Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A church founded in 1982 primarily serving Korean-speaking congregants operated independently for many years, later joining a regional Korean-American presbytery affiliated with a national Presbyterian denomination. Over two decades, the church participated in various activities with the presbytery, including meetings, reports, dues, and ordinations, while maintaining autonomy in its financial and property matters. Disagreements arose when the presbytery asserted a trust interest in the church’s property after the church refinanced a loan without presbytery approval, referencing denominational rules requiring property to be held in trust for the national denomination. The church disputed its membership status and the applicability of those rules, asserting independence.After a failed ecclesiastical complaint with the synod overseeing the presbytery, the church filed suit in the Fairfax County Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding its independence and property rights. The presbytery counterclaimed, seeking a declaration of membership and property trust obligations. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the church, finding it was not a member of the national denomination due to the absence of a covenant required by denominational rules, and thus, no trust obligation existed. The presbytery appealed.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine because the dispute involved church membership—a matter the parties had initially submitted to the synod.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case, holding that summary judgment was inappropriate because a genuine dispute of material fact existed about the church’s membership status. The Court further held that neither court could resolve the ecclesiastical abstention issue or the membership question on the summary judgment record. It reversed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Shalom Presbyterian Church of Washington v. Atlantic Korean American Presbytery" on Justia Law

EQT Production Company and related entities owned mineral lands containing natural gas reserves in Wise County, Virginia. In 2018, EQT sold these lands to Diversified Production, LLC. The County taxed only the physical infrastructure—gas wells, pipelines, and compressors—for the 2018, 2019, and 2020 tax years, using the cost approach for valuation, but did not assess the value of the gas reserves themselves. The Taxpayers objected, arguing that this method did not reflect fair market value because the well infrastructure cannot be valued independently from the gas reserves. They also argued that the County failed to properly consider the income and market approaches to valuation. The County maintained that it was allowed to exclude the gas reserves and had properly rejected alternative valuation methods.After a trial in Wise County Circuit Court, the court found in favor of the County, holding that it had statutory discretion to value only the improvements and to exclude the reserves. The court also found that the County properly considered and rejected use of the income and market approaches. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, agreeing that because the County had imposed a license tax on gas extraction under Code § 58.1-3712, it was excused from assessing the gas reserves under Code § 58.1-3286. The Court of Appeals further held the County’s assessment was entitled to a presumption of correctness because it considered and rejected the other valuation methods.The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. It held that, under Virginia law, imposing a license tax under Code § 58.1-3712 does not excuse the County from also assessing the fair market value of mineral lands—including gas reserves—under Code § 58.1-3286. The Court concluded the County’s assessment was incomplete and therefore plainly wrong. The judgments of the lower courts were reversed and the case was remanded. View "EQT Production Co. v. County of Wise" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a 50-foot-wide easement for ingress and egress over land owned by Thibault Enterprises, LLC, which is used by the Yosts to access their home. The easement is much wider than the gravel road the Yosts actually use, which is about 12 feet wide. Thibault has placed fences, grapevines, hay bales, and other objects within the easement's boundaries but not in the gravel road itself. These objects have not prevented or impeded the Yosts from traveling to and from their home. The Yosts requested an injunction to prohibit Thibault from placing anything within the 50-foot easement, arguing their entitlement to unrestricted use of the entire width.The Dinwiddie County Circuit Court granted an injunction, finding that although the objects did not interfere with the Yosts’ current use, their placement within the easement was improper. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, holding that any object placed within the easement’s defined width was an impermissible narrowing of the easement.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that Virginia law does not require the removal of all objects within an easement of defined width unless those objects unreasonably interfere with the easement holder’s rights. The Court held that the correct rule is one of reasonableness, which requires examining the deed and the purpose of the easement, and determining whether the servient owner’s actions unreasonably interfere with the easement. Because the objects did not impede the Yosts’ ingress or egress, Thibault was not required to remove them. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment for Thibault. View "Thibault Enterprises, LLC v. Yost" on Justia Law

