pleaded a trespass-to-try-title claim.Stelly brought this action against John DeLoach claiming that DeLoach had breached the parties' contract by not delivering a real property deed after Stelly had paid off the debt on the land's original purchase price.The jury entered a verdict in favor of Stelly. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Stelly pleaded only a breach-of-contract claim, not a trespass-to-try-title claim and that the statute of limitations had run on Stelly's breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Stelly adequately pleaded a trespass-to-try-title claim. View "Stelly v. DeLoach" on Justia Law

In this premises-defect case, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of mandamus brought by Eagleridge Operating, LLC seeking relief from a trial court order striking its responsible-third-party designation under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, holding that Eagleridge failed to establish that it was entitled to the writ.In this action, Eagleridge argued that a former well site owner-operator bore continuing responsibility for injuries caused by a burst gas pipeline because the former owner acted as an independent contractor in constructing, installing, and maintaining the pipeline. The lower courts concluded that Occidental Chemical Corp. v. Jenkins, 478 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2016), was controlling and that the former owners' responsibility for premises defects did not survive the conveyance of its ownership interest. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that an agreement between tenants in common to allocate expenses, assign responsibilities, and compensate for disparate efforts in a joint endeavor does not create an exception to Occidental as to improvements each party would otherwise have been free to construct without the consent of the other. View "In re Eagleridge Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a negligence claim can arise from the condition or use of an improvement even when negligence elsewhere is alleged to have contributed to a plaintiffs' injuries so long as the other statutory requirements are satisfied.Plaintiffs brought claims for negligence, gross negligence, and trespass to chattels against Defendant, the owner of property upon which Plaintiffs were working to drill a water well. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that there was negligence regarding a condition of the water well Plaintiffs were drilling, and this negligence caused damages. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Chapter 95 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code applied to Plaintiffs' claims. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Chapter 95 applied; and (2) the trial court properly granted summary judgment because Defendant proved conclusively that it could not be held liable under Chapter 95 given its lack of control over the work. View "Energen Resources Corp. v. Wallace" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that no contract to settle a debt was formed in this case, that the implied-revocation doctrine is not constrained to real-property transactions, and that the settlement offer was impliedly revoked when the offeror assigned the underlying judgment.At issue in this contract dispute was whether a purported offer to settle a debt for a reduced sum was accepted before it was revoked. The issue's resolution turned on the parameters of the doctrine of implied revocation adopted by the Supreme Court in Antwine v. Reed, 199 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1947). The trial court granted summary judgment against the offeree. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the implied-revocation doctrine is not limited to offers involving the sale of land; and (2) the settlement offer in this case was impliedly revoked when the offeror assigned the underlying judgment to a third party for collection and the assignee gave the offeree a copy of the assignment agreement before the offeree accepted the settlement offer. View "Angel v. Tauch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the Pemberton Park Community Association (Association) on its complaint against Li for violations of several restrictive covenants found in the "Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions and Easements for Pemberton Park" (the Covenants) holding that the court of appeals erred.On appeal, Appellant argued that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Appellant failed to preserve for appeal her argument that the Association's enforcement of the Covenants was "arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory," in violation of Tex. Prop. Code 202.004(a). The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that Appellant preserved her argument for appeal. View "Li v. Pemberton Park Community Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants in this trespass-to-try-title suit between the lessees of adjacent mineral estates, holding that the court of appeals erred.In its complaint, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants drilled wells either on Plaintiff's leasehold or closer to the lease line than allowed by Railroad Commission rules. Defendants argued in response that Plaintiff ratified an agreed boundary line, foreclosing Plaintiff's trespass claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a boundary stipulation between the fee owners of the two mineral estates, which Plaintiff accepted, was void and could not be ratified. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the boundary stipulation was valid and that Defendants conclusively established their ratification defense. View "Concho Resources, Inc. v. Ellison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of mandamus sought by Texas-New Mexico Power Co. (TNM) in this negligence action, holding that Plaintiffs' claim was not one within the Public Utility Commission's (PUC) exclusive original jurisdiction because it was not about TNM's operations and services as a utility.Plaintiffs, a larger number of homeowners near the Junemann Bayou and Las Marque, sued TNM, their electric utility, for damages due to flooding during Hurricane Harvey, alleging that TNM was negligent in not requiring its contractor to secure wooden mats to the ground during a construction project. The trial court denied TNM's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and TNM petitioned for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the PUC's exclusive original jurisdiction did not extend to the issues underlying this tort claim. View "In re Texas-New Mexico Power Co." on Justia Law