Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Several environmental groups challenged decisions made by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) regarding the legality of thirty-nine oil and gas leases in Southern Utah, owned by Kirkwood Oil and Gas, LLC and William C. Kirkwood. In the 1980s, Kirkwood applied to have its oil and gas leases converted to combined hydrocarbon leases, which would allow Kirkwood to extract oil from tar sands. At the time, BLM never accepted or rejected Kirkwood's applications. Between 2006 and 2008, BLM and IBLA issued several decisions declaring that the underlying oil and gas leases were "suspended" pending review of the conversion applications. The groups alleged that the BLM and IBLA violated the Mineral Leasing Act and other federal laws by retroactively deeming the leases to be suspended, avoiding expiration of the leases according to their terms. The district court held the groups did not have standing to bring its claims and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although the district court misapplied the law in important respects with regard to standing, the Tenth Circuit ultimately held that this case was not ripe for review. View "S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Palma" on Justia Law

This case concerned the construction of a new Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) rail/truck terminal outside Kansas City, Kansas. Because the preferred site contained streams and wetlands protected under federal law, several groups (collectively, "Hillsdale") brought challenges to a dredge and fill permit issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) under the Clean Water Act. The district court denied Hillsdale's motion for an injunction and granted summary judgment for the Corps and BNSF. On appeal, Hillsdale requested that the Tenth Circuit set aside the Corps's decision to grant the permit because the Corps inadequately considered alternatives to the selected site under the Clean Water Act and violated the National Environmental Policy Act by preparing an inadequate environmental assessment and failing to prepare a full environmental impact statement. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the Corps's decision was supported by the record, and was not an arbitrary and capricious exercise of its approval powers under federal law. View "Hillside Environmental Loss, et al v. United States Army Corps, et al" on Justia Law

The dispute before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on interest earned on block grants made to Indian tribes pursuant to the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act. Specifically, Appellant Muscogee (Creek) Nation's Division of Housing challenged both a regulation placing a two-year limit on the investment of grant funds and two notices issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development stating that any interest accrued after the expiration of this two-year period must be returned to the Department. The Nation sought declaratory relief invalidating the regulation and notices as well as an injunction to prevent HUD from recouping interest earned on grant funds. The Nation also sought recoupment of the approximately $1.3 million of earned interest it wired to HUD after HUD sent a letter threatening an enforcement action based on the Nation’s investment of grant funds for longer than two years. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that HUD’s sovereign immunity was not waived by the Administrative Procedures Act and, in the alternative, that the Nation had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted because HUD’s interpretation of the statute was permissible. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that HUD was authorized to promulgate a regulation limiting the period for investments, and required to demand remittance of interest earned in violation of the regulation. The Nation was therefore not entitled to recouping the interest it paid to HUD pursuant to HUD's enforcement of its rules. View "Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. HUD, et al" on Justia Law

In consolidated interlocutory appeals, Defendants-Appellants, natural gas producers with wells in south central Kansas, challenged a preliminary injunction enjoining them from further gas production from those wells. The district court entered the preliminary injunction after concluding there was a substantial likelihood that Plaintiff-Appellee Northern Natural Gas Co. would prevail on its state-law claim alleging that Defendants' natural gas production from these wells was an actionable nuisance because it was disrupting Northern's nearby underground storage of natural gas. The parties agreed that, to prevail on its nuisance claim, Northern needed to establish four things: 1) Defendants acted with the intent to interfere with Northern's use and enjoyment of the storage field; 2) there was some interference with the use and enjoyment of the Field of the kind Defendants intended; 3) that interference was substantial; and 4) the interference was of a such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the Field. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there was a substantial likelihood that Northern could prove all four of those elements of its nuisance claim. View "Northern Natural Gas Company v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a trespass action for damages to their land caused by Defendant's seismic exploration activities. Plaintiffs originally filed their action in Oklahoma state court, but Defendant removed it to federal district court based on diversity of citizenship. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had permission to enter the property and conduct seismic testing from owners of the mineral rights and/or oil and gas leasehold rights, which lie under the surface estate of Plaintiffs' properties. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment for Defendant. Defendant then sought an award of attorney's fees pursuant to title 12, section 940(A) of the Oklahoma Code. The district court awarded Defendant $71,560 in attorney's fees as the prevailing party. Plaintiffs appealed both the summary judgment and the award of attorney's fees. Upon review, and "in the face of […] clear Oklahoma precedent," the Tenth Circuit concluded there was no merit to Plaintiffs' challenge to the grant of summary judgment, or their argument that section 940(A) did not apply to the facts of the case. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in arriving at the final amount of the fees. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Kimzey, et al v. Flamingo Seismic" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case are owners of "chat" restricted by virtue of plaintiffs' membership in the Quapaw Tribe. They alleged that Bingham Sand and Gravel Company, Inc., owner of unrestricted chat, had been removing tailings from one of two piles of co-mingled chat without compensating the restricted owners. Under plaintiffs’ theory of the case, federal law prohibits the sale or removal of any chat from commingled piles without the approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”). Despite numerous informal requests that the BIA halt chat removal by Bingham and the Estate of Joseph Mountford (another owner of unrestricted chat), the agency has not done so. Seeking to stop chat removal and obtain an accounting for the chat that has already been removed, plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Interior and several BIA officials. The district court dismissed these claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Although it assumed that plaintiffs could plead a common law accounting claim outside the ambit of the APA, the court nonetheless required exhaustion as a matter of judicial discretion. As to the private defendants, plaintiffs asserted claims for conversion and an accounting. Following dismissal of the federal defendants, the district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over these claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies; the Court reversed the district court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the conversion and accounting claims. View "Gilmore, et al v. Weatherford, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Jimmie Allison’s causes of action arose from conduct on Kirtland Air Force Base, a federal enclave established in 1954. Because Allison’s state law claims were based on legal theories created by common law after that date, they are barred unless federal statutory law allows them to go forward. Because no federal statute authorized state employment and tort claims of the sort underlying this case to be asserted against federal contractors, Plaintiff's suit was barred by the federal enclave doctrine. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing Plaintiff's case. View "Allison v. Boeing Laser Technical Service" on Justia Law