Virginia Electric and Power Company sought certificates of public convenience and necessity to construct two high-voltage overhead transmission line projects in Loudoun County, including the Aspen-Golden and Apollo-Twin Creeks Projects. The Aspen-Golden Project involved approximately nine miles of transmission lines, some running beside Route 7 in the Lansdowne community. VEPCO evaluated several routes and preferred Route 1AA, asserting it minimized adverse impacts. The Apollo-Twin Creeks Project involved about 1.9 miles of transmission lines, some collocated with the Aspen-Golden lines, to serve data centers. VEPCO proposed overhead construction for both projects due to feasibility concerns with underground alternatives.The State Corporation Commission consolidated the applications for review. Loudoun County and Lansdowne Conservancy objected to overhead lines along Route 7, arguing for underground construction to protect scenic and historic assets, including Belmont Manor. They submitted an Updated Hybrid Proposal for partial underground construction, but VEPCO and Commission staff questioned its feasibility, cost, and engineering challenges. After public hearings and detailed testimony, the hearing examiner recommended approval of overhead construction along Route 1AA, finding underground options infeasible within required timelines and statutory criteria, and noting the proposal’s analytical deficiencies.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the Commission’s final orders, affirming the Commission’s approval of the CPCNs. The Court held that the Commission properly verified the need for the Aspen-Golden Project, reasonably rejected underground construction due to cost, engineering challenges, and timing, and gave due consideration to the local comprehensive plan and scenic easement. The Court concluded that the Commission’s decisions minimized adverse impacts to the extent reasonably practicable and found no abuse of discretion in declining to impose additional mitigation conditions or in approving the Apollo-Twin Creeks Project. The judgments were affirmed. View "Lansdowne Conservancy v. SCC" on Justia Law

Norfolk Southern Railway Company challenged the constitutionality of Code § 56-16.3, which allows broadband service providers to install fiber optic cables across railroad property. The statute, enacted in 2023, aims to promote broadband expansion in Virginia. Cox Communications filed applications to install fiber optic cables under Norfolk Southern’s tracks, which Norfolk Southern did not initially oppose. However, a dispute arose over the license fees, leading Cox to proceed without a licensing agreement, prompting Norfolk Southern to seek relief from the State Corporation Commission (the “Commission”).The Commission rejected Norfolk Southern’s arguments without a hearing, finding the claims insufficient to establish undue hardship. Norfolk Southern appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which stayed the Commission’s judgment during the appeal.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether Code § 56-16.3 violated Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution. The court emphasized that eminent domain statutes must be strictly construed and that the burden of proving public use lies with the condemnor. The court found that Code § 56-16.3 did not reference public use and allowed a private company to take property for financial gain, which is not a public use under the Virginia Constitution.The court held that the application of Code § 56-16.3 in this case constituted a taking of Norfolk Southern’s property for a nonpublic use, violating the Virginia Constitution. Consequently, the court reversed the Commission’s judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. SCC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between H. Cliff Page and the Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority (PRHA). Page owned a building in Portsmouth that shared a common wall with a building owned by PRHA. In 2014, PRHA demolished its building after the City of Portsmouth declared it an unlawful nuisance. Page claimed that the demolition was negligently performed and damaged his building. PRHA responded with a plea in bar, raising the defense of sovereign immunity.The circuit court held a hearing on the plea in bar and ruled in favor of PRHA, holding that sovereign immunity barred Page’s claim. The court found that the demolition of the property was implemented under the City of Portsmouth’s plan to address blight in the Downtown Portsmouth Historic District. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, stating that PRHA’s immunity should be the same as that of the City of Portsmouth.However, the Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that sovereign immunity does not shield PRHA from tort liability under the circumstances of this case. The court found that PRHA was acting in its proprietary capacity, similar to a private landowner, when it demolished the building. The court concluded that PRHA's obedience to the City’s Notice of Emergency Demolition was not an exercise of governmental discretion but a ministerial legal duty to perform a proprietary function. