Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In this property dispute between adjoining landowners the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court enforcing an easement, holding that a neighborhood association had standing to enforce the easement and that the evidence supported the trial court's rejection of the neighboring property owner's affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel.Petitioner owned a parcel of undeveloped property that bordered Champee Springs Ranches neighborhood, represented here by its property owners association, and was burdened by a restrictive easement. Petitioner sought to avoid the easement to connect the property to existing public roads and to develop the parcel into a residential subdivision. To further these plans, Petitioner's predecessor built a private construction road across the easement in violation of the easement's access restriction. Champee Springs bought this lawsuit to enforce the easement. The trial court enforced the easement, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Champee Springs had standing to sue to enforce the easement; (2) the evidence supported the trial court's rejection of Petitioner's affirmative defenses; and (3) this Court declines to declare the restrictive easement void on public policy grounds. View "Teal Trading & Development, LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Property Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that a devise of "all...right, title and interest in and to Ranch 'Las Piedras'" referred only to a surface estate by that name, as understood by the testatrix and beneficiaries at the time the will was made, and did not include the mineral estate.Respondents asserted that their father's life estate under their grandmother's will included her interest in not only the surface of Las Piedras Ranch but also the minerals beneath it. The trial court awarded judgment in favor of Respondents. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondents' claims were premised on an erroneous interpretation of their grandmother's will. Therefore, Petitioners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "ConocoPhillips Co. v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit regarding what constitutes good faith under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA) by holding that when a transferee on inquiry notice attempts to use TUFTA's affirmative defense that it acted in good faith to shield a transfer from the statute's clawback provision it must show, at a minimum, that it investigated its suspicions diligently.Creditors may invoke TUFTA to claw back fraudulent transfers from their debtors to third-party transferees, but if the transferee proves that it acted in good faith and the transfer was for a reasonably equivalent value, it may keep the transferred asset. The Fifth Circuit asked the Supreme Court whether a transferee on inquiry notice of fraudulent intent can achieve good faith without investigating its suspicions. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that a transferee on inquiry notice of fraud cannot shield itself from TUFTA's clawback provision without diligently investigating its initial suspicions, regardless of whether a hypothetical investigation would reveal fraudulent conduct. View "Janvey v. GMAG, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals divesting the Petitioners of an interest in property they inherited from their mother, holding that the estoppel by deed doctrine did not apply in this case and that Petitioners were entitled to retain the interest.At issue was whether the estoppel by deed doctrine or the Court's opinion in Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940), applied to prevent Petitioners from asserting title to the interest they inherited from their mother when Petitioners' father previously purported to sell that interest to Respondents. The trial court ruled in favor of Petitioners. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Respondents based on estoppel by deed and the Court's decision in Duhig. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Petitioners claimed their interest from their mother, an independent source predating the deed at issue, neither estoppel by deed nor the decision in Duhig applied to divest Petitioners of that interest. The Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether damages were appropriate for Respondents' breach of warranty claim. View "Trial v. Dragon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court awarding specific performance to Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc., which claimed a twenty-five percent working interest in certain mineral leases under a letter agreement that Great Western Drilling Ltd. claimed was unenforceable, holding that Pathfinder was entitled to specific performance.On the day before trial, the parties stipules that only certain issues would be submitted to the jury and that favorable jury findings would entitle Pathfinder to specific performance instead of money damages. The jury charge included only the specifically enumerated jury issues, and the jury answered those issues in favor of Pathfinder. The trial court awarded specific performance as provided by the parties' agreement. The court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment, holding that specific performance was unavailable without a jury finding that Pathfinder was "ready, willing, and able" to perform its obligations under the contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, through the stipulation, Great Western waived the right to insist on any other fact findings that might otherwise have been required to entitle Pathfinder to specific performance. View "Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great Western Drilling, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Rowlett on KMS Retail Rowlett, LP's complaint alleging that the City's exercise of its eminent domain authority to take KMS's private road easement and convert it to a public road connecting several commercial retail and restaurant sites, holding that summary judgment was properly granted.Specifically, the Court held that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that (1) chapter 2206 of the Government Code, which prohibits takings for economic development purposes, did not apply to the taking in this case; (2) the City's condemnation was necessary for a constitutional public use; and (3) KMS failed to raise a fact issue as to whether the taking was fraudulent, in bad faith, or arbitrary and capricious. View "KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals finding that Petitioner waived the argument that his contractual waiver of the statute of limitations was void as against public policy, holding that the court of appeals erred in declining to reach Petitioner's argument but that, when the enforceable portions of Petitioner's contractual waiver were applied, limitations did not bar Respondent's suit against Petitioner.Petitioner guaranteed a loan secured by real property. When the borrower defaulted, Respondent Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s successor foreclosed on the real property securing the loan. After purchasing property at a foreclosure sale Respondent sued Petitioner to recover the deficiency. Petitioner moved for summary judgment, arguing that Respondent's claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for deficiency claims. Respondent moved for partial summary judgment on the grounds that Petitioner waived Tex. Prop. Code 51.003's statute of limitations when he signed the guaranty agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondent. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner waived his public policy argument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner contractually waived the two-year statute of limitations and that a four-year statute of limitations applied to Respondent's claims; and (2) because Respondent sued Petitioner within that four-year period, limitations did not bar the suit. View "Godoy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality does not have the discretion to deny an ad valorem tax exemption for heat recovery steam generators (HRSGs), devices the Legislature considers "pollution control property," holding that the Legislature did not exceed its constitutional authority in exempting pollution control property from taxation.Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. filed for an exemption seeking a positive use determination for the HRSG used in two of its facilities. The Commission's Executive Director issued negative use determinations for the applications on the grounds that HRSGs are not eligible for a positive use determination. The Commission eventually affirmed the determinations as to both facilities. The trial court affirmed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under Texas Tax Code 11.31, property that qualifies as pollution control property, is entitled to a tax exemption, and HRSGs qualify, at least in part, as pollution control property; and (2) thus, assuming the applicant otherwise complies with the statute's requirements, the Executive Director may not issue a negative use determination for HRSGs. View "Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court concluding that an owner who tendered substantially all of the money required by Tex. Tax Code 34.21 could redeem real property purchased at a tax sale after the purchaser's deed was recorded, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the owner substantially complied with the requirements of section 34.21(e).The owner of the property in this case was the Estate of Benjamin Hardy Carlton, III. The property was sold at a sheriff's sale to enforce a judgment obtained from several taxing authorities. Plaintiff successfully bid for it, and Plaintiff then recorded his deed. Before its deadline to redeem the home the Estate paid eighty-eight percent of the total due. The Estate then sued Plaintiff seeking a declaration of redemption. The trial court concluded that the estate had effectively exercised the right of redemption by making substantial compliance and tendering full compensation within the redemption period. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Estate's tender satisfied the statute. View "Sorrell v. Estate of Carlton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that sovereign immunity barred Plaintiff's claim against the State brought after a cargo van owned by the State rolled backwards into a grounded helicopter owned by Plaintiff, holding that portions of the claim should have been allowed to proceed.The van in this case was owned by the Texas Juvenile Justice Department, an agency of the State. Plaintiff sued the Department, alleging that the Department breached its duty to act with ordinary care in maintaining and operating the van. The Department filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the plea and motion. The court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment, concluding that sovereign immunity protected the Department from Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in rejecting Plaintiff's claims related to a Department employee's allegedly negligent failure to apply the parking brake so the van would not roll away. View "PHI, Inc. v. Texas Juvenile Justice Department" on Justia Law