The Plaintiffs-Appellants in this case challenged the Federal Highway Administration's selection of a route for the proposed South Lawrence Trafficway project in the city of Lawrence, Kansas. Appellants claimed two aspects of the Highway Administration's decision rendered it arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Appellants claimed the environmental impact statement supporting the decision violated the National Environmental Policy Act and Department of Transportation noise analysis regulations. Furthermore, Appellants claimed the Highway Administration's analysis under the section of the Department of Transportation Act that protects historic sites, including property associated with Haskell Indian Nations University, improperly concluded there was no "feasible and prudent alternative" to the selected route. Finding "no fatal flaws" in the environmental impact statement or the prudence analysis, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Center ran a residential treatment facility in St. George, Utah for young people with mental and emotional disorders. It wanted to expand its operations with a "step-down" program hereby participants would live in a separate facility with more responsibility and autonomy that other students in preparation for reentry to society. Cinnamon Hills applied to the City for a zoning variance to use the top floor of a hotel it owned for the program, the City denied its request. Cinnamon Hills subsequently sued the City for discrimination against the disabled. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, and Cinnamon Hills appealed. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit found that Cinnamon Hills could not prove by the evidence on record, instances of discrimination as it alleged. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision in dismissing Cinnamon Hills' claims.

Plaintiff-Appellant Bruce McDonald took out a loan (Note) secured by a deed of trust on Colorado real property in favor of the lender, IndyMac Bank. Plaintiff made payments on the loan from its 2003 inception until April 2009, including while IndyMac was operated in receivership by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The FDIC sold IndyMac to a holding company that operated it as Defendant-Appellee OneWest, F.S.B. and OneWest, as the new loan servicer, notified Plaintiff of the sale. Plaintiff stopped making payments because OneWest "did not provide [him] with the instrument or reasonable evidence of authority to make such a presentment" in accordance with his demands for the original Note. Ultimately, OneWest foreclosed on the property and obtained a Rule 120 Order authorizing the sale of the property, after it produced the original Note, the deed of trust, and a pooling and servicing agreement governing the Note. The property was sold in 2010. OneWest purchased it, later assigning its interest in the property to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp (FHLMC). Plaintiff filed suit in state district court claiming that OneWest was not entitled to payment on the Note and the order of sale was void. FHLMC filed a forcible entry and detainer action against Plaintiff seeking to evict him; Plaintiff obtained a stay pending resolution of his state court action. Plaintiff then amended his state-court complaint to join FHLMC and include a quiet title action; neither defendant answered and the state district court granted a default judgment quieting title in Plaintiff. Onewest appealed the default judgment. While the appeal was pending, Plaintiff filed this federal action against OneWest Bank on civil RICO, pattern of racketeering activities, violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, fraud, and violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. The federal district court noted that it probably lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine given that Plaintiff was attempting to litigate the same claims that the Rule 120 court had rejected. The court ultimately dismissed the action on the basis of Plaintiff's failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed. Upon review of the case, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff's counsel admitted that the issue of the validity of the Note was presented at state court, but was not covered by the notice of appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Furthermore, Plaintiff's Rule 60 motion was not filed until nearly six months after the notice of appeal was filed, and no new notice of appeal was entered on this issue. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit was unable to consider these claims in this appeal, and affirmed the judgment of dismissal.