Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This was an appeal from the City of Austin's condemnation of property to build a parking garage for a nearby convention center and a facility to chill water to cool nearby buildings. A jury found the City's determination that the property was necessary for public use was fraudulent, in bad faith, and arbitrary and capricious, and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict, invalidating the taking. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City's determination that the property was necessary for public use was not fraudulent, in bad faith, or arbitrary and capricious. Remanded. View "City of Austin v. Whittington" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from litigation between a homeowner, its insurer, and the company hired to restore the home after a series of storms caused damage to the home. A jury found in the restoration company's favor and the trial court rendered judgment against the homeowner and its insurer, jointly and severally. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment with respect to the homeowner's state Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. & Com Code 17.50, claim because the homeowner was not a prevailing party and he was not a entitled to an order restoring all amounts paid under the contracts without deducting the value received under those agreements. The court also affirmed the restoration company's charge error complaint. The court reversed the court of appeals' judgment as to the insurer where the insurer received direct consideration for its promise to pay for the dehumidification and the court of appeals erred in concluding otherwise. The court remanded for that court to consider the insurer's remaining arguments, which included challenges to the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury findings.

This was an appeal from a judgment awarding tenant damages for a landlord's breach of a construction-related duty under a build-to-suit lease agreement. The tenant sued asserting that the landlord's failure to adhere to construction plans resulted in a substandard building, diminishing the value of its leasehold. On appeal, the court agreed with the landlord that the cost of repair was the appropriate measure under the circumstances of the case. Because under the appropriate measure, there was no evidence that the tenant had been damaged, the court reversed.

Pursuant to article V, section 3-c of the Texas Constitution and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 58.1, the court accepted the petition from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to answer three certified questions. The central issue in this case was one of first impression: whether private beachfront properties on Galveston Island's West Beach were impressed with a right of public use under Texas law without proof of an easement. The court concluded that land patents from the Republic of Texas in 1840, affirmed by legislation in the New State of Texas a few years later, conveyed the State's title in West Galveston Island to private parties and reserved no ownership interests or rights to public use in Galveston's West Beach. Texas law had not otherwise recognized such an inherent limitation on property rights along the West Beach. Accordingly, there were no inherent limitations on title or continuous rights in the public since time immemorial that served as a basis for engrafting public easements for use of private West Beach property. Although existing public easements in the dry beach of Galveston's West Beach were dynamic, these easements did not spring or roll landward to encumber other parts of the parcel or new parcels as a result of avulsive events. New public easements on the adjoining private properties could be established if proven pursuant to the Open Beaches Act, Tex. Nat. Res. Code 61.001(8) or the common law.

Respondent appealed the URSB's determination that her property was an urban nuisance and that the property should be demolished. The trial court affirmed the USRB's finding that respondent's home was an urban nuisance and awarded the city attorneys fees. The trial court then severed respondent's constitutional claims and tried them to a jury. At the close of trial, the City moved unsuccessfully for a directed verdict on the grounds that the Board's nuisance determination was res judicata, precluding respondent's takings claim. The jury rejected the City's contention that respondent's home was a public nuisance and awarded her for the destruction of her house. The trial court denied the City's post-verdict motions and signed a judgment in conformance with the verdict. The court of appeals affirmed but held that the USRB's nuisance finding could not be preclusive because of the brief delay between the nuisance finding and the house's demolition. The City subsequently petitioned the court for review, arguing that the lower courts erred in failing to give the URSB's nuisance determination preclusive effect in respondent's taking claim. The court held that the determination was not preclusive because substantial evidence review of nuisance determination resulting in a home's demolition did not sufficiently protect a person's rights under Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution.

A property owner appealed an administrative determination that his property was a nuisance and he also asserted a takings claim. The property owner then nonsuited the case. He later filed this suit, again alleging that the government illegally took his property. Because the property owner was collaterally estopped from doing so, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

This case involved a property dispute between the parties over easements and right-of-ways on plaintiffs' property. Defendant contended that the tort claims against it were barred by the two-year statute of limitations and that the declaratory judgment against it was unwarranted. The court held that plaintiffs' common-law tort claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations and the estoppel effect of the alleged fraudulent concealment ended in December 2002. Because plaintiffs did not file suit until more than two years after this date, their claims were time-barred. The court agreed that claims for declaratory judgment were moot because defendant had removed its cable lines from plaintiffs' properties prior to trial. Accordingly, the court granted defendant's petition for review and reversed the court of appeals' judgment.

This case involved two related oil and gas mineral lease disputes that were jointly tried. At issue was whether limitations barred the Marshalls' (respondents and lessors) fraud claim against BP America Production Co., et al. (the lessee and operator), and whether Vaquillas Ranch Co., Ltd., et al. (lessors) lost title by adverse possession after Wagner Oil Co. (successors-in-interest) succeeded to BP's interests, took over the operations, and produced and paid Vaquillas royalties for nearly twenty years. The court held that because the Marshalls' injury was not inherently undiscoverable and BP's fraudulent representations about its good faith efforts to develop the well could have been discovered with reasonable diligence before limitations expired, neither the discovery rule nor fraudulent concealment extended limitations. Accordingly, the Marshalls' fraud claims against BP were time-barred. The court further held that by paying a clearly labeled royalty to Vaquillas, Wagner sufficiently asserted its intent to oust Vaquillas to acquire the lease by adverse possession.

Respondent appealed the Dallas Urban Rehabilitation Standards Board's decision that her house was a nuisance and order of demolition, alleging a due process claim and a claim for an unconstitutional taking. The trial court, on substantial evidence review, affirmed the Board's findings. The court of appeals affirmed but held that the Board's nuisance finding could not be preclusive because of the brief delay between the nuisance finding and the house's demolition. The city petitioned the court for review, arguing that the lower courts erred in failing to give the Board's nuisance determination preclusive effect in respondent's taking claim. The court held that a system that permitted constitutional issues of this importance to be decided by an administrative board, whose decisions were essentially conclusive, did not correctly balance the need to abate nuisances against the rights accorded to property owners under the Texas Constitution. Accordingly, independent court review was a necessity and affirmed the court of appeals but on different grounds.

The City of Dallas seized vehicles, which it alleged were stolen, from a company that was entitled to petition for their return. Instead of pursuing its statutory remedy, the company sued, alleging that its interest in those vehicles had been taken without just compensation. The court held that because the company had actual knowledge of the vehicles seizure the company knew the cars were seized from its lots, and it knew who seized them, it was required to pursue a chapter 47 proceeding. Accordingly, the court held that the availability of the statutory remedy precluded a takings claims and reversed the court of appeals judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the suit.