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Page v. Portsmouth Redevelopment & Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County and Rita M. Leach-Lewis, trustee of the Rita M. Leach-Lewis Trust, which owns several homes in Fairfax County. These homes are used by members of the New World Church of the Christ, including Leach-Lewis, for activities such as handling correspondence, preparing spiritual teachings, and storing files and boxes. The homes are located in a residential-conservation zone, which prohibits office uses. After a zoning official conducted a search of the residences, a notice of violation of the zoning ordinance was issued, stating that the homes were being used as an "office."The notice of violation was appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which upheld the zoning administrator's decision. Leach-Lewis then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA's decision, arguing that the residences were not being used as an "office" and that the notice of violation was based on an improper search under the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court upheld the BZA's decision, and Leach-Lewis appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the BZA had a duty to interpret and apply a provision of the zoning ordinance that states that no part of the ordinance may be construed to authorize an unconstitutional inspection or search. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the BZA to determine whether the zoning ordinance was violated by the search of the church's property.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the BZA was not required to examine the constitutionality of the search underlying the notice of violation. The court also concluded that the residences were being used as an "office" as defined in the zoning ordinance. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment in favor of the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County. View "Board of Supervisors v. Leach-Lewis" on Justia Law

In Virginia, Bryant McCants arranged for his 1970 Ford Mustang Mach 1 to be repaired at a shop operated by CD & PB Enterprises, LLC, doing business as Maaco Collision Repair & Auto Painting. The repair shop was managed by Hanson Butler, a part owner and employee of CD & PB Maaco. After the work was completed, McCants inspected the vehicle and was unsatisfied with the work, prompting Butler to agree to repaint it. However, due to various personal circumstances, McCants was unable to pick up the vehicle for several months. In the meantime, Butler initiated the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles' abandoned-vehicle process, which resulted in him acquiring title to the vehicle, which he later sold.McCants sued Butler for conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act. The jury found in favor of McCants on the conversion claim only and awarded him $78,500. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that Butler had properly followed the abandoned-vehicle process and had obtained legal title to the vehicle.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that a rational jury could have found that Butler wrongfully used the DMV's abandoned-vehicle process as a pretext for severing McCants's ownership rights in the vehicle and thereafter claiming it for himself. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstated the jury’s verdict, and affirmed the trial court’s confirmation order. View "McCants v. CD & PB Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the State Corporation Commission dismissing Verizon Virginia LLC's petition for a declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition pursuant to Va. Code 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821.Verizon, a telecommunications company, filed a petition for a declaratory judgment with the Commission requesting a declaration that either Capital Beltway Express LLC (CBE) or The Lane Construction Corporation was responsible for costs pursuant to section 33.2-1815(B) to relocate some of Verizon's utility facilities, as required by the Virginia Department of Transportation in the underlying project to extend portions of the I-495 express lanes. The Commission dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Verizon appealed, arguing that sections 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821 granted the Commission jurisdiction to resolve which party was responsible for the costs of the utility relocations necessitated by the project. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition. View "Verizon Virginia LLC v. SCC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in this real property dispute, holding that the escheat provision of Va. Code 58.1-3967, as applied to the factual circumstances of this case, violated Va. Const. art. I, 11.The City of Richmond obtained a judicial sale of a parcel of property that was subject to a statutory lien for delinquent taxes. The circuit court confirmed the sale and directed that the City's lien for delinquent taxes, along with its costs and legal fees, be fully paid by the purchase proceeds. Although the sale proceeds satisfied the tax lien, the circuit court concluded that section 58.1-3967 required it to award a portion of the surplus sale proceeds to the City instead of an unsatisfied junior lienor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as applied to this particular case, section 58.1-3967 unconstitutionally authorized the City to take the proceeds and keep them for itself. View "McKeithen v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law