Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A Suffolk developer set aside an Equestrian Center Parcel (ECP) for lease to a riding school and stable, with the stable to pay real estate taxes owed on the ECP. The lease expressly anticipated that ownership of the ECP would later be conveyed to a property owners’ association, which was subsequently organized. Although the stable could sell services to non-members, the lease required preferential treatment for Association members. The Association’s declaration included the ECP as Association’s property but noted that it was leased. The city began assessing real estate tax on the ECP in 2009. In 2012, the city exonerated the Association of liability for tax years ending in 2009, 2010, and 2011. The city again assessed tax on the ECP for tax years ending in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. No one paid the assessments. The city published notice that the ECP would be sold for non-payment of taxes. The Association sought a declaratory judgment that the ECP could not be directly assessed because, under Code 58.1-3284.1(A), any tax due was payable only by the Association’s individual members. The court ruled that the stable was a commercial enterprise and that the statute did not intend “open or common space” to include real estate used for commercial enterprises open to nonmembers of an owners’ association. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed; nothing in the statutory definition excludes commercial property. Association members who did not board horses at the Stable used its picnic tables, trails, and parking area. View "Saddlebrook Estates v. City of Suffolk" on Justia Law

The City filed a petition for condemnation asking for a determination of just compensation for property taken and damages to the residue. The circuit court awarded Dominion SecurityPlus Self Storage, LLC $44,141 for the value of the fee take and more than $2.1 million for the damages to the residue, including loss of visibility and loss of direct access. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court awarding Dominion damages to the residue and entered final judgment in favor of the City on that claim, holding that Dominion failed to present any evidence by which any of over $2.1 in damages that the circuit court awarded could be apportioned to the City’s take of a utility easement and a temporary construction easement outside the area of reservation. View "City of Chesapeake v. Dominion SecurityPlus Self Storage, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a successor in title to property interests retained by grantors in two severance deeds executed in 1886 and 1887, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the term “minerals” used in the deeds did not effect a conveyance of the natural gas and coal bed methane underlying her land. The circuit court sustained demurrers to Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints, holding that the term “minerals” included the gas as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed after reaffirming the holding in Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., holding that the two severance deeds at issue in this case conveyed the gas as a matter of law. View "Dye v. CNX Gas Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a compliant against Defendants in order to enforce a mechanics lien. Wells Fargo was named in the complaint because it was the trustee and secured party of certain property. Wells Fargo filed a motion for leave to file answer out of time and requested its fees and costs incurred with regard to the motion. The trial court granted Wells Fargo’s motion and ordered Plaintiff’s counsel to reimburse Wells Fargo’s counsel $1200 for fees and costs incurred regarding the motion for leave to file answer out of time. The trial court also granted Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against Defendants. In its final order, the trial court stated that the mechanics lien had been released and that it had issued the $1200 sanctions award against Plaintiff’s counsel for its failure to voluntarily extend the time in which Wells Fargo might file its answer. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding sanctions, as Plaintiff’s counsel did not engage in behavior that could be characterized as unprofessional, an ethics violation or behavior that is subject to statutory sanctions. View "Env’t Specialist, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

In 2013, Plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action against their homeowners’ association (the HOA) challenging the validity of a 2008 amendment to the declaration of protective covenants and restrictions. The HOA filed a special plea in bar, arguing that the case should be dismissed as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations in Va. Code 55-515.1(E). The circuit court granted the special plea in bar and granted “prevailing party” attorney fees to the HOA. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the HOA filed a certification that did not comply with Va. Code 55-515.1(F), thus precluding the 2008 amendment from becoming effective for purposes of triggering the one-year limitations period in section 55-515.1(E). The Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiffs and reversed, holding (1) the one-year limitations period runs only from the date of an “effective” amendment; and (2) one of the requirements for an “effective” amendment - a proper certification - was not satisfied in this case, and therefore, circuit court erred in granting the HOA’s special plea in bar and dismissing the case as untimely. View "Tvardek v. Powhatan Village Homeowners Ass’n" on Justia Law

Wetlands America Trust, Inc. (WAT) held a conservation easement on property owned by White Cloud Nine Ventures, LP. When White Cloud commenced construction activities on the property, WAT filed the present action seeking a declaratory judgment that White Cloud’s construction activities and intended commercial use of a new facility on the property violated the easement’s restrictive covenants. White Cloud denied violating the easement and asserted as affirmative defenses that the easement was unenforceable because it was impermissibly vague and ambiguous and that WAT’s claims were barred by estoppel and laches. The trial court generally ruled in White Cloud’s favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the restrictive covenants in the easement are ambiguous and must be strictly construed against restriction and in favor of White Cloud. View "Wetlands America Trust v. White Cloud Nine" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendants owned adjacent properties. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging timber theft, trespass, and property damage and seeking an injunction, alleging that Defendants removed timber from her property without her permission. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarded attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff was entitled to recover any directly associated legal costs that she incurred as a result of the trespass but was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees; and (2) the trial court did not err in allowing Plaintiff’s claim for timber trespass to go to the jury. View "Chacey v. Garvey" on Justia Law

Mitchell Kambis owns John Rolfe Realty and Elegant Homes of Virginia (collectively, the Kambis parties). Kambis and April Considine formed and were the sole members of Villa Deste, LLC. Patricia Wolfe, Considine’s mother, later loaned money to Villa Deste for the purchase and development of real estate and the construction of a home that Considine and Kambis later occupied. Kambis eventually transferred his interest in Villa Deste and its assets to Considine for value received. Later, the Kambis parties filed a second and third amended complaint alleging several claims agains Considine, Villa Deste, and Wolfe (collectively, the Considine parties). After a complex procedural history, the Kambis parties eventually nonsuited their claims against the Considine parties. The trial court also granted the Considine parties’ motion for sanctions, ordering Kambis to pay $84,541 in sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s award of sanctions, holding that the award of sanctions was properly based on the reasons enumerated in Va. Code 8.01-271.1. View "Kambis v. Considine" on Justia Law