Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s final judgment against a Lessee and its guarantor in this action brought by the Lessor seeking unpaid rent under a fifteen-year lease after the Lessee vacated the leasehold prior to the expiration of the fifteen-year term.After this action was filed, the Lessee demurred, arguing that the lease was unenforceable under the Statute of Conveyances because it did not contain a seal as required by the common law for a deed or one of the substitutes for a seal available under Va. Code 11-3. The trial court overruled the demurrer and entered judgment against the Lessee. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment in favor of the Lessee and its guarantor, holding that the fifteen-year lease was unenforceable as a matter of law because the lease violated the Statute of Conveyances and the common-law seal requirement. View "The Game Place, LLC v. Fredericksburg 35, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the final judgment of the trial court in this eminent domain case granting $167,866 in damages to the landowner, holding that the trial court erred in disallowing the expert witness for the Commissioner of Highways from testifying.The Commissioner initiated this condemnation proceeding to acquire a strip of commercial property to create a multi-use trial. At trial to determine just compensation, the trial court allowed the landowner’s expert witness to testify that the take caused $193,270 in damages to the remainder but disallowed the Commissioner’s expert witness from testifying that the take caused $0 in damages to the remainder. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for retrial, holding that the trial court erred by excluding the Commissioner’s expert witness testimony. View "Commissioner of Highways v. Karverly, Inc." on Justia Law

In this dispute over contractual provision in a real estate purchase agreement (agreement) allocating future development rights for properties located near a new Metro rail station, the circuit court did not err in dismissing RECP IV WG Land Investors LLC’s (WG Land) suit against Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. (Capital One).WG Land, an assignee of certain rights of the seller under the agreement, sued Capital One, the assignee of the purchaser, alleging that Capital One breached the agreement and certain related covenants by developing the property acquired under the agreement without conveying a portion of floor area ratio rights to WG Land. The circuit court ultimately all three counts in the complaint and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to Capital One. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in sustaining Capital One’s demurrer as to Count I, sustaining Capital One’s plea in bar and granting its motion for summary judgment as to Counts II and III, and awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Capital One. View "RECP IV WG Land Investors LLC v. Capital One Bank" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining the Tax Department’s decision to rescind $4.9 million in land preservation tax credits it had previously awarded to the Woolford family on the grounds that the Woolfords’ appraiser was not a “qualified appraiser.” Specifically, the circuit court found that the Woolfords’ appraiser lacked the necessary education and experience, as required by applicable federal law incorporated by Va. Code 58.1-512(B), to offer a qualified appraisal. The Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the case, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that the Woolfords’ appraiser was not a “qualified appraiser”; and (2) the Department was not constrained from auditing the value of the tax credits claimed by the Woolfords after initially awarding them those tax credits. View "Woolford v. Virginia Department of Taxation" on Justia Law

The circuit court erred in relying on principles of res judicata to refuse to stay an injunction brought by the City of Staunton’s Zoning Administrator against the landowner in this case pending further proceedings before the City’s Board of Zoning Appeals and erred in granting the injunction against the landowner. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court as to the stay and the injunctive relief sought, holding (1) the doctrine of res judicata that the circuit court relied on was not a proper basis to deny the stay based on prior administrative or circuit court proceedings; and (2) as a result, the final order granting an injunction, when the landowner had not been given the opportunity to exhaust her administrative remedies, was in error. View "Chilton-Belloni v. Angle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court sustaining a demurrer filed by the Commissioner of Highways in his capacity as chief executive officer of the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) in this action filed by Plaintiff seeking to compel the Commissioner to reconvey property pursuant to Va. Code 33.2-1005(A). The VDOT acquired the property in 1994 in advance of a transportation project. A 1993 appraisal valued the land at $286,110. In 2014, Plaintiff informed the VDOT that he was exercising the right under section 33.2-1005(A) to require VDOT to reconvey the land “for its original purchase price” of $286,110, as the transportation project had not commenced within twenty years. The circuit court concluded that it did not have the authority to insert a purchase price of $286,110 based on the appraisal where the wording of the general assembly was “original purchase price.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an appraisal valuation is not synonymous with “original purchase price” as used in section 33.2-1005(A). View "Kalergis v. Virginia Commissioner of Highways" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court approving modifications to an easement by necessity crossing Joanna Palmer’s property. The circuit court approved the modifications after finding that they were reasonably necessary for the beneficial use of property owned by R. A. Yancey Lumber Corporation (Yancey). On appeal, Palmer argued that the circuit court erroneously granted Yancey the right to modify its easement by necessity because the modifications will unlawfully increase the width of an established easement by necessity. Alternatively, Palmer argued that the court erred by granting Yancey the right to modify the easement in order to use tractor-trailers extending over a road because this will unreasonably increase the burden on the Palmer property. The Supreme Court held (1) under the “reasonable necessity rule,” the width of an existing easement by necessity may be expanded without the consent of the servient landowner, but modifications to such easements must not create unreasonable burdens on the servient estate; and (2) the circuit court’s grant to Yancey the right to make modifications to widen its easement by necessity for use by tractor-trailers was neither plainly wrong, nor without evidence to support it. View "Palmer v. R. A. Yancey Lumber Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in denying Seller specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property after finding that Seller failed to establish that he held marketable title. The Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Seller’s motion in limine and admitting a substitute trustee’s deed, which rebutted Seller’s evidence that any dispute over ownership of the property had been resolved; (2) the circuit court did not err by granting Buyer’s motion to strike the evidence; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Buyer attorney’s fees. View "Denton v. Browntown Valley Associates" on Justia Law

The Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (ACP) sought permission to enter Hazel Palmer’s property to conduct preliminary surveys in order to build a natural gas transmission line. When Palmer withheld her consent, ACP provided a notice of intent to enter her property pursuant to Va. Code 56-49.01. Palmer continued to deny permission, and ACP filed a petition for a declaratory judgment requesting a declaration of its rights under section 56-49.01. Palmer filed a plea in bar and a demurrer, arguing that section 56-49.01 applies only to domestic public service companies and is unconstitutional under Va. Const. art. I, 11 because it impermissibly burdens a fundamental right. The circuit court overruled Palmer’s plea in bar and demurrer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 56-49.01 establishes the General Assembly’s intent that the entry-for-survey privilege be available to foreign natural gas companies that do business within the Commonwealth; and (2) Palmer’s fundamental property rights do not include the right to exclude ACP in this case. View "Palmer v. Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC" on Justia Law

The Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (ACP) sent Landowners letters seeking permission to enter their properties to conduct preliminary surveys and studies in order to build a natural gas transmission line. When Landowners withheld their permission, ACP provided notices of intent to enter their properties pursuant to Va. Code 56-49.01. ACP then filed petitions for declaratory judgment against Landowners seeking an order declaring that the notices of intent to enter provided ACP with a right to enter Landowners’ properties. The circuit court issued a final order concluding that ACP was entitled to enter landowners’ properties pursuant to section 56-49.01. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that ACP’s notices were deficient because they did not “set forth the date of the intended entry” as required by section 56-49.01(C). View "Chaffins v. Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC" on Justia Law