Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's complaint seeking to quiet title to certain property, holding that a deed restriction for the use of a particular church was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation.In 1875, Edna and Levi Lynn executed a deed granting one acre of land to the Woodbine Baptist Church. Woodbine used the land until 2006, when its trustees gifted it to a Virginia corporation. The corporation received a loan in 2007, and the bank's title search of the property did not disclose the 1875 deed. When the corporation defaulted on the loan, Canova Land and Investment Company acquired title to the property at a foreclosure sell but did not take possession of the property. Canova later brought suit to quiet title to the property, arguing that a reverter clause in the 1875 deed, providing that if the property was not used for purposes expressed in the deed it should revert to the grantors or their heirs, should be voided as an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, upholding the 1875 deed as valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the reverter was a restraint on use and not unreasonable. View "Canova Land & Investment Co. v. Lynn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that the cluster development plans submitted by two developers were not subject to planning commission review under Va. Code 15.2-2232, holding that the circuit court erred.Two real estate developers proposed to build conventional subdivisions and then reconfigured their previously approved subdivisions into cluster developments. The county planning department advised the developers that they would need to undergo another comprehensive plan compliance review in accordance with section 15.2-2232 because their new plans significantly deviated from the previously approved plans. The developers sought writs of mandamus requiring the county to approve the plans and writs of prohibition preventing the county from ordering a comprehensive plan review. The circuit court ruled in favor of the developers and entered an order directing the county to approver the cluster development concept plans. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the approvals of prior subdivision plans did not foreclose the requirement of a section 15.2-2232 review by the planning commission of different plans later submitted. View "Stafford County v. D.R. Horton, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiffs' three separate complaints against the County of Northampton (the County) and the Town of Cape Charles (the Town) with prejudice, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding one of Plaintiffs' witnesses as an expert.In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that their real property had been overvalued in recent tax assessments. The County and Town each filed a motion in limine and motion to dismiss arguing that Plaintiffs' two experts should be excluded because Plaintiffs had not complied with the court's uniform pretrial scheduling order. The court granted the motion to exclude both witnesses as experts and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding one of Plaintiffs' intended expert witnesses from testifying at trial. View "Galloway v. County of Northampton" on Justia Law

In this appeal brought by the landowner in a condemnation proceeding the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in all respects, holding that the circuit court did not err.After a trial, the circuit court entered a final order confirming the award entered by the Commissioner of Highways of $107,131 for the take and setting aside the award for damages to the residue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit ten-year-old site plans into evidence; and (2) did not err in deciding to strike the testimony of the owner of the property concerning damage to the residue of the property. As to Appellant's remaining assignment of error, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of invited error foreclosed relief on the claim that the trial court "put the parties on terms." View "Palmyra Associates, LLC v. Commissioner of Highways" on Justia Law

In this inverse condemnation action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendants' demurrers and dismissing the case, holding that the circuit court properly granted the demurrers.Plaintiffs, who leased oyster grounds from the Commonwealth for the purpose of raising oysters in the Nansemond River, filed an inverse condemnation claim against the City of Suffolk and the Hampton Roads Sanitation District alleging that discharge from a sewer system operated by Defendants polluted the river's waters, thereby preventing Plaintiffs from properly managing their oyster ground leases. The circuit court granted Defendants' demurrers and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the limited nature of the property interest conferred by a lease of state-owned bottomlands for the purpose of raising oysters forecloses recovery in an inverse condemnation action; and (2) prior takings cases involving different property interests did not control the Court's disposition of Plaintiffs' takings claim here. View "Johnson v. City of Suffolk" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Defendant's demurrer to Plaintiffs' suit, holding that "fair market value" on a specified date, without more specificity, was not a sufficiently certain price term to allow a court to compel specific performance of a contract regarding the purchase of real estate.The decedent executed a will wherein she devised property to Plaintiffs, her three daughters. In the same will, the decedent granted her son, Defendant, an option to purchase the property from his sisters. The decedent then executed a codicil to her will revising the purchase price for the option to "an amount equal to the fair market value at the time of my death." In their complaint, Plaintiffs sought specific performance of a contract for the purchase of real estate. The circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that there was no enforceable contract because the will and codicil did not determine the purchase price and did not provide a method of determining the purchase price. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term "fair market value," as set forth in the codicil, did not provide a price for the property, nor did it provide a mode for ascertaining the price with sufficient certainty. View "Wilburn v. Mangano" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that an insurer's payments on a fire insurance policy were not immune from garnishment as "proceeds of the sale or disposition" of property held in trust under former Va. Code 55.20.2(C) and that the contractual right under the insurance policy to receive fire loss payments was not intangible personal property held by the named insured and his wife as a tenancy by the entirety.Terry and Cathy Phillips owned their residence as tenants by the entirety until they retitled the property in the names of separate, revocable trusts as tenants in common. The residence was later damaged by fire. The residence was covered by an insurance policy issued by Chubb & Son, Inc. that named Terry Phillips as the policyholder. Andrea Jones sought satisfaction of a civil judgment she had obtained against Terry by filing this action to garnish insurance payments from Chubb arising out of the fire damage owned by the reciprocal trusts. The Phillipses sought to quash the garnishment, arguing that the insurance payments were immune from garnishment under section 55.1-136(C). The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in holding that section 55.1-136(C) immunized the insurance payments from garnishment. View "Jones v. Phillips" on Justia Law

In this interpleader action seeking a judicial resolution of two disputed claims of ownership of proceeds from the sale of unclaimed corporate stock the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that the buyer of the original stock, not the seller, had a super equitable claim of ownership, holding that the circuit court did not err.MCC Acquisition, LC purchased all of the assets of M.C. Construction, which included Trigon Blue Cross Blue Shield stock. M.C. Construction never delivered the stock certificates, however, because it had never possessed them. Later, the Treasurer sold the stock and filed this interpleader action. The circuit court awarded the proceeds from the sale of the unclaimed corporate stock to MCC Acquisition, finding that MCC Acquisition had obtained equitable title to the Trigon stock. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly awarded the interpleader stock proceeds to MCC Acquisition; and (2) did not err in rejecting the argument that the statute of limitations barred MCC Acquisition's in rem claim. View "Day v. MCC Acquisition, LC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees from the unrepresented parties in her partition suit under Va. Code 8.01-92 and denying Plaintiff's requests to share the costs for bringing the action and for an award of the rental value of the subject property from the parties who occupied it, holding that the trial court did not err.Plaintiff and her four siblings inherited real property from their mother. Plaintiff later brought suit to partition the property and requested that the trial court compel its sale and divide the proceeds according to the parties' respective rights and interests after subtracting the expenses of Plaintiff's suit. Two siblings appeared at trial pro se. The trial court ordered that the property be sold and the proceeds be split equally among all five siblings and denied Plaintiff's request for fair rental value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in refusing to award Plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees out of the shares of the unrepresented siblings in the proceeds of the sale of the property; (2) did not err in failing to divide the costs of the partition suit equally among the siblings; and (3) did not err in failing to award fair rental value. View "Berry v. Fitzhugh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from a decision of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) holding that short-term rentals were not authorized by Fairfax County zoning ordinances, holding that this case was moot.The Ratcliffs owned a home in Fairfax County that they made available as a short-term rental. After the decisions of the BZA and circuit court, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County filed a petition for appeal with the Supreme Court. The Ratcliffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot because they had sold the home. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot because there was no live controversy. The Court then ordered that the circuit court's judgment be vacated, holding that vacatur of the lower court judgment was appropriate. View "Fairfax Board of Supervisors v. Ratcliff" on Justia Law