Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment dismissing Bragg Hill Corporation's claims against the City of Fredericksburg, holding that the rezoning of property by a city ordinance upon annexation of the property by the city was not void ab initio and did not violate the procedural due process rights of Bragg Hill, the property owner.In the early 1970s the Spotsylvania Planning Commission approved a master plan submitted by Bragg Hill. Bragg Hill built several sections of a townhouse project on the property. The City of Fredericksburg later annexed Bragg Hill's property. The annexed property was zoned into the City's R-1 zoning classification, which did not permit the development of townhouses. Bragg Hill unsuccessfully requested a determination that it had a vested right to develop the property zoned R-1 according to the master plan. The property was later rezoned to an R-2 zoning classification. Bragg Hill then brought this action against the City. The circuit court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the change in the zoning of the property upon annexation was authorized; (2) the issue of whether Bragg Hill had a vested right was previously decided; and (3) Bragg Hill was not deprived of any property interest as a result of the rezoning, and its procedural due process rights were not violated. View "Bragg Hill Corp. v. City of Fredericksburg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court dismissing trespass and nuisance claims as time-barred and construing the provisions of express easements, holding that the circuit court erred in granting Defendants' plea in bar as to Plaintiff's trespass and nuisance claims based on the statute of limitations and erred in construing some provisions of express easements.Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, her neighbors, alleging that Defendants installed an underground sprinkler system that caused damaging encroachments of water to her property and that Defendants violated her rights under two express easements. The circuit court held that the trespass and nuisance claims were barred by the five-year statute limitations and construed the easements, entering an order in accordance with its rulings. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court erroneously granted Defendants' plea in bar on the basis of improper factual findings; (2) the circuit court erred by construing some terms in the express easements but did not err by construing others; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff's petition for a rule to show cause. View "Robinson v. Nordquist" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court upholding Augusta County's tax assessments against McKee Foods Corporation for the years 2011 through 2014 and remanded the matter for a new trial, holding that the assessments were not entitled to a presumption of validity.McKee filed an application for relief from erroneous assessment for real property taxes, alleging that the assessments were above the property's fair market value, were not uniform in application, and were otherwise invalid or illegal. After a trial, the circuit court upheld the assessments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the appraiser did not properly use any of the three generally accepted approaches to valuation the Supreme Court erred in applying the presumption of validity to his 2011 assessment; (2) the 2012 and 2013 assessments were based on the same improper methodology and were not entitled to the presumption of correctness; and (3) the 2014 assessment was not entitled to a presumption of validity because it was based on a single approach to the determination of market value. View "McKee Foods Corp. v. County of Augusta" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in refusing to declare a party a subsurety to a loan obligation, concluding that a purchase option contract was enforceable, and declining to explain the meaning of its final order upon request of a party, holding that the circuit court did not err.On appeal, Appellant argued that the circuit court erred in refusing to declare her a subsurety and that the circuit court failed to cite authority or make findings of fact to support its decision regarding the enforceability of the option. Appellant also argued that the circuit court erred in refusing to clarify in its final orders that it was not ruling on Appellant's potential future contribution claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare Appellant a subsurety; (2) was within its discretion to award specific performance of the terms of the option; and (3) did not err in declining to clarify its final orders regarding its effect on a future contribution claim. View "Callison v. Glick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal challenging a just compensation award, holding that the notice of appeal was not timely filed.In this condemnation proceeding, Appellant appealed from an order distributing funds held by the circuit court. The Town of Culpeper filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding (1) an order confirming the jury's award of just compensation is a final order for purposes of appeal in a condemnation proceeding; and (2) Appellant's notice of appeal was untimely under Rule 5:9(a). View "Dwyer v. Town of Culpeper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court in sustaining the demurrer filed by ALG Trustee, LLC and dismissing Appellant’s second complaint with prejudice, holding that Appellant’s allegations were sufficient to survive a demurrer.Appellant alleged in this complaint that ALG Trustee had breached its fiduciary duty as trustee under a deed of trust. Ultimately, the trial court sustained the demurrer filed by ALG Trustee. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in mischaracterizing Appellant’s claim as a common law negligence claim because Appellant’s claim sounded in contract, not tort; and (2) the trial court erred in concluding that ALG Trustees had no duties beyond those set forth in the deed of trust. View "Crosby v. ALG Trustee, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, reinstated the determination of the Fairfax County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), and entered final judgment for the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, holding that the circuit court erred when it held that Va. Code 15.2-2307(D) creates a vested right to an originally illegal use of a building or structure after the owner has paid taxes to the locality for that building or structure for fifteen years or more.Defendants owned real property located in McLean, Virginia. The Fairfax County Zoning Administrator issued a notice of violation (NOV) to Defendants regarding the property because a detached garage and garden house locate on the property had been converted to dwelling, resulting in three complete and separate dwellings on the property. Defendants appealed the NOV to the BZA, arguing that the garage and garden house were grandfathered. The BZA concluded that Defendants were in violation of the relevant ordinance. The circuit court reversed, holding that the nonconforming structures were protected under section 15.2-2307(D)(iii). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in holding that 15.2-2307(D) protected Defendants’ illegal use of their garden house and garage. View "Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Cohn" on Justia Law

At issue in this boundary dispute was whether a property line ran to the center of a road where the deed described the property as being bounded by that road and included the property’s square footage, as well as a reference to the subdivision plat.Landowner owned Parcel E, which was located in a property owners’ association (Association). The dispute concerned whether Landowner owned the portion of Hibiscus Drive, a road forming the northeast boundary of Parcel E, between the road’s edge and its center. The circuit court that Parcel E extended only to the edge of Hibiscus Drive and entered judgment for the Association. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because nothing in the deed expressed a contrary intent, Parcel E ran to the center of Hibiscus Drive by operation of the rule of construction. View "Ettinger v. Oyster Bay II Community Property Owners’ Ass’n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err when it found that an automobile graveyard was a lawful nonconforming use because the use began prior to the enactment of the county’s zoning ordinances and had not been discontinued.The Acting Zoning Administrator of Price William County determined that the use of one parcel as an automobile graveyard was not a lawful nonconforming use. The Prince William County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) upheld the Administrator’s denial of the non-conforming use verification for the parcel. The circuit court reversed the BZA’s decision, finding that the use of the parcel as an automobile salvage business operation predated the zoning ordinances of Prince William County and that the pre-existing lawful nonconforming use was never abandoned or discontinued. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lawful nonconforming use of the parcel as an automobile graveyard was not terminated by discontinuance of the use. View "Prince William Board of County Supervisors v. Archie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated in part and reversed in part the decision of the circuit court reducing the amount due on a deed of trust note (note) and entering a confessed judgment for the reduced amount without the agreement of Catjen, LLC.Hunter Mill West, L.C. (HMW) executed the note payable to the predecessor in interest to Catjen. HMW failed to repay the note in full by the date of maturity and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Catjen’s predecessor filed a claim for the amount it asserted was due on the note. The bankruptcy court sustained HMW’s objections to the claims and accepted HMW’s calculations. Catjen subsequently foreclosed on the property that was used as collateral for the note. The attorney in fact then confessed judgment against HMW in favor of Catjen. Citing Va. Code 8.01-433, HMW moved to set aside the confessed judgment. The trial court modified the confessed judgment, awarding Catjen the amount based on HMW’s calculations despite Catjen not agreeing to the amount due. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the confessed judgment and reversed the trial court’s judgment on the amount due, holding that the trial court erred by failing to place this case on the docket for a trial on the merits. View "Catjen, LLC v. Hunter Mill West, L.C." on Justia Law